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Advancement in technology over the years has led to improvement in the performance 
of modern reconfigurable computing devices, making them more attractive in high-end 
application domains like aerospace, defence, military, and nuclear power stations; 
thanks to technology giants like Microsoft, Amazon, and Baidu, which are now 
embracing these devices to meet their critical computing needs. Because of the critical 
nature of these application domains, these devices and the computations on them are 
required to be highly reliable. As such, algorithms and frameworks developed for 
application on these devices must be implemented with sufficient considerations for 
reliability.  
Meanwhile, the capabilities of these modern reconfigurable devices as computing 
platforms can be better exploited by providing supporting frameworks to manage the 
on-chip resources. Existing approaches in this regard have provided key headways but 
they are limited in reliability, security, and efficiency, especially regarding the flexible 
use of the on-chip resources for computation. 
This work proposes the enabling frameworks for more reliable, secure, and 
efficient computing on modern reconfigurable devices. For evaluation, a case study that 
uses a NASA Jet Propulsion Laboratory’s spectrometer data processing application is 
employed to demonstrate the improved reliability possible. It is observed that up to 74% 
time saving can be achieved for reliability by error mitigation when compared to state-
of-the-art vendor implementations. Moreover, an improvement in overall system 
reliability is observed when the proposed frameworks are deployed in the data 
processing application. In addition, for the secure configuration of a device, a time 
saving of up to 32% or 83% is achieved, depending on the device family; and on-chip 





The sheer hardware-based computational performance and programming flexibility 
offered by reconfigurable hardware like Field-Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) 
make them attractive for computing in applications that require high performance, 
availability, reliability, real-time processing, and high efficiency. Fueled by fabrication 
process scaling, modern reconfigurable devices come with ever greater quantities of 
on-chip resources, allowing a more complex variety of applications to be developed. 
Thus, the trend is that technology giants like Microsoft, Amazon, and Baidu now 
embrace reconfigurable computing devices likes FPGAs to meet their critical 
computing needs. In addition, the capability to autonomously reprogramme these 
devices in the field is being exploited for reliability in application domains like 
aerospace, defence, military, and nuclear power stations. In such applications, real-time 
computing is important and is often a necessity for reliability. As such, applications and 
algorithms resident on these devices must be implemented with sufficient 
considerations for real-time processing and reliability.  
Often, to manage a reconfigurable hardware device as a computing platform for a 
multiplicity of homogenous and heterogeneous tasks, reconfigurable operating systems 
(ROSes) have been proposed to give a software look to hardware-based computation. 
The key requirements of a ROS include partitioning, task scheduling and allocation, 
task configuration or loading, and inter-task communication and synchronization. 
Existing ROSes have met these requirements to varied extents. However, they are 
limited in reliability, especially regarding the flexibility of placing the hardware circuits 
of tasks on device’s chip area, the problem arising more from the partitioning 
approaches used. Indeed, this problem is deeply rooted in the static nature of the on-
chip inter-communication among tasks, hampering the flexibility of runtime task 
relocation for reliability. 
This thesis proposes the enabling frameworks for reliable, available, real-time, 
efficient, secure, and high-performance reconfigurable computing by providing 
techniques and mechanisms for reliable runtime reconfiguration, and dynamic inter-
 vii 
circuit communication and synchronization for circuits on reconfigurable hardware. 
This work provides task configuration infrastructures for reliable reconfigurable 
computing. Key features, especially reliability-enabling functionalities, which have 
been given little or no attention in state-of-the-art are implemented. These features 
include internal register read and write for device diagnosis; configuration operation 
abort mechanism, and tightly integrated selective-area scanning, which aims to 
optimize access to the device’s reconfiguration port for both task loading and error 
mitigation.  
In addition, this thesis proposes a novel reliability-aware inter-task communication 
framework that exploits the availability of dedicated clocking infrastructures in a 
typical FPGA to provide inter-task communication and synchronization. The clock 
buffers and networks of an FPGA use dedicated routing resources, which are distinct 
from the general routing resources. As such, deploying these dedicated resources for 
communication sidesteps the restriction of static routes and allows a better relocation 
of circuits for reliability purposes. 
For evaluation, a case study that uses a NASA/JPL spectrometer data processing 
application is employed to demonstrate the improved reliability brought about by the 
implemented configuration controller and the reliability-aware dynamic 
communication infrastructure. It is observed that up to 74% time saving can be achieved 
for selective-area error mitigation when compared to state-of-the-art vendor 
implementations. Moreover, an improvement in overall system reliability is observed 
when the proposed dynamic communication scheme is deployed in the data processing 
application. 
Finally, one area of reconfigurable computing that has received insufficient 
attention is security. Meanwhile, considering the nature of applications which now turn 
to reconfigurable computing for accelerating compute-intensive processes, a high 
premium is now placed on security, not only of the device but also of the applications, 
from loading to runtime execution. To address security concerns, a novel secure and 
efficient task configuration technique for task relocation is also investigated, providing 
configuration time savings of up to 32% or 83%, depending on the device; and resource 
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
There is a surge in the uptake of reconfigurable hardware like Field-Programmable 
Gate Arrays (FPGAs) as computing devices, with this idea being referred to as 
Reconfigurable Computing (RC).  Application domains ranging from datacentres [1] to 
aerospace now turn to RC to meet their high-performance computing needs. The 
increase in the density and on-chip resources [2] of modern FPGAs has made them even 
a more capable platform for computation. FPGAs are now deployed to execute 
important tasks in space applications (for example, satellites), aircraft, and datacentres 
[3][4]. Considering the high-end nature of these applications, there is a need for 
reliability, security, and ultimately, abstraction tools to ease the development of FPGA-
based applications.  In fact, the most important limiting factors in the adoption of 
FPGAs as computing platforms are the difficulty in designing applications offline, and 
managing their execution in run time.  The design of applications requires expert 
knowledge in Hardware Description Languages (HDLs). Moreover, HDL code 
development, testing, and debugging on available synthesis and simulation tools are far 
from being trivial. 
Over the past few decades, computing has been heavily software-based, with high-
level software routines written in C and other languages executing on traditional 
processors.  However, the sequential fetch-decode-execute nature of the von Neumann 
architecture, coupled with memory access bottleneck, limits the performance of 
processors [5]. Fuelled by transistor scaling (Moore’s Law) [6][7], over the years, 
processor speed has increased significantly, but memory chips have not been able to 
keep up, with processors forced to spend most of their time idling on wait cycles for 
memory access. Several techniques like caching, branch prediction, and pipelining [8] 
have been advanced to alleviate this bottleneck. Even with multiple processor cores 
fabricated on a single chip to parallelize computation and thus improve throughput, the 
inherent sequential nature of CPUs means that only a limited increase in throughput 
can be obtained. 
1 
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Despite the obvious limitations of processors and the advantages of hardware, a 
wholesale change in computing paradigm from software-based to hardware-based 
seems far-fetched, considering that mainstream computing facilities currently depend 
heavily on conventional processors. Moreover, processors excel in certain classes of 
application that hardware computation struggles with, for example, control algorithms; 
and are superior at context switching, able to switch program execution in a matter of 
a few clock cycles [9]. On the other hand, what is observed is that the use of 
reconfigurable hardware to accelerate compute-intensive and mission-critical tasks is 
gaining traction.  This presents a unique opportunity to explore the immense capability 
offered by reconfigurable hardware, especially from the point of view of high-level 
application development. 
Over the years, specialized hardware like Application-Specific Integrated Circuits 
(ASICs) have been used to speed up computation, with the Graphic Processing Unit 
(GPU) being a good example.  While ASICs offer advantages such as very low power 
consumption and cost effectiveness when mass produced, the lack of flexibility means 
they have limited application.  On the other hand, though FPGAs are more suitable for 
low to medium scale production, the provision of programmability means they can be 
adapted for use in a wide range of applications.  Moreover, modern FPGAs have 
rivalled ASICs in terms of power consumption [10]. 
1.1 Motivation and Justification 
The closest programming languages to the bare-metal processor are machine codes and 
assembly language but programming a processor in any of these is tedious, time-
consuming, and error-prone [11]. This has compelled the development of high-level 
languages, which require compilers to convert the high-level code to machine-readable 
instructions for execution on the processor.  As a result, the description of the hardware 
underlying CPUs has not been of a great concern to software developers. 
Moreover, since the 1950s when the first compilers appeared [12][13], they have 
evolved into efficient code converters, bridging the gap between high-level application 
development and the low-level intricacies of machine instructions.  In fact, current 
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compilers are able to produce compact and speed-efficient codes that rival assembly 
and machine codes, further widening the gap between high-level application 
development and low-level hardware intricacies, and making it easier to develop 
software applications. As such, the number of software developers and software 
applications has increased drastically over the years. 
However, while the FPGA presents an opportunity for higher performance 
compared to CPUs, these software developers are denied access to this immense 
capability; therefore, slowing down the adoption of FPGAs as general or accelerated 
computing platforms. If FPGAs are to become serious contenders as computing 
platforms, a similar mechanism to compilers, with supporting architectural frameworks 
must be provided for high-level hardware application development. 
Meanwhile, the idea that software developers should adopt HDLs and code directly 
for hardware is a good proposition. However, this is not a simple solution. Though, in 
general, HDLs are used to describe the high-level behaviour of circuits at different 
levels of abstraction – gate-level, register-transfer level (RTL), structural, and 
behavioural, the coding concepts are quite different from software coding.  HDLs have 
statements and constructs that are similar to those in high-level languages for software 
development, yet they are used to describe intrinsically concurrent behaviours of 
hardware circuits. This is often a source of confusion to software developers embracing 
hardware code development. The tendency to think sequentially when dealing with 
concurrent logic is a major pitfall.  Moreover, there are often standard or recommended 
ways of describing most circuits, and if not followed, this could result in slow, bloated, 
and power-hungry designs, defeating the purpose of using HDLs in the first place.  This 
means an understanding of the low-level hardware is still required, especially for 
efficient coding. 
Therefore, the ability to develop an application in a high-level language like C and 
have it automatically compiled to behavioural, structural, or RTL-level HDL codes is 
an attractive proposition.  This is called High-Level Synthesis (HLS).  In fact, several 
commercial products [14] in this regard have already been developed with the Xilinx’s 
Vivado HLS [15] being a typical example.  This is in the foreground of a substantial 
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body of academic research [16][17] advancing the underlying techniques and 
algorithms. 
Despite their promise, HLS compilers have limitations [18] as it is in general 
challenging to produce resource-efficient and power-efficient codes that could rival 
what an HDL designer would write. However, considering the precedential success of 
software compilers, given time, HLS compilers will catch up. 
Meanwhile, whereas the development of HLS compilers is a welcome 
advancement, there is still the need for an intermediate architectural model and 
hardware abstraction layer for computing on the FPGA. Modern FPGAs have immense 
capabilities that can be better exploited by an intermediate-level abstraction between 
the output of an HLS engine or a directly coded design and the low-level resources of 
the FPGA. 
While the HLS is a move to address the difficulties of FPGA-based application 
development, the management of the deployment and runtime execution of applications 
is still largely unresolved. For instance, Vivado HLS enforces a standard interface for 
the generated RTL design. However, if the design is meant to be part of a hierarchical 
design, a separate structural-level HDL coding would still be required to integrate the 
generated code into an overall design before deployment on an FPGA.  Accomplishing 
this would still present a fairly complicated task to the uninitiated in the art of HDL, 
further highlighting the need for a task management framework that could 
automatically abstract task interfacing and inter-task communication, among others.  
The reconfigurable hardware fabric is usually under the management of a host CPU 
for accelerating software processes. With the increased density of modern FPGAs, 
many more tasks are required to be running simultaneously and often requiring chip 
area allocation, circuit loading, and so on. In order to free up the host CPU and its 
resident software operating system from managing these hardware-level functionalities, 
the Reconfigurable Operating System (ROS) has been proposed with early examples 
including [19] and [20]. The “reconfigurable” terminology derives from the fact that 
the function of the ROS is to manage the intricacies arising from the reconfigurability 
of the underlying hardware fabric. Runtime task management needs to be addresses as 
in fact, a major barrier to the adoption of partial runtime reconfiguration in industrial 
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applications seems to be the lack of tools and methodologies for runtime task 
management [21]. 
The key requirements or services needed in RC have been categorized as task 
loading, partitioning or floor planning, memory management, scheduling, placement, 
security, I/O, on-chip communication, and synchronization [22]–[24]. The provision of 
these services has been generally investigated, both within the context of a ROS and as 
standalone research efforts. However, without a holistic approach to ROS design that 
considers multiple but individual design objectives such as reliability, availability, real-
time processing, efficiency, high performance, and security in the provision of the RC 
services, the FPGA could fail to realize its potential as a veritable computing device 
even while these requirements. It is clear that the afore-mentioned RC services need to 
meet high standards, the importance of which cannot be overemphasized. It would be 
interesting therefore, to consider why the need to meet high levels of RC requirements 
is paramount in current high-end applications. 
1.1.1 Reliability is Important 
Electronic devices deployed for operation in critical application domains like space, 
aviation, military, nuclear decommissioning, and nuclear waste management are 
exposed to extremes of environmental conditions like radiations, temperatures, 
electromagnetic interferences, and electric fields. These extreme conditions can trigger 
system-crippling temporary errors and permanent damages in on-board electronics. 
Reliability is all the more important when human lives are involved, as the failure of 
electronic devices can result in catastrophic system failures which could lead to 
disasters with great losses in human lives or economy. Scenarios in the past showed 
that space missions could go catastrophically disastrous due to the failure of electronic 
systems [25]. As such, a high premium is placed on device reliability in critical 
application domains like space and FPGAs targeted at such applications should be able 
to meet expected levels of reliability. As a further example, radiation-induced errors are 
taken seriously in space missions as was seen in the Europa Orbiter mission that was 
replaced with the Europa Clipper Mission for concerns of radiation [26]. With the 
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increasing use of FPGAs in space applications as evidenced in [27], the tolerance of 
FPGAs and the designs on them to radiations is important. 
Ageing-related errors are also a source of concern especially in space missions, 
which can last for very long times as seen in the Voyager I and Voyager II space probes 
which, launched in 1977, have been travelling in space for over 40 years [28]. In 
contrast, electronics’ lifetime has been reduced due to the use of state-of-the-art 
technologies that push manufacturing processes to the limits. Voyager is a good 
example of what was possible to achieve using the old and more robust technology, 
which is extremely constrained in terms of computation power. To achieve something 
similar using state-of-the-art high-performance COTS technologies, new techniques are 
needed. 
While wireless communication anywhere within the vicinity of earth has appeared 
almost instantaneous, exploration of deep space has highlighted the limited speed of 
our wireless communication technology and for now, it does not appear that much can 
be done in the way of changing that, except if a means of communication other than 
electromagnetic waves is discovered. Due to the astronomically high distances between 
cosmic bodies, communication signals take considerable amounts of time to traverse 
the large expanse of space.  As a result, an electronic device deployed in a system ready 
to explore deep space, for instance, should ideally be able make its own decisions as 
errors emerge. This calls for a high degree of autonomy and adaptation in such devices.  
Meanwhile, because of their inherent high performance capability, FPGAs now 
find use in critical applications.  As a result, reliability techniques that will ensure the 
autonomous and continuous operation of FPGA-based computing platforms in the face 
of emergent errors are highly sought after. There are at least two existing solutions to 
the reliability problem – the use of redundancy at the device level [29], and the use of 
specialized radiation-hardened (rad-hard) devices [30]. The disadvantage of the former 
is that it increases cost and weight, whereas the rad-hard devices are generally very 
expensive [31], often many orders of magnitude more expensive than their COTS 
equivalents are. Moreover, redundancy at the hardware level can be limited in 
improving reliability [32] and also have counterproductive effects by adding 
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complexity and potential failure modes to the system, increasing design opacity, 
encouraging risk, and discouraging further optimization of individual devices [33]. 
As such, it is important to consider reliability at the system component level. This 
work will not only present infrastructures and frameworks for achieving a better overall 
system reliability, it will also underscore a fault-tolerant implementation of these 
infrastructures, where applicable. 
1.1.2 Availability in High-End Applications 
Another factor closely related to reliability is availability. The availability of a system 
is defined in terms of its ability to perform the intended function when required; that is, 
the amount of time it is in a functional state. On the other hand, reliability measures 
how well the system has kept to producing the expected output within a given time 
period. While higher reliability leads to higher availability, the converse is not true. As 
such, the availability of an FPGA-based system has to be considered as a separate 
entity, with proper design considerations put in place. 
With the proliferation of cloud computing in recent years, it was only a matter of 
time before FPGAs would be available for computation in the cloud. One hallmark of 
datacentre and cloud computing is availability [34][35], with other requirements like 
reliability, and security [36]. For an FPGA in the cloud, these requirements must be 
met. Downtimes have to be kept to a minimum to maintain a high quality of service 
since one of the major concerns of organizations with cloud services is assurance of 
availability or lack of it [34]. 
Dynamic or runtime programmability will be required to keep an FPGA-based 
system online while making changes. Incidentally, modern FPGAs come equipped with 
reconfiguration capabilities that allow a part of the device to be reconfigured while the 
other parts remain active [37]. These capabilities can be exploited to ensure that FPGAs 
operating in the cloud and other computing environments provide the expected high 
levels of availability. This necessitates that proper attention is paid to module-level 
events that could hamper system-wide availability. This is part of the focus of this work 
as will be exemplified by the monitoring of errors during task reconfiguration (see 
Section 4.4). 
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1.1.3 The Need for Real-Time Computing 
Real-time and reliable computing often go hand-in-hand. Because of the stringent 
requirements of reliable systems, they are often required to be predictable and to meet 
specified timing requirements since delayed execution of critical tasks can be 
catastrophic [38]. To ensure these requirements are met, FPGA computing models have 
to be such that task execution deadlines are met. If access to shared resources is not 
well managed, this could result in missed execution deadlines, a situation that is 
particularly undesirable in real-time systems. In particular, the internal configuration 
interface of current FPGAs is singular and is required for multiple system-level 
functionalities like hardware task configuration and error mitigation. In order to ensure 
execution deadlines are met, every system function including their overheads must have 
predictable behaviour and bounded timing. 
In this research, real-time factors are put into consideration where necessary and 
applicable. For instance, the on-chip communication scheme proposed is implemented 
to ensure guaranteed latencies. In addition, a mechanism is provided for a more efficient 
management of the internal configuration interface for multiple complimenting system 
functions. 
1.1.4 The Importance of Security 
The adoption and support of FPGAs by technology giants like Microsoft, Amazon, and 
Baidu represents a step change in the prospect of deploying FPGAs as computing 
devices. Recently, Microsoft started using FPGAs in their Bing search engine servers 
with almost two-fold improvement in search ranking throughput at only 10% increase 
in power consumption  [3][39]. In addition, Amazon has introduced cloud-based pay-
per-use FPGA instances and an IP market place, providing ready access to a platform 
for accelerated cloud computing [4]. Baidu, on the other hand, uses FPGAs to accelerate 
large-scale deep neural networks and online services at low power cost [40][41]. These 
developments have served to increase interests in FPGAs and the value of IP cores that 
run on them. IP core vendors pay heavily in monetary terms and development time to 
design these IP cores. As a result, the protection of this investment is of paramount 
importance. However, malicious attacks have aimed to exploit the security 
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vulnerabilities of FPGAs to steal these IPs or cause undesirable effects. Meanwhile, as 
reported in [24], the issue of security has been given very little attention in 
reconfigurable computing.  As such, another subject in this work is the investigation of 
efficient techniques for secure task reconfiguration. 
1.2 Thesis Scope and Objectives 
The scope of this thesis is represented diagrammatically in Figure 1.1. The broad 
objective is to deliver the enabling frameworks for reliable, available, real-time, 
efficient, secure, and high-performance reconfigurable computing by providing 
techniques, methods, and mechanisms for runtime reconfiguration, and dynamic inter-











Figure 1.1: Diagrammatic representation of the scope of this thesis 
The aim is for the concepts advanced in this work to serve as the bedrock for a 
computing paradigm where a COTS reconfigurable hardware like an FPGA is used as 
a standalone or co-processing heterogeneous computing platform for reliable dynamic 
task management, as opposed to using very expensive rad-hard devices. As Figure 1.1 
shows, reliability is a feature theme and all the other features are implemented in the 
light of this. In particular, the specific aims of this research include: 
_______________________________________________________ Chapter 1 - Introduction 
 10 
 The development of a high-performance and efficient configuration engine 
for reliability and high availability in reconfigurable systems, 
 The investigation of reconfiguration mechanisms for secure bitstreams, and 
 The development of a dynamic network-on-chip infrastructure for intrinsic 
reliability-aware inter-task communication and synchronization. 
While the specific applications of the novel methods described in this thesis have 
been implemented and prototyped on FPGAs, the ideas and concepts are generic 
enough for application in other reconfigurable hardware and even in custom computing 
devices. 
1.3 Contribution to Knowledge 
The contributions of this research stem from the innovative approaches applied in the 
realization of the specific aims of this work.  While the deliverables of this work are 
targeted at reconfigurable computing, applications in closely related fields would be 
anticipated.  The major contributions of this work are: 
 A novel configuration mechanism for efficient runtime task loading, 
configuration memory readback, circuit and data relocation, and 
configuration error monitoring 
 An efficient method for soft error mitigation that explores a criticality-aware 
selective-area scanning of the chip for soft error detection and correction 
 A new and unique on-chip inter-circuit communication and synchronization 
technique with intrinsic support for circuit relocation, which promises to be 
an enabler for an improved system-level reliability in COTS reconfigurable 
hardware devices 
 A highly efficient mechanism for relocating circuits with encrypted 
configuration bitstreams without the need for on-chip decryption of the 
bitstream, ensuring that the security of IPs is not compromised nor maintained 
at a high cost of on-chip resources and system time 
 A unique relocation-aware configuration bitstream format for resource- and 
time-efficient secure circuit relocation 
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 A unique software interface for relocation-aware configuration bitstream 
formatting and encryption key reassignment 
1.4 Target Device and Development Environment 
The target FPGA family in this research is the Xilinx 7 series and all the HDL code 
implementations are evaluated on a 7 series device, unless stated otherwise. Moreover, 
when necessary, the Zynq-7000 FPGA, which contains an Arm® Cortex™-A9 
processor tightly connected with a 7 series FPGA is used for implementations. 
Nevertheless, the techniques developed in this work can be easily extended to other 
FPGA families, including the ones from other vendors.  The Vivado Design Suite is 
used for all synthesis and implementation. 
1.5 Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 reviews the techniques for the reconfiguration of hardware devices with 
particular attention to dynamic reconfiguration, which is the enabler for fine- and 
coarse-grained access to on-chip resources in runtime. Moreover, since FPGAs are 
becoming increasingly used as computing platforms, the security implications of this 
are great. Chapter 2 provides an insight into the provision made by vendors to ensure 
the security and integrity of reconfigurable devices and the applications that run on 
them. 
In Chapter 3, the concept of reconfigurable computing is introduced. Attention is 
drawn to the reliability concerns in reconfigurable hardware and existing mitigation 
approaches discussed. A key concept to look out for is partial bitstream relocation, 
which is important for reliability. A discussion of its requirements is presented as well 
as the existing body of work which has provided techniques for meeting these 
requirements. A foray is taken into the issues of configuration and communication in 
RC systems and existing approaches are examined. As real-time processing is closely 
related to reliability, real-time system requirements are studied and the implications of 
these on configuration and communication are brought to light. 
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A configuration controller with a unique set of reliability-enabling features is 
crucial for RC. In Chapter 4, the design and implementation of a high-performance 
configuration memory access controller are presented. Key RC-supporting 
functionalities for enabling a reliable ROS are advanced. These include task 
configuration and relocation to circumvent permanent damages, configuration memory 
readback, internal register readback for device diagnosis, and configuration monitoring 
and abort mechanisms for device availability improvement. Partial bitstream relocation 
capability is implemented intrinsically by treating every configuration operation as a 
relocation request In addition, an error mitigation functionality that allows selective-
chip-area scanning and thus saves on time, is put forward. 
To the best of the author’s knowledge, the concept of relocating encrypted partial 
bitstreams has not been met with a unifying approach. Methods already exist that can 
be used but this can at best be seen as an amalgamation of several distinct methods, 
resulting in bloated time and resource utilization. Chapter 5 proposes a novel method 
for achieving this with virtually no time and resource overhead when compared to 
existing methods. In order to achieve this, a new and unique bitstream format is 
proposed for encrypted partial bitstreams and a corresponding configuration controller 
implemented to load a bitstream so formatted. The algorithm is further implemented in 
a Windows-Form-based application to provide an easy-to-use graphical user interface. 
A key requirement for partial bitstream relocation is the provision of dynamic 
communication framework as circuits are relocated in runtime. An on-chip 
communication mechanism with intrinsic relocation support will therefore provide a 
step change in the reliability of reconfigurable systems. A move is taken in this direction 
in Chapter 6 by proposing a communication framework that is amenable to circuit 
relocation. The clock buffers and nets of the FPGA are adapted for communication. 
Being a new concept that has never before been investigated (as far as the author is 
aware), salient technical considerations and characterizations are presented. The 
chapter starts with an introduction to clocking resources in a typical FPGA and 
highlights the features exploited for communication. Different configurations of clock 
buffers to enable a variety of network topologies are also investigated. A demonstration 
of bitstream relocation that derives communication support from clock buffers is as 
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well presented. The chapter concludes with the implementations for a fault-tolerant data 
transfer via the clock buffers. 
In Chapter 7, the frameworks proposed in this work are evaluated with a practical 
application. A case study is drawn from the NASA/JPL spectrometer application. The 
data processing circuits of this spectrometer are used as hardware tasks and the 
performance of the methods in this work are compared with those of existing 
approaches. 
This thesis concludes with a retrospective look at the aims and objectives of this 
work. In particular, it discusses how these have been met in the light of the methods 
and techniques advanced in this work. Limitations and the possible route to addressing 
them are also furnished, especially in relation to the limitations of the target device and 
improvements offered by the latest devices from vendors. In addition, future directions 
for the work are presented. Specifically, this mostly involves how all the contributions 
in Chapter 4 through Chapter 6 tie together and enables a complete high-performance 
and reliable RC system. 
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Chapter 2  
Reconfiguration, 
Security, and Integrity in 
FPGAs 
The design on an FPGA is mapped by a Configuration Memory (CMEM), which holds 
information about the functional state of all the resources on the chip, including 
routings. Depending on the type of memory technology used for the CMEM, an FPGA 
can be categorized as SRAM (Static Random Access Memory), flash, or antifuse; with 
the majority of FPGAs in the market being SRAM-based, including the ones from 
Xilinx, which is considered as the inventor of the FPGA [10] and holds the largest 
market share [42]. 
Since the SRAM memory is volatile, SRAM FPGAs need to be reprogrammed 
each time the device is power-cycled and an external non-volatile memory is used for 
the application program’s storage. Any digital design implemented on an FPGA uses 
the reconfigurable logic and memory resources provided by the FPGA, interconnected 
together by means of routing resources. When synthesizing the digital design, a 
bitstream is generated that contains the configuration information. In order to 
physically realize the digital design on the FPGA this bitstream or bit file is written to 
the CMEM. Ranging from serial to parallel, and external self-reconfiguration to internal 
partial reconfiguration, there are several means of loading or reconfiguring an FPGA. 
The configuration details, interfaces, modes, reconfiguration strategies of FPGA will 
be explored in Sections 2.1 and 2.2. 
The obvious disadvantage of SRAM FPGAs is the perceived greater vulnerability 
to attacks. Since the configuration bitstream is kept outside the device, the process of 
transferring it to the FPGA is exposed to the prying eyes of attackers. As a result, 
SRAM FPGAs are generally considered to be less secure when compared to flash and 
antifuse FPGAs, which are based on non-volatile memories. However, both flash and 
antifuse FPGAs have their security challenges as well. The in-system programming 
2 
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commonly employed in flash FPGAs exposes the FPGA to the same security 
vulnerabilities as SRAM FPGAs and system-level security concerns may have to be 
addressed in antifuse FPGAs since they are one-time programmable and the configured 
digital design cannot be erased [43]. 
In general, from the security standpoint, all the types of FPGAs have their strengths 
and weaknesses. However, SRAM FPGAs are ubiquitous because they are often a few 
process nodes ahead of other technologies [10], with associated benefits of higher 
performance, enhanced power efficiency, and greater logic density; including  being 
easy to manufacture, test, and update in the field [43]. 
In all, there are varieties of potential attacks on FPGAs and some countermeasures 
have been provided by FPGA manufacturers to protect the FPGA and maintain the 
integrity of the on-board digital circuits. Some of these will be brought to light in 
Section 2.3. 
2.1 FPGA Configuration Details 
FPGAs are generally composed of columns and rows of Configurable Logic Blocks 
(CLBs), Block Random Access Memories (BRAMs), Digital Signal Processors (DSPs), 
and interconnect resources (wires, connection boxes, and switch boxes). There are also 
clocking infrastructures, and a host of other primitives for functionalities like internal 
configuration and analogue-to-digital conversion. Inside a CLB are Flip-Flops (FFs), 
and Look-Up Tables (LUTs) for implementing various digital circuits. All these 
resources can be controlled by accessing an on-chip configuration memory from 
outside or inside the FPGA. 
2.1.1 Layers of an FPGA 
For the purpose of clarity, different layers will be identified on the FPGA. Since the 
CMEM holds information about the functional state of all the resources on the chip, 
including routings and clock networks, that means an FPGA can be pictured as having 
a configuration layer which determines the behaviour of the functional or application 
layer, where the circuit designs reside. The functional layer comprises the user 
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resources – logic and memory blocks. In addition, the FPGA has a dedicated clock 
network for clocking synchronous circuits and as such, a third layer, which can be 
considered as a subset of the functional layer can be identified as the clock layer (or 
clock routing layer). 
Figure 2.1 shows a pictorial relationship among all the layers – the functional layer 
for mapping designs on the FPGA’s fabric, with a sub-functional-layer for clocking, 
and the configuration layer for loading the designs into a configuration memory. The 
clock layer contains dedicated networks for routing clock signals to relevant resources 
and a number of clock conditioners and buffers for steering signals to these networks 
[44]. Programmable Interconnect Points (PIPs) are provided for both logic and clock 
routing. The logic routing PIPs are in the Connection Boxes (CBs) and Switch Boxes 
(SBs). The PIPs are largely CMOS pass transistors that are also mapped in the CMEM. 
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A. Functional Layer 
The FPGA is made up of a reconfigurable hardware fabric with multiplicity of 
logic elements. Figure 2.2 is the traditional model of an FPGA, showing inactivated 
routing resources that can be programmed to interconnect configurable logic resources 
and Input/Output Blocks (IOBs). The CBs are used to connect directly between the 
input and outputs of programmable resource blocks (CLBs, BRAMs, and DSPs) while 
the SBs are used to switch between vertical and horizontal connections, allowing a wide 
range of routing options [45]. In the diagram LMD represents logic, memory, or DSP 
resources. In the 7 series, each CLB comprises of 2 slices and in each slice there are 
eight flip-flops, four 6-input LUTs, one arithmetic and carry chain, with each LUT 
configurable as a 64-bit distributed RAM or 32-bit shift register logic [46]. 
 
Figure 2.2: Model of a typical FPGA showing the interconnection among on-chip resources 
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Circuit designs for the FPGA are crafted using the resource blocks and configured 
on the FPGA by writing a bitstream to the CMEM of the FPGA. Since the 7 series 
FPGAs (as with the other families) are SRAM-based and as such the CMEM is volatile, 
the bitstream is always required to be loaded each time the device is power-cycled. In 
certain instances, FPGAs also come equipped with processing elements or cores like 
CPUs and GPUs. These are referred to as hard cores since they are permanent structures 
on the chip and are distinct from the reconfigurable fabric. However, sometimes 
processing elements not provided in fixed silicon by the FPGA can be obtained by using 
the existing CLBs, BRAMs, and DSPs to implement needed functionalities, as is the 
case with Xilinx MicroBlaze soft processor. Such cores are referred to as soft cores and 
offer more flexibility compared to their hard counterparts, though generally at a reduced 
performance. 
B. Clock Routing Layer 
To drive the clock and reset inputs of synchronous circuits on the FPGA, clocking 
infrastructures are provided. In the latest FPGAs like the 7 series, the CLBs, BRAMs, 
and DSPs are arranged in a grid of columns and rows, with contiguous number of same-
height columns grouped into clock regions. While the size and number of clock regions 
varies among device families, each clock region is fed by a number of local clock 
buffers and nets. To cater for the diverse clocking need of the user design, there are also 
multi-region and global device-wide clock networks spanning different groupings of 
clock regions. A clock region marks the granularity of the clock network of the FPGA. 
It is important to note that these clock networks use dedicated physical interconnect 
resources that are independent of the local and general routing resources. As such, an 
FPGA can be considered as having a clock routing layer, which is in addition to the 
functional and configuration layers. Nonetheless, the clock networks and their 
associated infrastructures have bits in the CMEM for controlling them. 
In the 7 series, a clock region spans 50 vertical CLBs, 10 36-kb BRAMs, 20 18-kb 
BRAMs, or 20 DSPs and depending the device size, there can be up to 24 clock regions 
[44]. Figure 2.3 gives a representation of a typical 7 series FPGA with respect to the 
location of the clock buffers. 
























Figure 2.3: Clock buffer distribution in a 7 series FPGA 
C. Configuration Layer 
The configuration layer includes the CMEM, the configuration access ports and 
the internal control logic for loading circuits’ configuration data into the CMEM. The 
CMEM holds the functionality (including routing) of circuits mapped into the FPGA. 
Physically, the CMEM is tiled about the device in configuration frames that run from 
the top to the bottom of a clock region. In the 7 series FPGA, these frames contain 3,232 
bits (101 32-bit words) each [47], with each bit stored in an SRAM cell. The 
configuration frame is the smallest unit of configuration and all CMEM read or write 
operations are therefore required to access whole configuration frames. It is the smallest 
addressable segment of the FPGA’s CMEM space and depending on the amount and 
type of resources to be configured, a number of frames have to be written to the FPGA. 
The internal structure of the configuration frames resembles the physical 
arrangement of the FPGA resources in the clock region column (see Figure 2.4). The 
most significant bits in the frame are associated with the upper resources in the clock 
region, whereas the least significant frame bits configure resources in the bottom part 
of the clock region. Likewise, the configuration related to the dedicated regional clock 
wires that cross through the central part of clock regions are mapped to the middle 51st 
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word in the frame. The configuration information for a given FPGA resource spans 
along several consecutive frames, always occupying the same relative position within 
them. For instance, the configuration information for one single CLB is spread along 
36 frames. Similarly, 128 frames are required to configure a BRAM, and 28 frames for 
a DSP slice (see Table 2.1). The third row in Table 2.1 gives the number of words in 
each frame that configures a single resource block. These numbers can be obtained by 
studying the bitstreams generated for circuits with different combinations of resource 
blocks. 
Each configuration frame is protected with 13 Error Correction Code (ECC) bits 
that are also embedded in the 51st word. These ECC bits allow for detecting and 
correcting single bit errors and detecting but not correcting double bit errors (see 
Section 2.3.2). 
 
Figure 2.4: Internal composition of a frame and its mapping to resources 
Table 2.1: Number of configuration frames for 7 series FPGA resources 
Resource Block CLB DSP BRAM18 BRAM36 
Number of Frames/Column 36 28 128 128 
Number of Words/Block 2 5 5 10 
 
CLB-01 B18-01 B36-01 DSP-01
CLB-25 B18-10 B36-05 DSP-10
CLB-26 B18-11 B36-06 DSP-11
CLB-50 B18-20 B36-10 DSP-20
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The configuration frame data in the CMEM are addressed by a 32-bit address 
space. For accessing frame data, a frame address has to be written into the Frame 
Address Register (FAR). Since there are many frames to be configured for the resource 
blocks, the FAR register is usually loaded with the starting frame address. The internal 
configuration logic automatically increments the frame address as new frames are 
loaded. Table 2.2 (adapted from [47]) shows the fields of a frame address. Unique codes 
are used to identify different resource blocks. 
Table 2.2: Frame address fields and corresponding description 
Field Bit Index Description 
Block Type [25:23] 
Valid block types are CLB, I/O, CLK (000), block 
RAM content (001), and CFG_CLB (010) 
Top/Bottom Bit [22] 
Select between top-half rows (0) and bottom-half 
rows (1) 
Row Address [21:17] 
Selects the current row. The row addresses increment 
from centre to top and then reset and increment from 
centre to bottom 
Column Address [16:7] 
Selects a major column, such as a column of CLBs. 
Column addresses start at 0 on the left and increase 
to the right 
Minor Address [6:0] Selects a frame within a major column 
 
Table 2.3 shows selected registers of the 7 series FPGA. Some of these registers 
have read/write capabilities while others have only read or write access. Each register 
write takes two words – one for the command and the other for the register value, except 
for the FDRI register which receives a multiple of 101 words as frame data. From the 
standpoint of CMEM access, the most important are the FAR, CMD, FDRI, and FDRO 
registers. The CMD register is used to specify what type of operation the FPGA should 
perform. Table 2.4 presents the CMD register commands and codes. 
For every write to the FDRI register, the identity of the device must be specified 
by writing to the IDCODE register, and a pre-computed CRC checksum can be written 
to the CRC register at the end of data loading to verify the integrity of the bitstream 
loaded. To reset CRC check prior to the loading of data, the RCRC command is used. 
The FPGA also exposes registers for device setup, status, and other device-level 
functionalities, e.g., CTL0, STAT and COR0 registers. 
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CRC R/W 00000 CRC Register 
FAR R/W 00001 Frame Address Register 
FDRI W 00010 
Frame Data Register Input (for writing configuration 
data) 
FDRO R 00011 
Frame Data Register Output (for reading configuration 
data) 
CMD R/W 00100 Command Register 
CTL0 R/W 00101 Control Register 0 
MASK R/W 00110 Masking Register for CTL0 and CTL1 
STAT R 00111 Status Register 
COR0 R/W 01001 Configuration Option Register 0 
MFWR W 01010 Multiple Frame Write Register 
CBC W 01011 Initial CBC Value Register 
IDCODE R/W 01100 Device ID Register 
R = Read, W = Write 
Table 2.4: Selected CMD register commands and codes 
Command Code Description 
NULL 00000 Null command, does nothing 
WCFG 00001 
Writes Configuration Data: used prior to writing 
configuration data to the FDRI 
MFW 00010 
Multiple Frame Write: used to perform a write of a single 
frame data to multiple frame addresses 
RCFG 00100 
Reads Configuration Data: used prior to reading 
configuration data from the FDRO 
START 00101 
Begins the Startup Sequence: The startup sequence begins 
after a successful CRC check and a DESYNC command are 
performed. 
RCRC 00111 Resets CRC: Resets the CRC register 
DESYNC 01101 
Resets the DALIGN signal: Used at the end of configuration 
to desynchronize the device. After desynchronization, all 
values on the configuration data pins are ignored 
 
Two main operations can be performed on the CMEM – configuration (writing), 
and readback (reading). By writing to the CMD and FAR registers, and reading from 
the FDRI register, which holds the frame data read back from the CMEM, a readback 
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operation can be performed. Similarly, for a configuration operation, the CMD, FAR, 
and FDRO registers must be accessed. More details on the configuration details can be 
found in [47]. 
2.1.2 Bitstream Structure 
In order to configure the on-chip resources and control device-related options, the 
configuration registers of the FPGA are accessed using variable length command 
packets (see Table 2.5). The minimum size of a packet is 64 bits and the FPGA is 
equipped with an internal 64-bit packet buffer. From this point forward unless otherwise 
stated, a word is to be taken as 32-bit long. The first 32 bits of the packet are a Type 1 
header, which defines the type of register operation, the register address and the word 
count (number of words to read or write). If the word count is less than 2048, there is a 
second 32-bit header which redefines the register operation and specifies the word 
count. If a Type 2 header has to be used a Type 1 header must be specified first although 
with the Type 1 header word count set to zero. When writing a register, the packet 
includes a variable-length register data word, the length depending on the register being 
written. For instance, when writing the FDRI register, a multiple of 101 words must be 
provided. 
Table 2.5: Packet format for configuration command and data 




Type 2 header Register data words 






Used only if 
the word 
count is > 
2047 
This field is needed only when writing a 
register. When writing the FDRI register, 
a multiple of 101 words must be loaded 
 
The Type 1 packets can read or write up to 2047 words while the Type 2 packets 
can access larger blocks of up to (227 – 1) words [47]. Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 show the 
composition of the Type 1 and 2 packets respectively, with read and write operation 
codes indicated in Table 2.8. 
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Table 2.6: Type 1 packet header format for configuration commands 
Header Type  Opcode Register Address Reserved Word Count 
[31:29] [28:27] [26:13] [12:11] [10:0] 
001 xx RRRRRRRRRxxxxx RR xxxxxxxxxxx 
Table 2.7: Type 2 packet header format for configuration commands 
Header Type Opcode Word Count 
[31:29] [28:27] [26:0] 
010 xx xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx 
Table 2.8: Opcode format for configuration commands 
Function NOP Read Write Reserved 
Opcode 00 01 10 11 
 
By using the register addresses in Table 2.3 with the Types 1 and 2 packet headers, 
the configuration commands can be formed. Table 2.9 gives an example of the 
formation of the command packet to write the CMD register. This packet is followed 
immediately by a command code. For example, to write configuration data, one would 
write 0x30008001 followed by 0x00000001, which is the WCFG code (see Table 2.4) 
before loading the data. 
Table 2.9: Forming the packet header to write the CMD register 
Packet Field Write CMD Description 
Header Type [31:29] 0b001 Header type 1 
Opcode [28:27] 0b10 Write 
Register Address [26:13] 0b00000000000100 Register address “00100” 
Reserved [12:11] 0b00 Reserved bits, set to 0s 
Word Count [10:0] 0b00000000001 Write one word 
Packet [31:0] 0x30008001 Full packet in hexadecimal 
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A bitstream eventually, is composed of many packets concatenated into a single 
bit file and used to program the FPGA. In general, a bitstream can be divided into 
multiple sections of configuration commands and frame data. The configuration 
commands are the packets that set device options and control the configuration logic of 
the FPGA, including writing the FAR register. The frame data are the register data 
words written to the FDRI register in order to set the functional state of the resources 
on the FPGA including controlling general interconnect resources and clock networks. 
The frame data is what gets written to the CMEM. 
Figure 2.5 shows the general format of the Xilinx bitstream. The bitstream includes 
a preamble, a body, and a postamble. The preamble includes special words for 
synchronizing the configuration logic and header command words for setting up the 
FPGA. The body is the bulk of the bitstream as it contains FAR loading commands, 
FAR values (starting frame addresses for the different resource blocks used by the 
design), and frame data. The postamble contains commands for starting up the FPGA 
after frame data loading. It also contains the CRC checksum and the DESYNC 
command packet (0x300080010000000D) for desynchronizing the configuration 
interface. The bitstream concludes with a couple of no-operation words (0x20000000) 










Figure 2.5: Xilinx bitstream format 
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Xilinx provides Vivado Integrated Development Environment (IDE) [48] for 
simulating, debugging, synthesizing, and implementing designs for their FPGAs with 
various design flows, including the generation of bitstreams. The Hardware Manager, 
a feature in Vivado can be used be for externally programming FPGAs. 
2.1.3 Configuration Interfaces and Modes 
The Xilinx 7 series FPGA offers different means of (re)configuring the chip (see Table 
2.10, adapted from [47]), with varying configuration port interface modes, widths and 
bandwidths. It should be noted however, that only one of these interfaces can access 
the internal configuration logic at a time, with the Joint-Test Action Group (JTAG) 
interface having the highest priority. Some of the configuration interfaces are serial, 
some are parallel, while others offer a combination of both serial and parallel. The 
interfaces in master mode can drive the clock of the configuration logic from an 
internally-generated clock at a maximum frequency of 100 MHz [49], though the 
Vivado IDE allows a designer to specify only a maximum of 66 MHz when using the 
internal oscillator option (master interface) for configuration clock generation [50]. 
However, for higher speeds, the slave modes can be used with a configuration clock 
sourced externally.  
Table 2.10: Configuration interfaces and modes in the Xilinx 7 series FPGA 
Interface Mode Bus Width Clock Source 
Serial 
Master Serial x1 Internal 
Slave Serial x1 External 
SPI Master SPI x1, x2, x4 Internal 
BPI Master BPI x8, x16 Internal 
SelectMAP 
Master SelectMAP x8, x16 Internal 
Slave SelectMAP x8, x16, x32 External 
JTAG - x1 Not Applicable 
 
From the consideration of reconfigurable computing, it is necessary to have an 
internal configuration interface or mode that allows an FPGA-based system to be self-
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contained, without requiring an external processor when necessary. While the Serial 
Peripheral Interface (SPI) and Byte Peripheral Interface (BPI) allow the FPGA to 
reconfigure itself by reading the bitstream out of an SPI or BPI flash memory, this is 
only applicable to full configuration. Only the JTAG, Serial, and SelectMAP interfaces 
support partial reconfiguration, with the SelectMAP in addition providing an Internal 
Configuration Access Port (ICAP) that a user design can use to access the configuration 
memory from inside the FPGA; providing self-reconfiguration capability without the 
need of external pins. 
The ICAP (named ICAPE2 in the 7 series FPGA) primitive is in essence, an 
internal version of the SelectMAP interface and it grants the user design access to the 
configuration memory of the FPGA. The diagram in Figure 2.6 shows the ICAP 
interface in the 7 series FPGA. CSI_B is the active-low ICAP enable port while 
RDWR_B is the read/write select line. The main difference between the ICAP in the 7 
series and the earlier FPGA family (Virtex-6) is that for readback, there is no longer a 
BUSY port to monitor in order to know when readback data on the output port is valid. 
In the 7 series, readback validity is deterministic, with data valid 3 clock cycles after 
CSI_B is asserted. The maximum bandwidth of the ICAP is 400 MB/s at the 
recommended maximum operating frequency of 100 MHz. 
 
Figure 2.6: 7 series FPGA’s ICAP interface ports 
2.2 Reconfiguration Strategies in FPGAs 
In terms of the granularity of reconfiguration, FPGAs started out as monolithic 
reconfigurable devices where the entire device had to be taken offline to reprogramme 
it, significantly adding to downtime.  Since then, FPGAs have come a long way as per 
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the available means of (re)programming FPGAs, setting a context for the need for 
dynamic task reconfiguration in a ROS. 
2.2.1 Full Reconfiguration 
With a full reconfiguration, the entire FPGA is held in reset while the full bitstream is 
loaded into the device. This is the classic method of programming FPGAs, and one 
which is limiting in applications that require a high uptime, as it turns out that even for 
a small change to the design on the FPGA, the entire device has to be taken offline for 
full reconfiguration. To generate a bitstream for full reconfiguration, the steps in Figure 
2.7 are generally followed. 
RTL Level








Figure 2.7: Typical FPGA design flow, from synthesis to bitstream generation 
According to Figure 2.7, the design is coded up in an HDL language like VHDL 
or Verilog. This is at the RTL level, with behavioural or gate-level hardware 
descriptions. The synthesis process converts RTL codes into a netlist descriptions, 
which can be implemented into bit files (bitstreams) for loading onto an FPGA. The 
process of implementation includes the placement of logic blocks, memory elements, 
and other design elements in specific sites on the chip as defined by the netlist. It 
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concludes with the establishment of routes to interconnect these elements, also as 
defined by the netlist. The last stage is the generation of bitstream. A more 
comprehensive FPGA design flow would include simulation and design verification to 
ensure the correctness of the design both logically and functionally [51]. 
2.2.2 Partial Reconfiguration 
Partial reconfiguration (PR) is a technology that allows a part of an FPGA to be 
reconfigured while the other parts retain their configured state [37]. The region that is 
not marked out for PR remains static while other regions can be partially reconfigured. 
Unlike a full reconfiguration, the entire device is not reconfigured, and as such, PR has 
advantages such as reduced device size, lower device count, and reduced cost arising 
from the fact that many circuits can be time-multiplexed to share a single region on the 
FPGA. Other benefits include in-field local or remote hardware servicing and updating, 
shorter reconfiguration times, and increased system performance (lower downtime) 
[52]. 
There are two types of PR: static partial reconfiguration, and Dynamic Partial 
Reconfiguration (DPR). In the former, the remaining part of the FPGA is brought into 
a shutdown state – the circuits in the region not being reconfigured stop operating but 
the corresponding CMEM content is not reset. This is also referred to as shutdown 
partial reconfiguration. 
On the other hand, DPR allows the parts of the FPGA not being reconfigured to 
continue operating [37]. Also known as, active partial reconfiguration, DPR takes 
further what partial reconfiguration offers. While the time it takes to configure a part of 
the FPGA is very small, with frequent shutdown partial reconfigurations, there would 
be many pockets of small configuration times.  For applications that require a high 
availability, for instance, datacentres, these pockets of configuration times could add 
up to constitute a significant downtime. DPR prevents such a scenario. 
It is safe to state that DPR is the key enabling technology for a ROS as it forms the 
basis for runtime task management. The actual dynamic loading of tasks itself depends 
on DPR, and without runtime reconfiguration of the FPGA, it would be impossible for 
a ROS to offer a service like runtime error mitigation, which involves actively checking 
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the CMEM of the FPGA for bit flips and correcting any correctable bit flips all while 
tasks are actively executing on the FPGA. 
A. The Process of DPR in Xilinx FPGAs 
Figure 2.8 shows a diagrammatic representation of the Xilinx’s PR scheme. The 
PR flow of Xilinx [37] involves the partitioning of the FPGA chip area into two main 
regions – the static region, containing resources not meant for PR; and the dynamic 
partially reconfigurable region. The reconfigurable region is then floor-planned into a 
number of Reconfigurable Partitions (RPs) to be shared by multiple Reconfigurable 
Modules (RMs).  It should be noted that only RMs assigned to a particular RP can be 
configured in that RP. That is, intrinsically, there is no intrinsic support for relocating 
an RM from one RP to another. As will be seen in Section 3.2.4, this is an important 
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Figure 2.8: Diagrammatic representation of partial reconfiguration 
For inter-communication between the circuits in the static region and the RMs in 
the RPs, and among the RMs (not recommended by Xilinx), during the PR flow, the 
build tool inserts LUT-based Partition Pins (PartPins) at every connection point 
between the static region and the RMs. The PartPins are LUT-based proxy logic that 
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serve as anchors in the RPs to provide a consistent interface between the static logic 
and the RMs. This interfacing approach is used by the vendor tool and it costs 1 LUT 
per signal connection in the early Vivado versions. This resource can be saved by using 
the PR link approach of [53], where blocker macros are used to force the tool to use a 
specific routing path for all static part and RM configurations, with the added advantage 
on improving relocatability of RMs. However, in the latest versions of Vivado PartPins 
incur no physical resources like LUTs but use the interconnect tile directly [37]. 
For each RM, a full bitstream and a partial bitstream (PB) are generated. The full 
bitstream is used for the first device-wide configuration of the FPGA mostly at power 
up, while the PB is used for (re)configuring the RM. More information on the PR flow 
of Xilinx can be found in [37]. 
It should be noted that the reconfiguration frame, which is the smallest selectable 
FPGA area for PR is two columns (CLB-CLB, CLB-DSP, or CLB-BRAM). This is 
because every two successive CLB columns (left CLB and right CLB pair) for instance, 
share an interconnect (INT) column, and partitions are not allowed to pass in-between 
them. Thus, the smallest selectable CLB area for an RP is two CLBs (right CLB and 
left CLB) as shown in Figure 2.9 [37]. The same applies to the boundaries between 
CLBs and BRAMs and between CLBs and DSPs. 
 
Figure 2.9: Permissible boundaries for a reconfiguration frame 
The reconfiguration frame is important as it determines the granularity of the 
physical area selection for partially-reconfigured circuits. In contrast, the configuration 
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frame simply determines the granularity of configuration memory read and write. Table 
2.11 presents the number of configuration frames required to (re)configure different 
reconfiguration frames on the 7 series FPGA. These numbers were obtained by 
studying the bitstreams generated for designs with different combinations of CLBs, 
DSPs, and BRAMs. 
Table 2.11: Number of configuration frames for different 7 series FPGA resource pairs 
Reconfiguration Frame CLB-CLB CLB-DSP CLB-BRAM 
Number of Configuration Frames  72 64 192 
 
B. Module-Based Versus Difference-Based Partial Reconfiguration 
Besides the partial reconfiguration flow that involves a whole RM being 
reconfigured in an RP, which can also be referred to as a module-based partial 
reconfiguration, Xilinx offers a form of partial reconfiguration which is difference-
based [54]. The difference-based option is used for making small design changes to an 
RM. It is recommended for things like changing the equation of an LUT or modifying 
the memory content of a BRAM. If only a small change to an RM is required, instead 
of making a new RM that contains the change, and generating a new partial bitstream 
for the module, the small difference between the existing RM and the supposed new 
one is converted into a bitstream for reconfiguring only a small portion of the RM. The 
key advantage here is that the resulting difference-based partial bitstream can be much 
smaller than the RM’s original partial bitstream. While the Xilinx BitGen toll can be 
used to generate difference-based partial bitstreams, with an understanding of the 
bitstream structure from reverse engineering analyses, it is possible to build such 
bitstreams using a custom tool. 
2.3 Security and Integrity in FPGAs 
Security in FPGAs has attracted a greater attention in recent years.  This can be 
attributed to the more prominent deployment of FPGAs as computing platforms. 
FPGAs are susceptible to reverse engineering, cloning, and physical attacks among 
others [55]. While the methods and aims of attacks on FPGAs may vary, the result is 
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often malicious and as such, not desirable. As a result, the unifying theme in FPGA 
security is that of protecting the design and the device itself. As part of achieving this, 
FPGA vendors have relied on the complexity of bitstream formats as a deterrent to 
reverse engineering by attackers. The transformation of an FPGA-based design into a 
bitstream is a closely-guarded process, with no known successful reverse engineering 
attack. However, this is deemed as insufficient security for bitstreams. 
2.3.1 Bitstream Security 
Despite the fact that bitstream generation is a closely-guarded process, relying on the 
complexity of bitstreams as a deterrent to attackers is not considered prudent [43], and 
because there are other strains of attack like cloning, overbuilding, tempering, and 
spoofing, the best way of hiding design information is to use encrypted bitstreams. 
FPGA manufacturers have thus been driven to introduce encryption and decryption 
mechanisms into the FPGA configuration process [56]. 
Encryption is used to transform the readable plaintext bitstream into non-readable 
cyphertext bitstream. The encrypted bitstream is decrypted on-chip before delivering 
the data to the configuration memory. The encryption in the 7 series FPGAs is based 
on the 256-bit Advanced Encryption Standard (AES-256) implemented in the Cypher 
Block Chaining (CBC) mode, where a 256-bit key is used to encrypt and decrypt data 
blocks of 128 bits in size, with a CBC Initial Vector (IV) that is also 128 bits long. 
Figure 2.10 shows the AES encryption in the CBC mode. 
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The CBC is a mode of block cypher encryption that hides recognizable patterns in 
the cyphertext by chaining the encryption of a plaintext block of data to the cyphertext 
of the previous block [57] (see Figure 2.10). It ensures that two identical plaintexts do 
not have similar cyphertexts. Since the encryption of each block requires the cyphertext 
of the previous block, a 128-bit IV is usually provided for the encryption and decryption 
of the first block. The process is reversed during the on-chip decryption, in which every 
decrypted block is XORed with the previous cyphertext block to obtain the plaintext 
block. 
2.3.2 Bitstream Integrity 
Despite the use of encryption, an attacker, even without a sufficient knowledge of the 
bitstream format can still manipulate portions of the encrypted bitstream with the aim 
of causing the FPGA to malfunction.  This can happen if the validity of the bitstream is 
not ensured before configuration. It is obvious that encryption alone is insufficient.  
Therefore, to authenticate bitstreams and ensure the correct and intended operation of 
the device, hash algorithms have been applied in addition to encryption to ward off 
targeted malicious tampering [58]. 
A. Bitstream Authentication 
Authentication ensures that the bitstream has not been deliberately or inadvertently 
modified before delivering it to the FPGA. For authentication in Xilinx FPGAs, the 
Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is used. The Vivado applies a 256-bit 
HMAC key and the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) on the entire bitstream command 
and data to generate a 256-bit message digest or Message Authentication Code (MAC). 
The HMAC key and the MAC are both included as part of the unencrypted bitstream 
before encryption is applied. In the FPGA, as the bitstream is sent to the configuration 
logic after decryption, an on-chip HMAC-SHA-256 circuit uses the HMAC key to 
calculate the MAC on the configuration command and data and compares it with the 
MAC embedded in the bitstream. Any discrepancy results in the disabling of the 
configuration interface if the fallback option is not enabled [47]. As a result, the MAC 
helps determine the data integrity and authenticity of the bitstream. The HMAC-SHA-
256 authentication is always enabled along with the AES-CBC-256 encryption. That 
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is, both encryption and authentication are applied together when the encryption option 
is selected. It is impossible to use encryption without authentication and vice versa. 
B. Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) 
For SRAM-based FPGAs, the configuration bitstreams are usually stored in an 
external non-volatile memory and transferred to the FPGA at power-up.  The process 
of transferring the bitstream from this external storage can sometimes corrupt the 
bitstream.  While the probability of this is low, the possibilities of bit flips occurring in 
the bitstream are particularly higher when bitstreams are delivered through error-prone 
mechanisms like radio transmission. 
To ensure the correctness of the data, a 32-bit Cyclic Redundancy Check (CRC) is 
performed on the entire bitstream command and data during the bitstream generation.  
For the 7 series FPGA, the CRC-32 is calculated based on the CRC32C (Castagnoli) 
polynomial: x32 + x28 + x27 + x26 + x25 + x23 + x22 + x20 + x19 + x18 + x14 + x13 + x11 + 
x10 + x9 + x8 + x6 + 1 [59] and is stored in the postamble of the bitstream. Xilinx uses 
this polynomial because it is more reliable at error detection than the default CRC-32-
IEEE, evidenced by the fact that at a Hamming Distance of 4, it is able to cover a 
payload of 2147483615 bits. A CRC with a Hamming Distance of D allows all multi-
bit errors below D – 1 bits to be detected [60]. 
While it may be similar to authentication, the CRC is not secure enough from the 
perspective of cryptography and is thus used primarily for error detection and control 
rather than data integrity confirmation [61].  When a bitstream is being uploaded to the 
configuration memory of the FPGA, an internal CRC-32 circuit calculates the CRC of 
the commands and data from the last CRC reset event.  The calculated value is 
compared with the precomputed value stored in the bitstream. Any dissimilarity results 
in the configuration interface throwing a CRC error, which can be detected by 
monitoring the configuration interface's output, and reset by writing to the Reset CRC 
(RCRC) register. 
C. Frame Error Correction Code (ECC) 
In the 7 series FPGA, each CMEM frame is protected by a 13-bit Error Correction 
Code (ECC) stored in the 51st word of the frame while the entire CMEM is protected 
_______________________ Chapter 2 – Reconfiguration, Security, and Integrity in FPGAs 
 38 
by CRC.  In reality, it is uncommon for an error to escape being detected by ECC and 
be found only by CRC [62]. This implies that in certain applications, the 
implementation of error mitigation could rely only on the frame ECC. The ECC bits 
are computed according to [63]. 
The FPGA comes with a FRAME_ECC primitive (depicted in Figure 2.11). If 
instantiated by the user in the design, this primitive enables the monitoring of the built-
in ECC circuitry of the CMEM. Each time a readback is performed, the FRAME_ECC 
checks for errors by calculating a syndrome value from all the bits of the frame 
including the ECC bits in the 51st word. There is an error if SYNDROME[12:0] is non-
zero. A single-bit error is indicated on the ECCERRORSINGLE port of the 
FRAME_ECC as a ‘1’. The index of the 32-bit frame word that contains the flipped bit 
is reported by SYNWORD[6:0] while SYNBIT[4:0] points to the bit position in the 
word. The CRCERROR port is used to signal a CRC error and is useful when the 
Readback CRC (see Section 2.3.2) is used. 
The Frame ECC logic uses a Single-Error Correction, Double-Error Detection 
(SEC-DED) Hamming code, meaning that both singe-bit and multi-bit errors are 
detected but only single-bit errors can be corrected. The FRAME_ECC circuitry itself 
does not correct errors but indicates the location of a single flipped bit. 
 
Figure 2.11: FRAME_ECC primitive’s ports 
2.3.3 Secure Bitstream Format 
When encryption is used, the Xilinx Vivado tool generates the bitstream in a secure 
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encrypted as it is used to set up the FPGA and the internal decryption circuit but the 
HMAC authentication key (HKEY) and the configuration data (which includes the 
configuration commands and frame data) are encrypted. There are eleven 32-bit Use-
Encryption words in the preamble which consist of the commands to enable the AES 
decryptor; load the AES IV, and the Decrypt Word Count (DWC). The body section 
contains encrypted header commands, the frame address command and value, and the 
frame data. The encrypted body is appended with the HKEY. In the postamble, the 
footer commands and the HKEY, followed by the message digest (MAC) of the 
authentication process, are all encrypted. 
The secure bitstream contains no DESYNC command packet (0x3000 8001 0000 
000D) [47] as the DWC indicates when configuration should stop. The DWC is written 
with a command that has a register address of "11010" [47]. A more in-depth 
description of the secure bitstream format has been covered in [43]. This format can be 







(HKEY, Header, Frame 
Address and Frame Data)
Postamble
(Footer, HKEY, MAC)
HKEY – HMAC Key




Figure 2.12: FPGA’s secure bitstream format 
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2.3.4 Key Management 
A key file (NKY file) is generated by Vivado when encryption is used. This file 
contains hexadecimal strings for the AES key, the IV, and the HMAC key. The system 
designer has the choice of supplying the keys and the IV or allowing them to be 
generated by implementation tool. To load the key file into the FPGA, the Vivado 
Hardware Manager can be used. 
The AES key can be stored in the Battery-Backed RAM (BBRAM) or in the 
eFUSE. While the eFUSE requires no external battery, it is not as secure as the 
BBRAM. Once the key is programmed into the eFUSE, it cannot be cleared if there is 
an attack [64]. The IV is not stored on the chip but is used by the internal configuration 
circuit for the AES-CBC-based decryption of the bitstream being loaded. The IV is 
transparent to users and attackers since it is stored and transmitted unencrypted. The 
implication of this is that an attacker can modify the IV to cause malicious effects. 
However, because of the way the CBC scheme works, only the first block (128 bits) of 
the decrypted bitstream will be corrupted from being decrypted using an incorrect IV. 
Every subsequent cyphertext block uses is decrypted by chaining to the previous 
cyphertext (not plaintext) block, and as such will always be correctly recovered given 
that the AES key is correct. 
2.4 Chapter Summary 
Since their introduction by Xilinx in 1985, FPGAs have come a long way as computing 
devices. Starting out as a prototyping platform, they are now becoming a serious 
contender for mainstream computing. An FPGA can be considered as having three 
layers – configuration, functional, and clock routing layers. Using the Xilinx 7 series 
device as an example, this chapter has reviewed the different means of reconfiguring 
an FPGA. The key take away is that dynamic partial reconfiguration, which allows the 
FPGA to stay online and retain its operational state while a certain part of it is being 
reprogrammed, is an important technology that enables reconfigurable hardware to be 
deployed in ever-increasing number of applications. 
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The popularity of FPGAs means that the values of the IP cores that run on them 
has increased significantly. This has warranted the introduction of security measures 
including authentication and encryption to protect devices and the IP cores running on 
them. This however, has an impact on system design, with designers having to consider 
the storage of encryption keys. Moreover, the use of a special secure bitstream format 
will pose a challenge to design techniques that require the bitstream to be in plain 
formats. This is the motivation for the work in Chapter 5, where a unique secure 







Chapter 3  
Reconfigurable Computing 
In the 1940s, the need for flexibility in computation led to the introduction of the 
computer processor or CPU [65][66] for stored-programme as against fixed-
programme computing. However, no sooner had the processor been introduced, than it 
was realized that it was limited in performance. Early CPUs ran at relatively slow 
frequencies with very limited performance compared to what is obtainable today.  
However, as the demand for computing increased, it was imperative to increase the 
speed of processors.  By 1971, the first commercial microprocessor, the Intel 4004, 
which integrated a CPU comprising of 2300 transistors into a single chip, had appeared 
[67].  The advent of microprocessors drastically improved speed and performance.  For 
years, the integrating density, which fuelled an increase in the performance of 
microprocessors,  kept increasing, doubling every two years, as predicted by Moore’s 
law, but a limit in practicable processor speed was soon reached, as the enormous heat 
generated by microprocessors could not be extracted fast enough; a phenomenon 
known as the Power Wall.  Keeping the voltage down is a way of reducing power 
dissipation but this is limited by the unavoidable transistor leakages and process 
variations in the fabrication techniques [8].  This has prompted the move from 
uniprocessors to multi-core processors and multiprocessors.  While this masks the 
original problem of the processor’s software-based computation which arises from the 
sequential execution of processes and the von Neumann bottleneck [5], this is also 
destined to ultimately slam into the Power Wall. 
In contrast, a hardware-based computation has the capacity to execute multiple 
tasks in parallel and thus, provide a high computational performance at low power. For 
instance, in comparison to processors, FPGAs have been shown to be up to 540 times 
faster [68] and up to 70% more power efficient [69] for certain applications.  The trend 
is thus, towards the use of specialized hardware to execute compute-intensive and time-
critical tasks while the host processor focusses on software tasks.  This can be seen in 
the latest Xilinx and Altera heterogeneous System-on-Chip (SoC) devices, combining 
3 
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a high-performance ARM processor and an FPGA fabric into a single chip [70][71]. 
While specialized hardware based on Application-Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) 
offers the advantage of speed, it lacks the flexibility of software. Reconfigurable 
hardware like the FPGA, on the other hand, offers programmability to logic circuits, 
combining the flexibility of software with the sheer high performance of ASIC-like 
hardware. The subject of reconfigurable computing is that of exploiting this powerful 
combination to meet high computing demands, reduce cost, and achieve lower power 
consumption. 
 Years before FPGAs were conceived, the earliest reconfigurable computing 
architecture was proposed by Gerald Estrin in 1960.  In his work on the fixed-plus-
variable structure computer [72][73], he proposed a reconfigurable computer 
architecture that would “permit computations which are beyond the capabilities of [the 
then] present systems by providing an inventory of high speed substructures and rules 
for interconnecting them such that the entire system may be temporarily distorted into 
a problem oriented special purpose computer” [72]. However, it was not until 1984 that 
the first real reconfigurable computing hardware fabric appeared when Xilinx 
introduced the first FPGA and since then FPGAs have progressed through various 
stages of development [10]. From that humble beginning of the XC2064 FPGA which 
contained about 64 logic-only cells (less than 1000 gates), current FPGAs now boast of 
millions of gates making up heterogeneous resources that include not only logic cells 
but also memory elements, processing elements, and other functional blocks.  
There are other reconfigurable hardware like Programmable Array Logics (PALs) 
and Complex Programmable Logic Devices (CPLDs) but FPGAs are the most widely 
used because of their higher densities, allowing for highly complex designs. In 2017, 
the global FPGA market accounted for $63.05 billion and is forecasted to reach up to 
$117.97 billion by 2026 growing at a compound annual growth rate of 7.2% [74]. The 
driving force of this market is the adoption of FPGAs for various applications ranging 
from hand-held devices to datacentres and aerospace. 
Several concepts and methods have been advanced in a bid to exploit the 
potentials of reconfigurable hardware, especially FPGAs. The research efforts 
expended have led to a number of promising architectural solutions in the form of 
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ROSes that aim to present the FPGA fabric as an extension of conventional processors. 
However, in the various architectures, there is a uniformity of purpose, which is the 
abstraction of the intricacies of the reconfigurable hardware fabric by providing 
essential RC services. In the following sections, the existing RC architecture and 
service implementations will be brought to light and considered in the light of the 
objectives of this research. Furthermore, several works have implemented key RC 
services without focussing on full ROS implementations. These will also be reviewed. 
3.1 An Overview of Reconfigurable Operating Systems 
The introduction of DPR in FPGAs allows parts of a device to be reprogrammed while 
other parts are operating (see Section 2.2.2). Using this capability, hardware circuits 
can time-share resources and be swapped in and out of the FPGA as and at when 
required in runtime; and following the software nomenclature, these circuits can be 
named as “hardware tasks”. A strong requirement for the categorization of a hardware 
circuit as hardware task is the sharing of resources and intercommunication with other 
circuits. Where this is not the case, a hardware circuit in a reconfigurable system would 
be best described as a hardware accelerator [19]. New terminologies like morphware 
and configware have also been coined to describe a reconfigurable hardware device and 
the application mapped onto it [75]. 
A Reconfigurable Operating System (ROS) attempts to give to hardware a software 
look by abstracting the low-level intricacies of hardware from application developers, 
and thereby easing the development of applications for execution on FPGAs.  
Traditional operating systems for processors manage every aspect of the operations of 
processors, from process execution to memory management, and I/O access. In a 
similar vein, a ROS aims to manage the on-chip resources in an FPGA, but mostly on 
behalf of software processes running in a host CPU for an improved system-wide 
performance. In general, a ROS is an extension of a conventional software operating 
system. 
Typically, a ROS is expected to provide services ranging from task scheduling, 
task placement, task configuration, inter-task communication, partitioning, memory 
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management, IO, and security [22]–[24]. Arguably, the most essential of these are task 
placement, task configuration and inter-task communication. Depending on the chip 
area partitioning approach used by a ROS, three reconfigurable area styles are possible 
in ROSes [24]. In the island style, a number of RPs can be marked out on the chip for 
hosting one task each without the possibility of overlapping; that is, an RM or task 
cannot use multiple partitions. Most existing ROSes use island-style partitions. On the 
other hand, in the slot style of reconfigurable area, the chip is divided into contiguous 
areas that allow one-dimensional placement of tasks. In a closely related style, the grid 
allows a two-dimensional placement. In both the slot and the grid styles, an RM can 
occupy multiple RPs. 
The main concerns in this thesis relate to task configuration and communication. 
As such, how these and closely-related features are implemented in the sate-of-the-art 
ROSes will now be reviewed. OS4RS [76] is an operating system primarily for 
software-to-hardware context switching and vice-versa. Each task is designed to have 
software and hardware versions with the same functionality. The reconfigurable fabric 
is divided into fixed islands called tiles, which are of the same shape and size. The tiles 
are interconnected by a network-on-chip (NoC), with each tile designed to run a single 
task at any given time. For task loading, partial reconfiguration is carried out through 
the ICAP. 
In [77] and [78], the authors present HybridThreads (HThreads), which is a real-
time OS kernel that allows hardware and software multithreading. Inter-task 
communication is provided over a system bus using a memory-mapped register 
interface. It is difficult to classify HThreads as a complete ROS since it does not 
support DPR and as a result, there is no resource sharing among the threads (tasks) 
[79]. The hardware tasks are never reconfigured. Instead, they are static tasks that 
reside in static slots attached to the system bus.  
BORPH  [80], developed at the University of California at Berkley, is another 
Linux extension. In BORPH, a whole FPGA is used as the reconfigurable island, with 
four FPGAs interconnected to serve as user FPGAs while one FPGA serves as the 
control FPGA. However, using a whole FPGA as a reconfigurable slot can easily lead 
to inefficient resource utilization and high reconfiguration time overheads, especially 
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since the FPGAs are not partially reconfigured. For communication, BORPH uses a 
SelectMap bus connection between the central control FPGA and the four user FPGAs 
while inter-FPGA communication is Point-to-Point (P2P) via a ring network. 
ReconOS [81] [82], CAP-OS [83], FUSE [84], SPREAD [85], and RTSM [86]  
are further ROSes that all generically use island-style partitions and provide 
communication by means of P2P connections, buses, or NoCs. However, in [87], a 
grid partitioning is provided targeting the ReconOS. In addition, all these ROSes 
support DPR. However, while FUSE claims support for DPR, in the proof of concept 
implementation, the hardware tasks are fixed and not dynamically reconfigured. 
Rainbow [88] is an extension of a real-time OS kernel for hardware multitasking. 
While the real-time OS provides software multitasking functionality, the Rainbow 
extension adds a hardware multitasking capability. Fixed slots in grid style are 
provided for placing hardware tasks and communication is provided by a P2P scheme. 
It provides an ICAP-based configuration controller for hardware task allocation and 
pre-emption. 
All of the afore-mentioned ROSes are in line with FPGA vendor design tools, 
which force the use of fixed islands and slotted partitions to preserve the routes between 
the static and reconfigurable regions (see Section 2.2.2). However, fixed partitions lead 
to inefficient use of FPGA resources (e.g., small circuits must be mapped to enlarged 
reconfigurable slots) and limits the chances of finding a damage-free alternate location 
for hardware tasks (e.g., a single damaged resource makes an entire slot unusable). In 
addition, as seen in the afore-mentioned ROSes, reconfigurable slots are typically 
interconnected by means of a static communication infrastructure (e.g., bus or NoC), 
which does not only consume a significant amount of FPGA resources [89], but also 
fills the chip with lots of static routes that limit the allocatability of hardware tasks.  
As opposed to these approaches, R3TOS [79], advanced to be a reliable ROS, uses 
a slotless reconfiguration mode in which hardware tasks can be arbitrarily placed on the 
FPGA. R3TOS does not rely on any fixed communication infrastructure like P2P, 
buses, or NoC. Instead, it provides inter-task communications and synchronization 
through the configuration layer by using the ICAP to copy data between buffer 
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memories attached to the inputs and outputs of tasks [90]. While R3TOS can be 
classified as grid-based in terms of reconfigurable area style, it is in fact different by 
definition as it does not actually mark out slots on the chip area. R3TOS keeps the 
FPGA reconfigurable area empty, that is, free of any partition boundaries (i.e., PartPins) 
and static routes. However, R3TOS relies heavily on DPR for task loading, 
deallocation, and inter-task communication & synchronization. 
Table 3.1 summarizes the relevant features of all the ROSes just discussed. The 
common feature in all of these ROSes, except Rainbow and R3TOS, is the use of 
islands for task placement. This is a consequence of the nature of the infrastructure 
used for inter-task communication. Except R3TOS, the other ROSes provide P2P, bus, 
or NoC-based communication, which uses the resources in the functional layer for 
implementing communication. The choices of partitioning and communication are 
influenced by the limitations imposed by the FPGA design tool flows and the 
increasing heterogeneity of modern FPGAs [88]. To address this, R3TOS deploys the 
configuration layer for communication by using the ICAP to relocate data between 
tasks. Hence, it is able to advance a slotless architecture that favours relocatability. 
Table 3.1: Architecture of existing reconfigurable operating systems 
ROS Reconfiguration Style 
Architecture 
Reconfigurable Area Style 
Inter-Task 
Communication 
OS4RS DPR Islands NoC 
HThreads None Static islands Bus 
BORPH Full Reconfiguration FPGA-based islands P2P 
ReconOS DPR Islands/grid Bus 
CAP-OS DPR Islands NoC 
FUSE DPR Islands Bus 
SPREAD DPR Islands Bus and P2P 
RTSM DPR Islands Bus 
Rainbow DPR Grid P2P 
R3TOS DPR Grid ICAP-Based 
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While the provision of the key RC services has been generally provided by the 
afore-mentioned ROSes, implementing these services in a ROS expected to be reliable 
brings a whole new set of technical challenges.  For instance, apart from R3TOS, there 
is no other ROS that has laid claim to being reliable in the context of runtime error 
mitigation, especially for permanent damage circumvention.  By far, R3TOS can be 
considered as the only ROS that has put a strong focus on reliability. Mostly, the 
inability to advance a ROS with high reliability can be attributed to the limitations 
imposed by the communication mechanisms employed by these ROSes. They are all 
based on statically determined inter-task communication infrastructures that are not 
amenable to runtime task relocation for permanent damage circumvention. 
While R3TOS attempted to solve the communication bottleneck by using the 
configuration infrastructure of the FPGA for inter-task data transfer [90], other critical 
services relying on configuration are impaired, as the configuration interface is a single 
resource that needs to be shared by these critical system services [83].  As a result, one 
of the major issues addressed in this work is that of inter-task communication for 
reliable reconfigurable computing (see Chapter 6). 
3.2 Reliability Concerns in Reconfigurable Computing 
Since FPGAs now find use in high-value applications, the requirement for reliability is 
all the more important. Radiations are able to cause errors like temporary upsets or 
permanent latch-ups in the underlying physical structures (e.g., CMOS transistors) of 
the FPGA, propagating faults to the CLBs, BRAMs, and DSPs that make up the digital 
designs resident on the FPGA, and potentially leading to system failures. These errors 
can as well appear in the CMEM cells and other device-functionality primitives. 
Resilience to these errors is an integral factor in the design of reliable reconfigurable 
hardware systems. The following sections will provide further insights into the nature 
and causes of these errors and the techniques deployed by system designers to combat 
the menace. 
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3.2.1 Soft and Hard Errors 
The underlying fabric of SRAM FPGAs is fabricated using the CMOS technology. 
Most ICs today, including reconfigurable devices use the CMOS technology because 
of its high density, high speed, and low power consumption [91][92]. The CMEM in 
SRAM-based FPGAs are composed of CMOS SRAM cells, with a typical cell made 
up of six transistors. The interconnect switches, CLBs, BRAMs, DSPs, and other 
primitives, including control registers on the FPGA are made from CMOS transistors. 
The correct functionality of the device and the digital design built from these resources 
depends on the ON or OFF logic states of these transistors. As such, an unintended bit 
flip, which turns an ON transistor OFF or vice-versa is able to cripple the functionality 
of a digital design mapped on the FPGA. Such a bit flip can be temporary (soft) and 
would disappear when the device is power-cycled, or permanent (hard), in which case 
there is a permanent damage to the transistor and any digital design built on it would 
be permanently affected. 
Compared to hard errors, which render affected FPGA resources permanently 
unusable, soft errors can generally be corrected without taking the device offline. It is 
important to correct soft errors as soon as they appear because if left to accumulate, 
they may become uncorrectable, and a full device configuration might be unavoidable, 
increasing the downtime of a device or system. The main cause of errors is radiation in 
space and nuclear environments. The description of the underlying physical processes 
and interactions that trigger errors have been covered in [93]. 
A. Soft Errors 
A soft error occurs in an FPGA when one or more bits of the chip’s transistors flip 
due mainly to charge disturbance from ionizing radiations [94], especially for devices 
deployed in space and nuclear applications. A single ionizing energetic particle can 
transfer an electrical charge to a device to cause a Single-Event Effect (SEE), which can 
be soft or hard. On the other hand Total Ionizing Dose (TID) effects are a result of 
accumulated ionizing energy deposited by photons or particles getting trapped in the 
insulating materials of transistors [95], and inducing a degradation of the device with 
time. 
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There are different types of SEEs, depending on the kind of effect created. When 
a soft error causes a single bit flip in a storage element like memory cell, latch, or flip-
flop, it can be referred to as a Single-Event Upset (SEU) [96] and is the most common 
of all SEEs. This is in contrast to the less likely Multiple-Bit Upset (MBU) where more 
than one bits are affected by a high-energy radiation. 
A Single-Event Functional Interrupt (SEFI) is a result of an SEE that affects a 
critical system control register or an internal circuit needed to operate a device and in 
the process causes the entire device to malfunction [97]. Six types of SEFIs have been 
identified for the Virtex-4 FPGA, but are as well applicable to other FPGA families. 
These are: Power-On-Reset (POR) SEFI, SelectMAP (SMAP) SEFI, Frame Address 
Register (FAR) SEFI, Global Signal SEFI, Readback SEFI, and Scrub SEFI. The detail 
descriptions of these SEFIs can be found in [98]. SEFIs are critical since a user design 
cannot correct them by scrubbing in most cases. However, they rarely occur, with 
approximately one SEFI occurring in 65 years for galactic cosmic rays in deep space 
[99]. 
When a logic gate is hit by an SEE, the corresponding event is referred to as a 
Single-Event Transient (SET) as this leads to an error only when an erroneous bit state 
propagates through one or more combinatorial path and eventually gets registered in a 
memory element [96]. All the afore-mentioned soft error modes are non-destructive as 
they do not potentially lead to permanent damages. A Single-Event Latch-up (SEL) is 
a potentially destructive SEE “where a low-resistance path develops between power 
supply and ground but remains after the triggering event is removed” creating high-
current conditions that can potentially destroy a device  [100]. 
In the functional layer of an FPGA, BRAMs are more highly prone to radiation 
effects while flip-flops are less susceptible because they constitute the smallest portion 
of the internal state of the FPGA. On the other hand, in the configuration layer, because 
of the sheer number of bits the CMEM contains, it is comparatively more affected by 
radiation effects, with bits mapping logic resources less vulnerable compared to those 
of the routing resources [101][102]. 
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B. Hard Errors 
Hard errors are permanent damages or defects that appear in the underlying silicon 
fabric of devices. These errors are permanent and cannot be remedied by any method 
used for mitigating soft errors. Since these errors cannot be corrected, if they happen to 
fall within the region occupied by an active task, they would most likely lead to 
computational errors or eventual system failures depending on the essentiality of the 
bits affected. 
The continuous process scaling leading to the miniaturization of transistors has 
given rise to FPGAs with ever higher densities than before. The repercussion however, 
is that the on-chip resources and interconnects have become more prone to degradation 
and ageing-related permanent damages or hard errors. For instance, [103] reports that 
resources on Xilinx 65-nm-node FPGAs can experience first-time failures within three 
to five years of the device going into operation. While hard errors can be caused by 
manufacturing defects, the most important from the user’s perspective are those caused 
by ageing-related factors, including: Time-Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB), 
Electromigration, Negative Bias Thermal Instability (NBTI), Hot-Carrier Effects 
(HCEs), and Stress Migration. The description of the physical processes powering these 
mechanisms have been covered in [103]. Another factor that can influence ageing and 
eventually cause damages is thermal cycling (extreme variation of temperatures) in the 
chip substrate [104]. 
Ageing-related errors can occur due to the natural unavoidable wear and tear or 
degradation of the silicon as time passes. However, radiations can cause SELs, which 
can trigger unintentional excessive currents and eventually leading to permanent 
damages [100][105]. Furthermore, radiation can cause permanent errors in the form of 
Single Event Gate Rupture (SEGR), or Single Event Burnout (SEB) [106]. In addition, 
permanent failure modes earlier discussed can be exacerbated by extremes of 
temperatures [107]. 
3.2.2 Soft Error Mitigation (SEM) in FPGAs 
SEM includes both the detection and correction of soft errors. The early detection of 
errors is important in reliable systems, allowing for mitigation techniques to be applied. 
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If errors are allowed to accumulate, the system might eventually need to be power-
cycled to clear the errors, contributing to system downtime. Error detection techniques 
that permit a runtime diagnosis and correction are thus highly favoured in reliable 
dynamically-reconfigurable computing devices. There are several methods for 
mitigating errors, which include radiation hardening and redundancy. An in-depth 
survey of mitigations techniques can be found in [108]. 
A. Radiation Hardening 
Radiation hardening is any process or technique applied to make a device resistant 
to ionizing radiation effects. There are two general categories – Radiation Hardening 
by Process (RHBP) and Radiation Hardening by Design (RHBD) [109]. RHBP 
involves making changes at the fabrication level in silicon. It involves modifying 
fabrication processes. This is done in order to make ICs withstand radiation doses in 
the order of 100 krad to more than 1 Mrad for space-grade use [31], with the majority 
of space applications requiring a tolerance of 300 krad (Si) for TIDs and 37 MeV-
cm2/mg for SEUs [110]. However, the high cost of these ICs and the long lead times 
are a disadvantage [111]. Moreover, the fabrication process deployed for RHBP is a 
number of years (two generations or more) behind state-of-the-art [112], with the 
implication that RHBP devices have inferior density and performance. 
An alternative to RHBP is RHBD, which is the use of design techniques based on 
standard CMOS technologies to harden ICs without making fabrication process 
changes. RHBD approaches range from gate-level, techniques like selectively 
hardening the critical gates (those affecting a circuit’s functionality) of a circuit [113] 
and circuit-level [114], to system-level methods [115]. Since gate-level mitigations are 
applied during fabrication, they are not applicable to COTS devices which are already 
in the market. As such, error mitigation approaches for COTS FPGAs are often at the 
circuit (e.g., flip-flops and LUTs), module, and system levels. 
On the other hand, as most COTS devices can tolerate  radiation doses in the range 
of 5 krad to 20 krad or more, it is possible to use them in radiation environments when 
properly characterized with “Careful COTS” design steps [31]. This radiation tolerance, 
which is observed in parts not manufactured with space radiation in mind can be raised 
by deploying system-level reliability approaches similar to the ones used in RHBD. In 
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particular, the flexibility of reconfigurable hardware can be exploited to raise the 
tolerance levels of COTS FPGAs in a bid to make them usable as space-grade devices 
within a characterized radiation dose and SEE tolerance range.  
B. Triple-Modular Redundancy 
A classical method of mitigating errors is Triple-Modular Redundancy (TMR) with 
majority voting [116][117], where three instances of a circuit are configured. A voting 
mechanism is then used to compare the outputs of the three circuits.  The correct output 
is the same as that of at least two of the three instances. The likelihood of having two 
instances being struck by error in the same manner and thus, producing the same 
erroneous outputs, is highly unlikely. However, where system reliability requirements 
are higher, a designer would do well to revert to another error detection mechanism as 
backup. To avoid a single point of failure, where the majority voter itself fails, the voter 
can be triplicated [118]. 
TMR can best be described as an error detection and masking technique, its main 
advantage being that it ensures a continuous correct functionality in the presence of 
errors. Essentially, it masks the underlying error and prevents it from propagating faults 
into the rest of the system. However, if the errors are not cleared (corrected) as soon as 
possible, the TMR scheme could eventually be defeated as errors accumulate. Two 
modules could become faulty at a time, and all the three modules could produce three 
different outputs, defeating the voting mechanism. 
TMR is applicable to both soft and hard error detection. However, as good as TMR 
is, it has its failings. The apparent downside of a traditional TMR implementation is 
that it incurs a large overhead, at least 200% more resource and area utilization arising 
from the two redundant modules. To mitigate this, several variants of TMR have been 
implemented to cut down on the resource overhead. For instance, in [119], a selective 
TMR (STMR) mechanism is introduced, where SEU-sensitive sub-circuits of a main 
design are identified and triplicated. The STMR technique achieved an area overhead 
of 60-70% of that of the traditional TMR approach for the example circuits used. 
For radiation hardening, TMR can be applied at the gate, circuit, module, device, 
or system level [118][120]. However, as TMR does not correct bit flips and errors 
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should not be allowed to accumulate, other mechanisms must be deployed for the 
correction of errors as they emerge. A popular method for soft error correction is 
scrubbing, which involves overwriting the CMEM through PR to correct bit flips [121]. 
Scrubbing is useful for mitigating errors in the CMEM and can be external if the 
scrubber is outside the FPGA and internal, if otherwise. In terms of the approach to 
updating the CMEM, two scrubbing methods have been identified – blind scrubbing 
and readback scrubbing. In fact, TMR can be combined with scrubbing to obtain a 
substantially reduced failure rate [122]. 
C. Blind Scrubbing 
To prevent error accumulation, a technique called scrubbing is often used. 
Scrubbing involves a continuous update of the CMEM as often as possible with a 
golden bitstream stored in a rad-hard memory outside the FPGA. It is recommended to 
be carried out at least ten times faster than the worst-case SEU rate of the target FPGA 
[99]. Since the CMEM is refreshed often, any soft error in the CMEM is eventually 
corrected. However, care must be taken not to overwrite user data in the flip-flops, 
LUT-RAMs, Shift Register LUTs (SRLs), and BRAMs as the contents of these could 
have changed since configuration. This method of scrubbing has been referred to as 
Blind Scrubbing since the CMEM is updated without first reading the CMEM to check 
whether or not there has been an upset. 
Though fast and simple, blind scrubbing can cause a Scrub SEFI and risk damage 
to the device as observed in [123], where an SEU in the FAR register or a SET on the 
clock line feeding the configuration data caused frame data to be written to a wrong 
location and triggered contention which led to high currents on the core supply. Since 
a SEFI cannot be scrubbed, a solution to Scrub SEFI is to perform the scrubbing frame-
by-frame rather than full-device, with the implication that when an upset is detected, 
only a single frame would be written. This is instead of allowing the FAR to auto-
increase from an initial starting value, which is the usual practice with blind scrubbing. 
This solution is proposed in [123] and evaluated in [124]. 
Another shortcoming of blind scrubbing is that if the internal scrubbing approach 
is used and the ICAP is relied upon for writing the golden bitstream, as is often the case, 
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this reduces the availability of the ICAP for reconfiguration. Moreover, the need for a 
rad-hard external memory to keep the golden bitstream creates an added cost. 
D. Readback Scrubbing 
With the advent of DPR in FPGAs, an alternative approach to blind scrubbing has 
emerged – Readback Scrubbing. In readback scrubbing, the CMEM frames are first 
read back and compared with a golden bitstream to check for errors. If there is an error, 
the golden frame data is written to the CMEM to correct the error. While this method 
still requires an external memory, the advantage is that there is no need for continuous 
writing. However, the ICAP is still continuously occupied for readback operations.  
Along the lines of readback scrubbing, the Xilinx FPGAs, starting from the Virtex-
4, have shipped with a FRAME_ECC primitive that when activated, computes a 
syndrome value to determine errors in frames during readback. This can be used to 
eliminate the need for an external storage, although only single errors can be corrected. 
The Xilinx SEM IP [62] and the work in [125] circumvent this single-error correction 
limitation by allowing frame data to be loaded from an external memory to correct 
multi-bit errors especially since these can constitute a significant portion of errors 
detected, as observed in [126]. Further details on the FRAME_ECC primitive have been 
presented in Section 2.3.1. 
In the 7 series FPGA, there is an internal Readback CRC circuitry that can 
automatically perform readback in the background of user design to detect and correct 
SEUs in the CMEM [47]. It is based on a CRC check of the CMEM. The Xilinx SEM 
IP [62] and the work in [125] both rely on this internal circuitry.  While Readback CRC 
eliminates the need for a custom readback circuitry, it, however, cannot be controlled 
to scan only a specific number of frames in the CMEM. As at the time of writing, Xilinx 
documentations have not proven this to be otherwise. This means the entire chip has to 
be scanned in each SEM pass. Earlier, we noted that less than 1% of the ICAP’s 
bandwidth should be used for configuration if SEM coverage of the entire chip is 
desired. To put this in perspective, we note that the smallest task on the FPGA will 
occupy a CLB-DSP pair and this requires a total of 64 frames for configuration (see 
Table 2.11 in Section 2.2.2).  These frames can be written in 66.24 µs (computed from 
Table 4.15 of Section 4.5).  Taking the XC7Z100 chip as an example, the maximum 
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full device scan time of the chip is 34.3 ms [62]. If the 66.24 µs is taken as 1% then 
SEM will take 6.56 ms.  To ensure an effective SEM coverage, 6.56 ms has to be the 
minimum duration between successive task reconfigurations.  However, practical hard 
real-time systems can have time bounds on the order of several microseconds to a few 
milliseconds [127], implying that at > 99% ICAP occupation for SEM, the system will 
be operating outside the bounds of hard real-time processing. 
E. Diagnosis of User Memories 
After the initial configuration of a circuit, the user data in the flip-flops and BRAMs 
can change as the circuit operates. These changes are not updated in the corresponding 
bits in the CMEM. As such, if a flip-flop or BRAM bit is hit by a SEU, it is impossible 
to detect the flipped bit by checking the CMEM. For mitigating errors in the BRAM, 
the BRAM in the 7 series FPGA comes with a built-in ECC that supports SEC-DED, 
similar to the FRAME_ECC for CMEM. As ECC logic does not actually correct the 
error but only presents a correct memory output, a form of memory scrubbing is also 
recommended for ECC-protected BRAMs [102]. 
LUTs and other logic-related resources are susceptible to SETs. Since they have 
no memory, the transient event does not constitute an error until registered in a memory 
element like flip-flop or latch. As such, it is difficult to distinguish between a bit flip 
that is a direct result of an SEU or one that is indirectly triggered by a SET. To prevent 
transient events from inducing SEUs, SET filters can be used [128]. For flip-flop error 
mitigation while TMR can be used to mask error, the isolation of the erroneous bit often 
requires a self-checking mechanism like Built-In Self-Test (BIST) circuitry. 
While TMR can be used to mask an SEU in a flip-flop and feedback from the voter 
used to correct it [108], this is applicable when TMR is applied to individual flip-flop. 
When an entire module is triplicated, it becomes more challenging to fix the error. The 
entire module can be reconfigured but instead, a BIST circuit can be configured in the 
region under test to identify the offending flip-flop and reconfigure only the associated 
configuration frame. The use of BISTs prevents the need for an external diagnosis 
service. BIST circuits have been proposed for diagnosing LUTs, flip-flops, and BRAMs 
[129], with some concerned more with reducing the storage requirement and 
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configuration overhead for BIST circuit bitstreams by using a BIST-cloning technique 
[130] while others consider the reduction in test time in addition [131]. 
3.2.3 Hard Error Mitigation (HEM) 
The mitigation of hard errors or more appropriately, permanent damages, that appear 
on the FPGA chip area ranges from delaying the occurrence of the errors, to 
circumventing them when they eventually surface. Mitigation techniques include: 
radiation hardening (e.g., using TMR for error masking) and BIST for error isolation. 
These have already been discussed in Section 3.2.2. However, in addition to diagnosing 
flip-flops, BIST can also be used to detect permanently damaged logic elements (e.g., 
LUTs) [130] and routing resources [132]. In addition, when a BIST detects a hard error, 
the error cannot be corrected by reconfiguring the affected frame. Instead, the affected 
resource is completely avoided. Other mitigation approaches, relevant especially to 
HEM, include Wear Levelling (WL); online rerouting; and precompiled circuits for 
alternate positions.  
A. Wear Levelling (WL) 
To mitigate ageing-related hard errors, wear-levelling (uniform-ageing) strategies 
can be applied. WL is any strategy deployed to pre-empt hard errors before they happen. 
Eventually, every silicon chip will wear out; however, prolonging the lifespan of the 
chip is crucial and this is the aim of WL. In [103], the authors proposed different WL 
methods to achieve uniform ageing of FPGA chips with respect to different causative 
factors. Load balancing was used to tackle the impact of HCEs by periodically changing 
the physical location of circuits to even out the usage of resources over time. Selective 
Alternate Routing Technique (SART) was proposed for increasing the time to failure 
due to electromigration in interconnects through dynamically switching between an 
ageing route and an alternate unused route between logic resources (see Figure 3.1, 
where an alternate route is used for connecting between the two logic blocks). Using 
the SART technique, a percentage increase in chip age of up to 40% was observed in 
an example benchmark. Another solution was configuration bit flipping for alleviating 
the impact of NBTI. All these mitigation techniques were simulated and reported to 
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extend the operating lifetime of an FPGA chip, even up to a 100% in one of the 
benchmark designs. 
 
Figure 3.1: Alternate routing as a wear-levelling strategy 
The authors in [133] argued that the findings of [103] were based on simulations 
and were therefore difficult to verify. They went ahead to propose three WL strategies, 
namely: alternative logic mapping, spare resources, and alternative placement to 
mitigate the effects of NBTI. Since static logic levels are the root cause of NBTI, these 
methods respectively involve disrupting constant logic levels by inverting the sense of 
inputs and outputs in the design to alter the stress pattern, relocating active circuits to 
unused resources, and exchanging the positions of circuits to ensure that logic resources 
are stressed under multiple similar conditions. Hardware evaluations of these three WL 
strategies using accelerated-life tests demonstrated that at least a 20% reduction in 
degradation can be obtained. 
A solution to thermal cycling is proposed in [104] which involves cyclically 
relocating circuits with high power dissipation to regions where tasks with low power 
emissions are allocated and vice-versa. As the temperature of a region on the chip 
directly obtains from the power consumption of the circuit occupying that region, this 
means unoccupied and less-used regions will have lower temperatures. To even out the 
temperature of the chip and prevent hot spots or a steep temperature gradient, circuits 
are moved about the device intermittently at a cycle period determined by the switching 
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Though the prime advantage of WL for FPGAs is that there is no need to actively 
check the chip for errors and address them in run-time, WL cannot be solely relied upon 
since the eventual occurrence of age-related hard errors is inevitable and unpredictable. 
As such, WL should be deployed as a passive mitigation technique while active 
strategies should be used for periodic hard error detection and mitigation. 
B. Precompiled Circuits 
Precompiled circuit configurations can be used to target alternate locations in the 
event of damages. This involves anticipating that damages will occur and mapping 
circuits to multiple pre-determined regions. In a basic form of this, a battery of 
bitstreams corresponding to different regions for each circuit are generated. This idea 
is used in [134], where multiple test bitstreams are used to avoid defects in a 
programmable device. The obvious downside to this is the increased bitstream storage 
requirement. 
To reduce bitstream storage size, in the column-based precompiled configuration 
technique of [135], alternative RMs that avoid specific areas of the original RM are 
created by shifting the original RM one column at a time to create similarities among 
generated bitstreams. Differential coding and data compression are then used to reduce 
the ensuing bitstream size. The implementation however, does not cater for the possible 
resource heterogeneity of FPGAs as only CLBs are considered. 
C. Online Rerouting 
Online rerouting is another method used for circumventing permanent damages. In 
[136], the authors propose an incremental routing strategy for ripping up and rerouting 
interconnections between logic blocks. This can be used to provide communication 
support for circuits targeting alternate locations. The major downside of online 
rerouting is the prohibitively high time it incurs. Even with the efficient incremental 
rerouting implementation of [137], with reconfiguration time per fault as high as 73 
seconds. 
Because of the high computational cost needed, routing algorithms are often run 
offline. As such, in the rerouting strategy of [137], an external software is used to 
determine the new route before the actual on-chip rerouting. On the other hand, self-
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routing approaches have been proposed. These do not require auxiliary external 
software as demonstrated in [138] where faulty cells are automatically replaced with 
spare ones and rerouted. However, self-routing can be at the expense of increased 
resource usage due to the self-routing core and some approximations or compromises 
might have to be made as exemplified by [139]. 
3.2.4 Partial Bitstream Relocation 
Most of the proposed solutions to HEM require first, the ability to reconfigure the 
FPGA dynamically, in which DPR comes to the rescue; and second, the ability to move 
a configured circuit from one place to the other on the chip in runtime [140], often 
referred to as Partial Bitstream Relocation (PBR). In the context of RC, PBR can also 
be referred to task relocation. However, since task relocation can also refer to the 
migration of a software task to hardware and vice-versa, a concept termed 
heterogeneous task relocation [141], we make a distinction here by explicitly referring 
to the migration of a hardware circuit from one region on the chip to another as PBR or 
homogeneous hardware task relocation, as different from heterogeneous task 
relocation. 
PBR is a technique of removing a configured circuit from its original location and 
reconfiguring it in another location on the FPGA and it can be performed offline or in 
runtime. Runtime PBR is enabled by DPR, allowing runtime access to the configuration 
memory of the FPGA without power cycling the device, and permitting circuits in 
damaged chip regions to be configured in another region while the rest of the FPGA 
remains operational. PBR involves adapting an RM for placement in more than one RP. 
Realizing bitstream relocation involves the manipulation of the frame addresses in 
the task’s bitstream before (offline) or during (online) configuration. When done 
offline, methods used include manipulating the frame address in the bitstream file as 
seen in PARBIT [142] to generating and storing multiple copies of the partial bitstream 
for the different target locations. PARBIT is an offline C-based command-line tool for 
reformatting the original bitstreams generated by Xilinx tools into partial bitstreams 
targeted for placement in their original locations or different locations. Unlike PARBIT, 
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in other offline relocation techniques, the same design is added as an RM in multiple 
RPs so that the design can be configured in more than one RP at runtime.  
With respect to reliability, the obvious limitation with the offline relocation 
methods is that it is impossible to anticipate all the possible locations where permanent 
damages could occur. In addition, generating and storing bitstreams for multiple target 
locations increases the external storage size and cost. On the other hand, runtime PBR, 
which involves the modification of the location address of the task online ensures that 
only one copy of the bitstream is kept. Furthermore, emergent faults can be easily 
circumvented given that the requirements for PBR are met. While adapting a tool like 
PARBIT to run online on a processor in the FPGA is a possibility; however, this would 
incur a large reconfiguration overhead due to the time taken to run the routine. 
For runtime PBR, several methods have been proposed and implemented. In [143], 
the authors present REPLICA, a hardware bitstream filter for runtime relocation. 
REPLICA implements a subset of the PARBIT functionality but unlike PARBIT, it 
manipulates the location address online while the bitstream is being downloaded, thus 
avoiding extra reconfiguration overhead and increased external storage. REPLICA is 
targeted at Virtex/-E architectures and can only relocate designs that use only CLBs. In 
the second version called REPLICA2Pro [144], which is similar to REPLICA, the 
Virtex-II/Pro architecture is supported and the relocation of BRAM and multiplier 
blocks is possible. However, both REPLICA and REPLICA2Pro are limited to column-
wise 1D relocation. 
The BiRF [145] is another hardware bitstream filter and it has a general structure 
which is similar to REPLICA, but unlike REPLICA it is targeted at both Virtex/-E and 
Virtex-II/Pro architectures, with an improvement in speed of more than 50%. The 
authors in [145] also introduced BAnMaT Light, which is a completely software-based 
relocation solution implemented in C. 
Several other runtime relocation techniques have appeared in the literature. 
However, the common theme is the provision of a FAR manipulating functionality, a 
configuration engine, and a means of recalculating CRC. The recalculation of the CRC 
checksum is important because the deliberate modification of the FAR value will void 
the checksum pre-computed by the design tools. In order to maintain bitstream 
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integrity, a CRC recalculation functionality is needed. It is however, possible to relocate 
a partial bitstream without regard to CRC recalculation. One can simply issue a CRC 
reset command (0x30008001 followed by 0x00000007) at the point in the bitstream 
when a CRC checksum would normally be specified to the configuration logic. As a 
result, it is possible to have circuit relocation implementations that do not include a 
CRC recalculation feature although CRC is recommended to be used if the FPGA is in 
an environment where the bitstream transmission is not prone to error [146]. 
None of the existing relocation techniques seems suitable for encrypted PBs. As a 
matter of fact, as far as the authors know, there is not a single work (not even a tool 
flow) that has considered the relocation of encrypted PBs, especially from the 
perspective of runtime PBR. With an encrypted PB, existing relocation 
implementations like those just reviewed would require a runtime decryption of the 
bitstream before feeding it to the ICAP, incurring a resource overhead for implementing 
the decryption circuit. A technique where an already configured task is read back and 
relocated on-chip [147][148] looks attractive for relocating encrypted PBs but there is 
an initial configuration time which increases the system’s overhead. In Chapter 5, this 
thesis will propose a mechanism that offers a solution with considerably less resource 
and time overheads. 
It is worth noting that apart from WL strategies, which require PBR for achieving 
uniform ageing; and permanent damage circumvention, which requires PBR for 
moving a task to a damage-free region, there are other justifications for PBR. One is 
the reduction of external bitstream storage arising from the fact that multiple RMs can 
share the same RP and hence, only one bitstream has to be kept. 
3.2.5 Requirements for Partial Bitstream Relocation 
For a circuit to be relocatable from one location to another on the FPGA, a set of 
stringent requirements must be met, namely: the matching of the source and destination 
regions in terms of resource type and relative positions, including the routing structure; 
the provision of dynamic communication between the relocated circuit and the other 
circuits on the FPGA; the preservation (or rather, avoidance of) of any static routes 
crisscrossing the target region; and the provision of clocking. 
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These requirements apply to both offline and runtime PBR, though mostly to 
runtime PBR. However, it is relatively easy to meet them offline since the designer is 
in control of the synthesis. Meeting the requirement of a matching location is eased 
since the synthesis tool can use the place and route to address a situation in which the 
target location does not have the resources in the required order. Moreover, all the other 
requirements are related to general interconnect and clock routings and these are well 
suited for offline handling and align well with the established PR flow constraints of 
establishing routes offline. Hence, the following considerations are mostly relevant to 
runtime PBR. 
A. Finding a Matching Target Location 
The first requirement to be met for PBR is to find a matching target location. The 
location to be relocated to must have similar resources (by type, number, and relative 
positions) as the circuit’s original location (see Figure 3.2). The PBs must respect the 
existing irregularities in the FPGA fabric [149]. These can be inherent to the chip 
structure, such as clock region boundaries or heterogeneous BRAM and DSP columns, 
but can also be created by the designer when using PartPins. 
This requirement is the easiest to meet as FPGA resources are generally tiled in 
regular repeating patterns. In Figure 3.2, RM2 can be relocated to the indicated matched 
location because the resources in the target location are of the same type and 
arrangement as those in RP1. It is salient to state that with newer FPGAs like the 7 
series and the UltraScale, the architecture of the chip area is more heterogeneous and 
irregular. This means it is more difficult to find matching locations on the horizontal 
plane. Vertical matching locations are easier to come by because there is homogeneity 
at the column level of all known Xilinx FPGAs. 
In general there is almost always a matching location for any circuit on the FPGA, 
not considering other circuits that may be on the FPGA. However, in reality, other 
circuits could have taken up potential matching locations, in which case other 
techniques of relocation like the memoization-based method in [150] can be used, 
though with a limitation in the data width support, but nonetheless, a promising solution 
to an impossible situation. 
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Figure 3.2: Representation of the considerations for circuit relocation 
B. Provision of Dynamic Communication 
The second requirement that must be met for PBR is the provision of 
communication at the desired location both for preserving existing interconnections and 
making new ones. This requirement is generally more difficult to fulfil for runtime 
relocation because of the need to establish routes in runtime, and is often the question 
raised against PBR. PBR involves moving a circuit from its original location where it 
has established communication routes with other circuits on the FPGA. Re-establishing 
these communication routes after relocation is not natively supported by the existing 
design tools, as the PR flow demands that all communication routes are statically 
determined at design time by inserting Partition Pins between the static design and the 
RMs. 
With respect to Figure 3.2, the easiest way to provide dynamic communication is 
to ensure that routes from RP1 and RP3 to the matched location for RM2 are established 
at design time. This way, during runtime, RM2 can be relocated while maintaining its 
communication link with RM1. This can be accomplished by using the PR flow of the 
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forces all RMs meant for a particular RP to share the same fixed interface with the static 
part. The downside of this is that in runtime, an RM can only be placed in or relocated 
to an RP to which it belongs. Since the decision of which RP an RM belongs is made 
at design time, this limits the number of locations circuits can be relocated to in case of 
emergent permanent faults. This deteriorates the reliability figures of the device. 
To overcome the limitations imposed by the PR flow, online routing, a technique 
that involves recomputing the routes through connection and switch boxes by 
programming the relevant PIPs during runtime can be used, but this is computationally 
expensive, often requiring several thousands of clock cycles per net [151]. Moreover, 
determining the location of bits controlling the switch matrices and PIPs in the bitstream 
is non-trivial and there is no constancy in the bitstream format from one FPGA family 
to another. With the increasing size of newer FPGA chips, bitstream formats and 
interconnects have become more complex, and runtime routing inevitably more costly 
and complicated. Several other approaches have been proposed for dynamic 
communication to support PBR. These are presented in Section 3.4.4 in the context of 
on-chip dynamic communication infrastructures in FPGAs. 
C. Preservation of Existing Static Routes in Reconfigurable Partitions 
One other challenge with relocation is that of existing static routes in the target 
region which belong to circuits outside that region, and as such must be manually 
preserved [90]. The target location for a relocated circuit is not guaranteed of being free 
from interconnect routings that belong to a neighbouring circuit most especially, 
circuits in the static region. If the relocated circuit is reconfigured in the location 
without regard to these pre-existing routings, it could override the routings and break 
the functionalities of the nearby circuits. 
For instance, in Figure 3.2, there is an existing static route passing through the 
matched location for RM2. To avoid conflict, this static route has to be manually 
preserved when placing RM2. This problem exists because FPGA implementation tools 
like Vivado allow circuits to use routing resources external to their confined regions 
even if they have no logic resources there. While the Vivado constraints 
EXCLUDE_PLACEMENT and CONTAIN_ROUTING can be used to ensure that an 
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RP does not use logic and routing resources outside its bound, they however, do not 
prevent routings from the static region from crossing the RPs [37]. 
A method of preserving pre-existing routings would be to read back the 
configuration frames corresponding to the routings in the target region and XOR  this 
with those of the relocated circuit before configuration, but care has to be taken to 
ensure that these pre-existing routings are avoided if their path would conflict with the 
routing in the relocated circuit. A good allocation algorithmic search should put this 
into consideration in finding a suitable place for relocation in the first place. One 
shortcoming of this is the time it takes to perform the readback before configuration 
and more time could be incurred if this has to be done recursively to find an appropriate 
location. 
FPGA design tools generally allow circuits in the static region to use routing 
resources in the RPs mostly because of the need to resolve routing congestion. While it 
is entirely possible to prevent design tools from doing this by using blockers that leave 
the place and route tool with only one option regarding routing a demonstrated in the 
OpenPR [152] and ReCoBus-Builder (now GOAHEAD) [153] PR tool flows; however, 
this can exacerbate congestions and increase path latencies [154]. While it is possible 
to use blockers, implementing this is not a trivial exercise and tool support is not yet 
mature. 
D. Timing Constraints Must be Met 
One issue that is often overlooked in PBR is timing. When an RM is relocated from 
its original location, it is possible that it fails to meet timing requirements in the new 
location. To ease timing closure, it is recommended that inputs in the RM and static 
logic are registered [37]. 
Once an RM meets timing within its bounded partition at design time, for the 
purpose of relocation, the RM can be expected to maintain its timing closure within its 
own physical bound regardless of wherever it is relocated on-chip in runtime if a strictly 
matching target location is used. Timing issues are related more to the interface between 
the static logic and the RM. As the RM circuit is moved about, its physical distance 
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from the static interface changes and thus its interface timing changes. This timing 
change must be taken into consideration in a practical PBR implementation. 
Timing is addressed in the GOAHEAD PR flow tool by considering the latency on 
interface signals when generating relocatable bitstreams [154]. Another tool which 
considers timing issues is AutoReloc [155], which is an automated design flow for 
generating relocatable bitstreams. To meet timing requirement for PBR, AutoReloc 
determines the delays between each pin on the RM and the static part for all the RPs to 
which the RM can be relocated. The maximum of these delays is used to constrain 
timing for the RM. 
E. A Clock Network Must be Provided at the Target Location 
The design tools do not route clock signals to regions of the FPGA that are not 
used by user designs. As such, if a circuit is relocated in runtime, a suitable clock 
network must be provided at the target location. The clock networks of the FPGA are 
routed through switch matrices of PIPs. These routing resources can be controlled by 
activating specific bits in the CMEM. This approach is exploited in [156] to provide 
online clock routing for relocated circuits. For instance, the authors manipulate regional 
clock buffers in runtime to provide different clock frequencies to tasks and to also 
switch away from failed clock networks. 
To simplify the process of clock routing, the clock tree routing information that 
pertains to each RP can be extracted from the static design and added to the RM at 
design time as done in [152]. Alternatively, dummy primitives like flip-flops or 
BRAMs can be placed into the floorplan and connected to global clock lines at compile 
time, forcing the place and route tool to route the required clock network to 
predetermined regions that will be used for relocation [154]. 
3.3 Task Configuration in Reconfigurable Computing 
The most important service provided by a ROS for RC is hardware task configuration. 
The capability to dynamically reconfigure an FPGA, brought about by DPR is exploited 
in RC for swapping tasks in and out of the FPGA in runtime. A review of the existing 
ROSes in Section 3.1 reveals that DPR is often used. The most popular means of 
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supporting DPR is through the ICAP. Access to the CMEM can also be achieved 
through the Processor Configuration Access Port (PCAP) [70] in Xilinx Zynq FPGAs 
as demonstrated in [157]. However, the PCAP can only be controlled from the 
processor in Zynq FPGAs. As such, though it incurs no hardware resource overhead as 
per a controller,  it is limited to a configuration throughput of 128 MB/s and blocks the 
processor during reconfiguration, preventing it from running other tasks [158]. 
Therefore, the better choice is the ICAP when high performance is required. 
As shown in Figure 3.3, in a typical ICAP controller, a finite state machine or 
processor is used to control the ICAP for a variety of read and write operations ranging 
from task configuration and readback, context switching, PBR, task replication for 
TMR implementation, and scrubbing for SEM, among others. There is usually a buffer 
memory composed out of BRAMs and used for buffering or streaming the bitstream. 
A data mover initiates bitstream transfer from an external storage memory. In order to 
meet the diverse needs of different RC architectures and ROS implementations, several 
configuration or ICAP controllers have been developed. These controllers can be 
broadly classified into two: those targeted at improving configuration throughput and 
those targeted at reliability. 
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One issue with RC in terms of performance is that of reconfiguration throughput 
especially as multiple system functions compete for access to the same internal 
configuration interface. A lot of the services provided by a ROS depends on DPR via 
the ICAP for self-reconfiguration. The maximum bandwidth of the ICAP is 3.2 Gbps 
at the recommended maximum operating frequency of 100 MHz. There are several 
attempts at increasing configuration throughput by overclocking the ICAP as seen in 
[159], [160], [161], and [162], even up to 550 MHz in [163], but this is substantially 
over the recommended maximum for which the chip has been characterized and 
guaranteed to perform reliably by Xilinx. Moreover, the maximum overclocked 
frequency is expected to be device-dependent and even vary among devices with the 
same speed grade [164] and could lead to erratic behaviours that could be hard to 
diagnose. As such, overclocking the ICAP would not be a safe option. Even when a 
feedback approach is used to ensure a continuous correct operation of the ICAP and the 
device [161][164], it is challenging to guarantee that there is no upset in expected 
functionality. In fact, the authors of [164] acknowledge the need for a thorough 
checking to ensure that the functionality of the configured module is correct. 
A different way of increasing configuration throughput is the use of bitstream 
compression enabled by the Multiple Frame Write (MFW) feature of the Xilinx FPGA. 
The MFW command (see Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 in Section 2.1.1) can be used to 
perform a write of a single frame data to multiple frame addresses. This compression 
exploits the fact that a bitstream usually contains many configuration frames that are 
the same. This is especially true for BRAM contents initialized to zeros. This feature is 
exploited in [165], where the authors notice speedups of up to 4.6x and 2.7x for test 
relocatable PWM and K-means circuits respectively. 
Apart from increasing configuration throughput, ICAP controllers have also been 
implemented to provide features useful for adaptation. From the viewpoint of a basic 
task loading requirement in RC, the only feature required in an ICAP controller is task 
configuration. However, the need for reliability has driven feature expansion in ICAP 
controllers. Most controllers implement basic features like task configuration and 
CMEM readback. However, some have added fault-tolerant capabilities like scrubbing 
and PBR with the purpose of supporting reliability in RC. 
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For instance, in [164], the ICAP controller features a Statistics Block with two 
hardware counters for system monitoring. The counters keep track of reconfiguration 
clock cycles and the performance of the controller itself. The values kept by these 
counters are meant for system-level adaptation management. As a further example, a 
functionality for modifying LUTs online without the use of precompiled bitstreams is 
introduced in [166], allowing a time-efficient dynamic modification of logic functions 
through runtime-generated partial bitstreams for LUTs. This can be a useful feature for 
error mitigation in LUTs.  
The reliability of an ICAP controller itself is important when it is designed for 
reliable CMEM access. In [167], selective TMR is used, in which a selected component 
of the controller is hardened by TMR. With this implementation, the controller as a 
smaller area footprint of 49% of a full TMR implementation. The features of this fault-
tolerant controller include hardware task downloading, hardware task blanking, and 
internal scrubbing in conjunction with the FRAME_ECC primitive. TMR is applied to 
a special self-recovery module that is aimed at recovering the controller in case of an 
error by fetching a golden bitstream from external memory. Since TMR is not applied 
to the controller itself, error detection is done by monitoring the BUSY signal of the 
ICAP. 
A comparison between different fault-tolerant implementations of an ICAP 
controller is presented in [168]. The authors investigate the reliability and area 
overheads of using TMR, Dual-Modular Redundancy (DMR), and CRC to protect the 
controller. In the DMR version of the controller, a small TMR-based recovery 
controller (much like in [167]) is used to recover when the DMR indicates an error. A 
multiplexer arbitrates access to the ICAP between the main controller and the recovery 
module. 
3.4 Communication in Reconfigurable Computing 
On-chip communication architectures can be grouped into three main categories, 
namely P2P, Bus, and NoC, based on the structure of the physical interconnect, the 
protocol of data transfer, and the interface design [169]. The main characteristic of P2P 
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interconnect is the simple and direct interconnection between two communicating 
circuits, but it is quite inefficient in terms of scalability as the number of cores increases. 
The shortcomings of P2P architecture scales up in shared buses.  
While a shared-bus system allows multiple cores to communicate by granting them 
access to a central global bus; however, because of the diverse nature and sheer number 
of these cores, buses become longer, introducing longer communication latencies, and 
consuming more power [170]. Bus arbitration also becomes more complicated. Buses 
are not flexible and scalable enough as an addition of a new module requires that the 
entire system be redesigned. As a result, NoCs have been proposed as the future of on-
chip communication. 
3.4.1 Network-on-Chip for Communication 
The NoC was borne out of the need to improve scalability, modularity, and performance 
among other factors, in on-chip communication [171]. This need arose because of the 
increase in the number and type of modules or processing elements running and 
communicating on a device. CPUs, graphic processors, DSPs, memory elements, and 
other modules with different functionalities became common-place on a single chip, 
effectively giving rise to the idea of System-on-Chip (SoC). 
The deficiencies of dedicated P2P and bus architectures are rooted in the reliance 
on the routing of wires between communicating circuits. With the increase in 
networking requirement as more cores are added, wires become long and connections 
more complicated, leading to increased power consumption. In fact, with the increasing 
logic resource density of modern FPGAs, on-chip interconnects have become more 
complex and take a considerable share of a device’s power consumption. For instance, 
in an on-chip interconnect power measurement carried out in [172] on a real hardware, 
the authors reveal that up to 14% of the total dynamic power can be consumed by the 
interconnect. It is clear that modern on-chip communication cannot rely on connection-
based interconnections. 
All these deficiencies have  given rise to the notion of routing packets, and not 
wires [173], which is the main idea behind the NoC. Instead of establishing P2P 
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connections, whether based on direct dedicated interconnections or shared buses, the 
NoC abstracts the Data Link Layer (data transfer on wired links) from the 
Application/presentation Layer (the on-chip cores). That is, it decouples computation 
from communication with the potential to bring about unprecedented levels of 
scalability and performance. The general structure of a NoC is shown in Figure 3.4, 
with 3-by-3 nodes as an example. NoCs come in various forms targeted at addressing 
different performance metrics, but in general, they are made up of routers, adapters, and 
links that connect all the cores (processing elements or hardware tasks) on a chip. Each 
core is interfaced to the network via a network adapter that implements a network 
interface on the network side and a core interface at the core side. 
 
Figure 3.4: Architecture of a generic NoC 
In terms of network topology, which is the arrangement and connectivity of the 
routers, the NoC shown in Figure 3.4 is a typical mesh architecture, which is the most 
popular due to its support for easy physical design and scalability, but its performance 
degrades with increasing network size, as it takes more hops for packets to reach their 
destinations. There are other topologies like Ring, Star, Butterfly Fat-Tree, Polygon, 
and Torus. There is no one-size-fits-all topology, and in fact, this is the same for the 
other NoC design parameters in general, as they are selected based on compromises 
that deliver the targeted network performance, especially for throughput and latency 
metrics [174]. 
Core RouterLink
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One important NoC architectural parameter is routing, which determines how 
communication packets are routed from source to destination nodes. In a deterministic 
routing, packets are always transferred along the same fixed route unlike in adaptive 
routing where packets can take alternate routes to the destination depending on the 
network load which is dynamically evaluated [175]. An example of a deterministic 
algorithm is the XY routing, which moves packets in the horizontal direction first as far 
and close as possible to the destination node (to a node that has the same X coordinate 
as the destination node), and then goes in the vertical direction until it arrives at its 
destination. However, several other routing algorithms have been proposed. A good 
review of these algorithms  has been presented in [176]. 
There are several other architectural features of NoCs. However, as the concept of 
NoCs is an already comprehensively covered subject, more extensive details on its 
basics can be found in [171], [175], and [177]. Nevertheless, it is pertinent to identify 
the performance parameters of NoCs, which are bandwidth, throughput, and latency 
[175]. Measured in bits per second (bps), the bandwidth of a NoC is the maximum rate 
of data transfer and it usually considers the entire packet. Throughput makes allowance 
for the fact that a packet usually contains non-message-related header and tail 
information. As such, it measures the rate of transfer of the message payload in 
messages per second or messages per clock cycle, or normalized to bits per node per 
clock cycle. Both bandwidth and throughput scale with the number of channels. 
Latency is the time elapsed from the instance a packet departs a source node to the 
moment it is completely received at the destination. 
3.4.2 Shortcomings of NoCs 
As promising as NoCs are, they have their downsides. Though they offer a good 
communication solution when compared to dedicated P2P and bus communications, 
there is an attendant resource overhead, which can be significant in smaller devices. 
That is, NoCs lead to an increase in the footprint of the overall design, and this is due 
mainly to the additional resources used for the routers to grant network access to the 
tasks. Depending on the size of the network, an overhead of up to 34.8% (3227 slices) 
for a 2-by-2 network is not impossible [178]. To reduce an NoC’s area utilization, a bit-
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serial network access can be used as proven in [179], where in a comparative analysis 
of serial and parallel interconnects, the authors note significant improvements of up to 
5.5× and 17× power consumption and area utilization respectively of serial links over 
parallel links. Similarly, in [180], the author observe that bit-parallel routers are 8× (for 
LUTs) and 23× (for FFs) larger than bit-serial routers. In addition, bit-serial designs are 
noted to have route congestion factors of only 1-2% compared to 10-20% for their bit-
parallel counterparts. 
Moreover, while compared to shared buses, NoCs lend themselves more readily to 
runtime circuit placement because of their support for easy modularity and scalability; 
however, the static routes of the network links still constitute a bottleneck to circuit 
relocation. In particular, the traditional NoC links pose the challenge of static routes as 
these links are constructed from the chip’s general routing resources and are free to 
cross RPs in partially reconfigurable system architecture. In a bit-parallel NoC, the 
network adapter at each node creates static routes that cross into other nodes. A bit-
serial NoC that uses general interconnects as links would have lesser static routes, but 
it would still require online redetermination of route in order to support dynamic 
communication. 
Meanwhile, it is possible to completely do away with routers and still have 
comparable or better network performance as demonstrated in [181], where a routerless 
NoC implementation shows a 7.7× reduction in power, a 3.3× reduction in area, a 1.3× 
reduction in zero-load packet latency, and a 1.6× increase in throughput when 
compared to a router-based NoC. 
3.4.3 Bit-Parallel and Bit-Serial NoCs 
The interconnections that carry packets from router to router can be made up of several 
single wires to form a parallel link that is able to switch a multi-bit data at a time. This 
is the typical case with NoCs and such NoCs can be referred to as bit-parallel NoCs. 
On the other hand, the link can also be composed of a single wire which is able to 
transmit a bit of data at a time, and as such, the resulting NoC can be termed bit-serial. 
Although bit-parallel NoCs generally offer higher throughputs, however, it has 
been shown that a serial implementation has the potential to reduce the area overhead 
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and power utilization of NoCs [179] while at the same time improving noise and signal 
interference, offering simpler network layout, and enhancing timing verification. It 
turns out that because of the efficiency it brings, high-speed serial communication is 
the current trend in digital design, e.g., PCI Express. As a result of the serial single-wire 
implementation, the usual performance-limiting skew on parallel links is localized to a 
single link and as such a much higher frequency is possible with a serial link.  
A bit-parallel link can provide a higher throughput than a bit-serial one when 
clocked at the same frequency. However, in the long run a bit-serial link can achieve a 
higher throughput if it can be clocked at a fast enough rate, at which point a bit-parallel 
link fails because of skew. For instance, in [180], the authors demonstrate bit-serial 
NoC routers that were 2-3x faster than their equivalent bit-parallel routers even with 
some level of pipeline optimization in the parallel implementation. 
3.4.4 The Need for Dynamic Communication 
One of the key requirements for dynamic task loading and PBR is the provision of 
dynamic communication for relocatable circuits. As such, the need for dynamic 
communication infrastructures is a salient one. In [148], the approach to dynamic 
communication involves the use of LUTs. LUT-based communication interfaces are 
attached to the lower right corner of RMs with vertical reconfigurable slots marked 
out on the chip. These slots have right-aligned vertical routing channels with LUT-
based communication primitives. This arrangement allows an RM to be dynamically 
connected to existing RMs on the slot or other slots via a hard-wired macro that runs 
through the bottom of all the slots. This macro also makes connection to the static 
region. 
A different approach to dynamic communication is taken in DyNoC, a dynamic 
network-on-chip architecture [182]. While several research works have been carried 
out on dynamic or reconfigurable NoCs, most do not actually consider the placement 
of a new task. Rather, they are mostly concerned with the runtime restructuring of the 
network topology or packet routing to meet changing communication needs as seen in 
ReNoC [183] and Hoplite [184] respectively. On the other hand, DyNoC’s approach to 
dynamic communication involves placing a new circuit over existing deactivated 
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network routers while leaving surrounding routers free for communication. With this 
arrangement, a new circuit can be placed anywhere on the mesh network with continued 
access to the network. However, we deem this approach to still have the challenges of 
static routes as the authors do not seem to have provided details on how these are 
managed and their implementation diagram [182] shows routings crisscrossing the 
entire floorplan. Indeed, it is unlikely that the authors intend DyNoC to be a 
communication network for relocatable circuits, as this is not a claim in the work. 
An ideal situation for dynamic communication is to have no static interconnects to 
deal with nor have the need to create routes on the fly. A step in that direction is taken 
in [90], where the authors present a communication mechanism that involves using the 
ICAP to transfer data between arbitrarily-placed hardware tasks, in the context of 
achieving the relocatability of tasks. This is done by connecting memory elements 
(distributed RAMs or BRAMs) to the inputs and outputs of circuits to serve as data 
memories and using the ICAP as a side channel to copy data from output memories to 
input memories thereby avoiding static interconnects. The data contents of a memory 
element can be accessed online from the CMEM (configuration layer). As such, reading 
back the correct portion of the CMEM in runtime would give access to the data written 
by a task into an output memory in the functional layer. The readback data can then be 
written to the input memory of another task via the configuration layer. Figure 3.5 
shows how a task would be interfaced with input and output data memories. 
Indeed, the idea of transporting data using the configuration layer of an FPGA dates 
back to 1998 when Brebner et al. in [185] proposed a virtual communication channel 
that involves reading from and writing to registers within source and destination virtual 
tasks defined as swappable logic units. In addition, the work in [160] demonstrates the 
use of the ICAP for moving data between circuits, but this is not used as a means of 
providing dynamic communication support with respect to relocation. 
This idea of moving data from one task to another without using physical wires can 
be seen as a form of relocation and it has limitations and consequences as highlighted 
in [186]. There is no way to know when a task has finished computation apart from 
polling the task. With multiple tasks possibly simultaneously active, this is even more 
demanding. There are three operations needed to be performed for each data relocation 
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– polling, readback, and writing. All these operations have to be serialized since the 
ICAP is a single resource. That is, ICAP-based data relocation does not support 
concurrent communication and this is the main bottleneck of transporting data in the 
configuration layer. 
 
Figure 3.5: Task interfacing for transferring data using the configuration layer  
Furthermore, the single nature of the ICAP has an implication on reliability. The 
ICAP has a maximum theoretical bandwidth of 400 MB/s [37] and Xilinx recommends 
that more than 99% of this bandwidth should be dedicated to SEM [187] for the entire 
device. SEM is indispensable for reliable RC. Using at least 99% for SEM means that 
only a meagre 4 MB/s of the ICAP’s bandwidth is available for other functions. With 
communication drawn in, there are two system functions competing for the remaining 


















































__________________________________________ Chapter 3 – Reconfigurable Computing 
 78 
3.5 Real-Time Systems and Requirements 
The concept of real-time computing is often confused as to mean executing tasks 
instantly. The main objective, on the hand, is to execute tasks before specified 
deadlines. It is not a matter of how soon or fast, but of when. Even if it takes a hundred 
years, so far it is completed before its deadline, an execution can be considered real-
time. Therefore, in general, “real-time systems are those in which the correctness of the 
system depends not only on the logical results of computations, but also on the time at 
which the results are produced” [38]. 
Despite the fact that the emphasis is on meeting deadlines, there are real-time 
systems in which missed deadlines do not lead to catastrophic system failures. Such 
systems are referred to either as firm real-time or soft real-time systems; firm when the 
delayed results are useless, and soft when the results can still be used. For example, 
dropping one or two frames in a video processing system due to missed timing would 
only affect the quality of the video stream, causing some performance degradation and 
placing this in the firm category. The same cannot be said of the flight control system 
of an aircraft or an anti-missile system where a missed deadline can have a fatal 
implication. Systems with such a stringent timing requirement are categorized as hard 
real-time. The categorization of real-time systems into hard, firm, and soft also translate 
directly into deadline ranges. While hard real-time systems can have time bounds in the 
order of several microseconds to a few milliseconds, firm real-time systems typically 
have time bounds in the range of a few milliseconds to several hundreds of 
milliseconds, and soft real-time systems can cope with time bounds in the range of a 
fraction of a second to a few seconds [127]. 
In terms of expected basic requirements, real-time systems are expected to be 
timely – producing correct results both in terms of value and timing; predictable, 
guaranteeing all timing requirements; efficient; robust – able to retain anticipated 
functionality even in overload scenarios; fault-tolerant; and modular – allowing easy 
modification of system features and functionalities [188]. 
To account for the mixed-criticality of tasks in a real-time system, where tasks have 
varying levels of criticality and as such, different strictness of timing requirements, with 
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some even completely non-critical, priorities can be assigned to these tasks. While 
missed deadlines in safety-critical real-time task execution can have catastrophic 
effects; in a bid to keep to deadlines, it is imperative to ensure that other less critical 
lower-priority tasks in the system are not starved of resources. At the same time, 
priority inversion, a situation where a low-priority task blocks a high-priority task for 
an unbounded period of time [189], must be avoided. 
It would be beneficial to highlight the importance of the awareness of real-time 
constraints in the key services of reconfigurable computing. This will highlight the 
factors that have to be considered in the design and implementation of these services, 
3.5.1 Real-Time Concerns in Configuration Memory Access 
The main real-time concern with CMEM access is with the ICAP and this stems from 
the fact that the ICAP is a single resource and multiple system functions in a ROS 
compete for its use. Two key functions that require the ICAP’s bandwidth for CMEM’s 
access are task configuration and error mitigation. There might even be multiple task 
configuration requests simultaneous or in close time proximity requiring access to the 
ICAP. 
The theoretical maximum bandwidth of the ICAP is 3.2 Gb/s at 100 MHz [37] and 
out of this, at least 99% is recommended to be put towards SEM [187] for effective 
device-wide coverage. This will affect the responsiveness of the ICAP to 
reconfiguration requests as much more time is spent on SEM, though scanning the 
entire device for errors all the time is questionable in the first place and this is the subject 
of this thesis in Section 4.3.2. Nevertheless, it is evident that there is a need to properly 
arbitrate the CMEM access in a reconfigurable computing system to ensure that real-
time constraints are respected. 
From the point of view of command and frame data loading, a task configuration 
operation through the ICAP is deterministic, especially since there are no external 
dependencies that might introduce unbounded timing. However, the possibility of 
configuration errors should be considered as they could necessitate an increase in the 
overall configuration time due to error diagnosis and bitstream reloading. 
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In reality, the management of the ICAP as a single shared resource is a real-time 
scheduling problem and it has to be treated as such. This has been the subject in several 
research works like [190], where the problems of priority inversion high-priority 
reconfiguration requests, and that of starvation of low-priority requests are addressed 
by introducing reconfiguration pre-emption, in which a reconfiguration process can be 
interrupted and completed at a later time without restarting the data loading from 
scratch. In another research [191], a reconfiguration controller with a command-based 
reconfiguration queue (CoRQ) was implemented to provide guaranteed reconfiguration 
latencies and support for the timing analysis of Worst-Case Execution Time (WCET) 
guarantees in the system. WCET is the upper bound execution time of a task and is used 
for validating real-time systems [192].. 
Another factor to consider, which relates to CMEM access is that partial 
reconfiguration can have an unpredicted impact on resource sharing. For instance, if a 
block of memory included inside an RM is shared by multiple tasks, the memory will 
not be available during the reconfiguration operation. It is also possible for the memory 
to be completely unavailable after reconfiguration if the RM has been inadvertently 
replaced with one that does not include the shared memory. These are possibilities that 
are worth considering for real-time PR. 
From the viewpoint of secure task (re)configuration using encrypted bitstreams, 
the restrictions in the port width (only the x8 port is allowed) of the SelectMAP and by 
extension, the ICAP interface (see Section 2.3.1), means that the configuration time is 
at least be quadrupled. This increase in configuration latency has to be considered when 
determining the WCET for a reconfigurable computing system that uses encryption. 
3.5.2 Real-Time Concerns in On-Chip Communication 
From real-time standpoint, the most important communication metric is predictable and 
guaranteed bandwidth and data transfer latency [193]. As communication traffic flows 
in the network from one node to another, there must be a guarantee on the maximum 
time it would take a packet to reach its destination. 
The risk of unbounded latencies is particularly exacerbated in a NoC, where 
routing algorithms can allow a packet to circulate in the network indefinitely in a bit to 
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find a non-congested path to the destination, a condition known as Livelock. In terms 
of a packet never reaching its destination, this is similar to Deadlock, in which two or 
more packets block one another indefinitely because needed network resources (e.g., 
buffers and channels) are fully occupied by other packets. Deadlock is as well 
detrimental to real-time processing since it is unbounded. Deadlock can be prevented 
by a careful routing algorithm implementation [170]. The XY routing never experiences 
either deadlock or livelock because it deterministically routes packets [176]. As such, 
it ensures predictable latency and is suited to real-time networking. An extensive survey 
of real-time NoCs can be found in [194]. 
A challenge with real-time on-chip communication, which arises from DPR, is that 
there is no way to predict the behaviour of an RM that is undergoing reconfiguration 
[37]. As a result, if the interfaces between RMs and the static region are not properly 
decoupled, there could be inter-task communication deadlocks where a task waits for a 
long time expecting data packets to arrive from another task which has been removed 
from the hardware fabric. This could lead to unpredictable and unbounded 
communication latencies. Proper handshaking techniques to release RMs safely for 
reconfiguration would help resolve this potential bottleneck. 
3.6 Towards Secure and Dynamic Reconfiguration in RC 
Indeed, a lot of research effort has been expended on the development of ICAP 
controllers as the survey in [195] and [196] show. However, there are important features 
that have not been given adequate attention in the existing configuration controllers. 
Since one of the aims of this thesis is to provide configuration infrastructure for reliable 
RC, ICAP controller features that will support key reliability-enabling functionalities 
must be implemented. These features include internal register read and write for device 
diagnosis; CMEM access abort mechanism, and SEM functionalities. These features 
and more are the subject of the methodologies in Chapter 4. 
Moreover, there is a key limitation with PBR with respect to a secure bitstream 
format. PBR requires the runtime manipulation of the bitstream’s frame addresses 
before it is delivered to the configuration interface.  As such, access to the readable 
__________________________________________ Chapter 3 – Reconfigurable Computing 
 82 
plaintext decrypted bitstream is needed. However, the frame addresses are specified in 
the encrypted portion of the secure bitstream and are as such, in cyphertext format. 
Meanwhile, to prevent a breach of security during reconfiguration, the on-chip 
decryptor in the FPGA feeds the plain decrypted data directly to the configuration 
interface; and as such, access to the decrypted data is denied. Therefore, there is a 
motivation to develop a secure bitstream format that is amenable to relocation. This, as 
well as supporting configuration controller and software for parsing vendor bitstreams 
are proposed in Chapter 5. 
In addition, it is evident that dynamic communication is important for reliability in 
RC systems and that the static nature of the interconnect wires employed in state-of-
the-art inter-task solutions is a big bottleneck, creating relocation-hampering rigidity in 
the hardware fabric. A motivation, therefore, exists to search for alternate 
communication solutions that would be amenable to circuit relocation. Chapter 6 
presents our approach to dynamic communication, which involves adapting the on-chip 
clocking resources for inter-communication among relocatable circuits. Since the clock 
resources use interconnect wires that are independent of the general logic interconnect 
wires, they do not constitute static routes. In other words, since the clocking resources 
are in a separate layer (refer to clock layer in Section 2.1.1), communication signals can 
be safely routed through them, freeing up the circuits to move freely in the functional 
layer. 
3.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented an overview of reconfigurable operating system with 
particular attention drawn to the various approaches to chip partitioning, 
reconfiguration style, reconfigurable area style, and inter-task communication. A 
conclusion that can be drawn is that there is a good body of existing work. Yet, there is 
a limited reliability or a complete lack of it and this can be attributed to the nature of 
the inter-circuit communication frameworks used. Even when a whole new approach is 
taken (e.g., configuration-layer-based data transfer), this falls short in other reliability 
scenarios. The general reliability concerns in RC were then discussed and it stood out 
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that partial bitstream relocation is a key technique for enabling reliability, most 
especially for permanent chip damage mitigation and circumvention. 
Furthermore, task configuration and inter-communication methods have been 
reviewed. Existing configuration controllers were deemed to already be concerned with 
high configuration throughput and reliability. However, there is still room for 
improvement, especially regarding reliability-enabling configuration functionalities for 
COTS reconfigurable devices. Moreover, some implementations went as far as 
overclocking the configuration interface in a bid to achieve higher performance. 
However, this approach is counter-reliable as the devices have not been characterized 
for speeds higher than those reported in the documentation and as such, such solutions 
cannot be relied upon.  
In addition, with real-time processing a consideration in this work, the real-time 
concerns in configuration memory access and on-chip communication were x-rayed. 
Predictability, timeliness, efficiency, robustness, and fault tolerance are some of the 
requirements that have to be met in real-time systems and attention is paid to these in 
the next chapters where the main contributions of this are presented, especially with the 





Chapter 4  
Configuration Memory Access 
Framework for Reliable 
Reconfigurable Computing 
As noted in Section 3.3, a lot of research effort has been expended on the development 
of ICAP controllers. However, there are important features that have not been given 
adequate attention in the existing controllers. For instance, if the system controller in a 
ROS issues a task configuration command and before the bitstream has been fully 
loaded, the controller deems it fit that the configuration is no longer needed, it should 
be possible to stop the operation and reset the ICAP without causing any lockups. 
Indeed, the ICAP has an abort feature that can be used to implement such a 
functionality. Moreover, as task configuration and SEM both require the ICAP’s 
limited bandwidth for their operations, it is important to ensure that an optimal 
operation strategy is used to ensure a fair sharing of the ICAP between these two critical 
system functions without starving any of them. Furthermore, access to device registers 
for device-level information and control would be handy, especially for system 
diagnosis and SEFI mitigation. As such, this thesis proposes an ICAP controller with 
these functionalities. To manage the various low-level operations of this controller is 
abstracted by a CMEM Access Manager (CAM) that incorporates Direct Memory 
Access (DMA) access, operation parameter setting, and operation control. 
The techniques and implementations reported in this chapter are covered in the 
author’s publication in [197]: 
 A. Adetomi, G. Enemali, and T. Arslan, ‘A Fault-Tolerant ICAP Controller 
with a Selective-Area Soft Error Mitigation Engine’, in 2017 NASA/ESA 
Conference on Adaptive Hardware and Systems (AHS), 2017, pp. 192–199. 
 
4 
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4.1 Configuration Memory Interfacing 
Figure 4.1 is a diagrammatic representation of the proposed CAM. The core of the 
manager is a Finite State Machine (FSM) that interfaces to the ICAP. The ICAP FSM 
(IFSM) controls the loading of bitstream command packets to the ICAP. A BRAM-
based buffer is used to temporarily store the bitstream inside the chip before it is sent 
to the ICAP. There are also functional blocks for configuration monitoring, FAR 
command packet detection and frame address modification for PBR. 
  
Figure 4.1: Top-level view of the configuration memory access controller 
To control all these functions, a controller or processor external to the IFSM is 
required. In this prototype, the processor used is the ARM Cortex-A9 for the Zynq 
FPGA and MicroBlaze processor for the 7 series FPGA. The processor is not part of 
the configuration controller; it is a user-level component. On receiving a DMA transfer 
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transfer by writing to the control registers of the Data Mover. The following subsections 
throw more light on the implementation details of the controller’s components. 
4.1.1 ICAP Controller 
The ICAP controller encompasses an FSM which directly interfaces to the ICAP and 
performs low-level read and access operations. Configuration error monitoring is 
provided by a dedicated Configuration Monitoring Circuit (CMC) while the incoming 
bitstream is monitored to detect and modify FAR values for PBR operations. 
The ICAP Finite State Machine (IFSM) is the core of the ICAP controller and it 
exposes a number of interface ports to the user or a host processor for controlling the 
FSM. There are other ports that connect to the ICAP primitive and the ICAP Buffer. 
The IFSM is based on a one-hot FSM encoding, which is better at error detection than 
binary encoding [198]. Standard FSM coding techniques are followed in the 
implementation of the IFSM. For instance, an enumerated type containing all possible 
state values is used to declare the state register. Since an SEU in a flip-flop can throw 
an FSM into a non-existent deadlock state [102], the IFSM includes a default state that 
catches all invalid state transitions  and passes control to an ERROR_PERSIST state, 
which asserts the icntrlr_err signal. In addition, the Vivado safe_implementation and 
safe_recovery_state attributes are used to implement an FSM that is as reliable as 
possible. 
For state control, state and state_after internal signals are used to simplify the 
control of an otherwise complex but efficient state machine. To prevent code bloat and 
unnecessary hardware resource usage as multiple FSM states send commands and data 
to the ICAP at different points, every write to the ICAP is handled in a 
WRITE_TO_ICAP state. A correct return of control to the proper state is then achieved 
by setting next_state to the content of the state_after register, which is always set 
before control is passed to the WRITE_TO_ICAP state. This coding style is justified 
by the fact that the eventual resource utilization is much lower than state-of-the-art 
considering a similar feature set or even more (see Section 4.5.1). 
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Figure 4.2 shows the key interfaces and ports of the IFSM. Note that internal inter-
connection ports like the ones controlling the CMC are not shown. Brief descriptions 
of the control interface ports are given in Table 4.1. 
  
Figure 4.2: Key interfaces and ports of the ICAP finite state machine 
In terms of control flow (see Figure 4.3), the IFSM remains in the RESET state 
waiting for the opcode to change, at which point it deasserts the icntrlr_rdy signal and 
move on to the CHOOSE_OP state. For most of the operations, command sequences 
and templates are kept in the IBUF and used as the basis for the operations (see Section 
4.1.3). Thus, the first step in performing an operation is to point the IBUF address 
pointer to the appropriate address in the memory. In the CHOOSE_OP state, the FSM 
first synchronizes the ICAP by writing the operation starting command sequence (see 
Appendix A.1) and then proceeds to perform the operation chosen by the user. It should 
be noted that in the implementation, there are multiple distinct states used to perform 
each operation. For instance, to perform a relocation, the target location address has to 
be first retrieved from the ICAP Buffer in a different state prior to writing the frame 
data. 
After the operation has been performed, the END_OP state is used to send 
desynchronization commands to the ICAP while a subsequent COMPLETE_OP state 
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to NOP) before returning control to the CHOOSE_OP state. Every operation is ended 
with a DESYNC command to ensure that each operation starts from a known state. 
The IFSM’s interface to the ICAP is presented in Figure 4.4. Every data word 
presented to the ICAP’s input and read from its output is bitswapped at the byte level. 
That is, every byte is swapped such that the MSB becomes the LSB. Reading the ICAP 
requires deasserting CSI_B (= ‘1’) first, and then setting RDWR_B to ‘1’. Asserting 
CSI_B (= ‘0’’) after this makes readback data available three clock cycles later. Writing 
the ICAP is similar except that RDWR_B is set to ‘0’ and the data written one word per 
clock cycle after asserting CSI_B. 
Table 4.1: Description of the IFSM’s control interface ports 
Port Description 
clk Clock input to the IFSM. The maximum allowed frequency is 100 MHz 
icntrlr_en 
1-bit active LOW enable for the ICAP controller. The opcode port 
should be set prior to asserting this. 
opcode 
4-bit operation selection port. This should be set before asserting 
icntrlr_en 
wait_for_ibuf 
1-bit signal instructing the IFSM to stall because there is no new data to 
load from the IBUF 
cfg_count 
2-bit configuration count port, used to specify how many frame locations 
should be written for MFW 
rgr_addr 
5-bit register address port. This address can be for any of the device 
configuration registers in Table 2.3 
icntrlr_rdy 
1-bit output port  that indicates the completion of an operation and the 
readiness to start a new one 
dma_irq 
1-bit DMA interrupt signal to the user for requesting frame data transfer 
from the external memory into the IBUF 
icntrlr_err 
1-bit output port to indicate internal FSM error. This is asserted in the 
ERROR_PERSIST state 
ecc_mbu_error 
1-bit output indicating that a multi-bit ECC error has been detected in 
the frame pointed to by the ecc_error_far port 
ecc_erorr_far 
26-bit output indicating the frame address where an ECC error has been 
detected 
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Figure 4.4: IFSM’s interface to the ICAP 
For PBR operations, the FAR Detection Circuit (FDC) and FAR Modification 
Circuit (FMC) work together to detect and modify frame FAR addresses on their way 
to the FPGA’s CMEM. Once a FAR command packet header (0x30002001) is detected 
by the FDC, the FMC is activated to compute a new FAR value based on user 
specification. The user is able to control the generation of new FAR values by writing 
parameters into appropriate IBUF locations (see Section 4.2). Up to three new frame 
addresses can be modified, and this for TMR implementation purpose. The frame 
address modification involves changing column, row, and top_bottom values when 
necessary. 
4.1.2 Bitstream Buffering 
The partial bitstreams of hardware tasks are stored in an external DDR memory and 
transferred to an on-chip BRAM-based ICAP Buffer (IBUF) by a Data Mover. All these 
components in addition to the multiplexer at the input of the IBUF are grouped as the 
Buffer Arbiter (see Figure 4.1). In addition to the task bitstreams coming from the 
external DDR into it, the IBUF is also used to store configuration command templates 
and sequences, which are merged with configuration data prior to being written to the 
FPGA’s CMEM. The templates require a user to specify certain parameters needed for 
some operations and sequence are often used commands kept inside the IBUF (e.g., the 
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The 7 series FPGA’s BRAM is dual-ported, with two possible RAM modes [199]. 
When configured in the true dual-port mode, it provides two independent read/write 
ports to the user. That is, both ports can access any memory location at any time. On 
the contrary, in the simple dual-port RAM mode, one port is dedicated to writing and 
the other to reading. For access conflict avoidance, certain restrictions are 
recommended, depending on whether the dual-port access is synchronous or 
asynchronous. This mostly involves using the READ_FIRST, WRITE_FIRST, and 
NO_CHANGE modes to control which operation (read or write) has priority for each 
of the ports. This work uses the WRITE_FIRST mode with a true dual-port RAM 
selection. 
As conflicting simultaneous access to the BRAM can cause data uncertainty, the 
IFSM never accesses the IBUF unless an operation is going on and the user processor 
should also not set parameters while the IFSM is active. The expected order of 
controlling of operation is to set parameters in the IBUF first, then start an operation. It 
is however, necessary to access the IBUF during an active frame data loading, for 
transferring bitstream data from the external memory but care is taken to avoid access 
collision by monitoring the ibuf_addr_pntr. A dma_irq interrupt signal is routed out to 
the configuration controller’s interface for this. The IFSM tracks the location of the 
ibuf_addr_pntr at a frame (404 bytes) granularity level. Once at least a frame space is 
available, the dma_irq is pulsed for one clock cycle. The user can monitor an 
ibuf_space_pntr port for an indication of the position of the ibuf_addr_pntr. The frame 
data buffer space can accommodate 9 frames. Therefore, ibuf_space_pntr is a 4-bit 
signal. The DMA interrupt is fired each time ibuf_space_pntr. 
The combination of an interrupt request with coarse frame-level information about 
the space available in the IBUF allows flexibility in data transfer and ensures that the 
minimum possible delays are incurred, if any. It should be noted that the ICAP clocking 
is done at the recommended 100-MHz speed. This leaves room for clocking the Buffer 
Arbiter at a higher rate. If for any reason, frame data is not loaded as at when signaled 
by the dma_irq, the user can assert a wait_for_ibuf signal to instruct the IFSM to stall 
while new frame data is being loaded. 
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There are three components of the configuration controller that require access to 
the IBUF, namely, the IFSM, the Processor (to set operation parameters in the IBUF), 
and the Data Mover. The IFSM is given a dedicated port on the IBUF while the 
Processor and the Data Mover both have a multiplexed access to the other port. 
While the BRAM can practically be of any size depending on how much buffering 
is desired, a single BRAM36k is used in the demonstration. This provides a total of 
1024 32-bit memory locations. An address map of the composition of the IBUF is 
shown in Figure 4.5. The frame data buffer space is the section used for bitstream 
buffering and it is initialized to all zeroes. It can buffer up to 9 frames. The following 
subsections provide details on the contents of the sequences and templates kept in the 
IBUF. 
4.1.3 ICAP Access Command Templates 
For the various operations of the ICAP controller, configuration command packets are 
kept inside the IBUF as templates and are written to the ICAP along with the 
configuration frame data. The commands are based on the registers in Table 2.3. Details 
on how to compose read and write commands packets have been presented in Section 
2.1.2 and be further explored in [47]. The benefit of using templates is that the 
commands are generic and thus reusable, minimizing external storage requirement as 
incoming bitstreams do not have to include the commands already in these templates. 
The details of the composition of these templates can be found in Appendix A. 
4.1.4 Execution and User Interface Flows 
The execution and user interface flows of the ICAP controller are shown in Figure 4.6 
and Figure 4.7 respectively. At the completion of an operation, which is signalled by 
the assertion of the icntrlr_rdy signal, the Processor or a user-determined driver must 
change the opcode to NOP in order to revert to the RESET state for a new operation (if 
any) to start. The RESET state resets the internal registers and it is important for this 
state to be used intermediate of operations. For instance the icntrlr_rdy signal has to be 
de-asserted in readiness for synchronizing a new operation. 
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Note that an exception to the user interface flow is the abort operation which can 
be specified at any time during an active operation. A special circuit in the same process 
as the IFSM is used to continuously check if the opcode becomes ABT at any point 
during an active operation. 
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Figure 4.7: ICAP Controller’s user interface flow 
4.2 Configuration Memory Access Operations 
There are eight operations in all. These operations are described in the subsections that 
follow. A unique operation code (opcode) is assigned to each operation as shown in 
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code to the opcode port of the ICAP controller. The three most basic templates are the 
CFRT, CFWT, and MFWT templates and these are used in various forms by the 
operations. These templates give primitive access to reading and writing the CMEM. 
In addition, Appendix B contains relevant waveforms for the different operations. 
These waveforms were captured during real tests of the operations. 
Table 4.2: ICAP Controller’s operations and opcodes 
Operation Abbreviation Opcode Templates 
No Operation NOP 0x0 None 
Readback RBK 0x1 CFRT 
Configuration CFG 0x2 CFWT, MFWT 
Read Modify Write RMW 0x3 CFRT, CFWT 
Blanking BLK 0x4 CFBT, MFWT 
Register Read RGR 0x5 None 
Custom Write CWR 0x6 None 
Abort ABT 0x7 None 
Soft Error Mitigation SEM 0x8 CFRT, MFWT 
 
4.2.1 No Operation (NOP) – Opcode 0 
This is the idle or default state of the ICAP Controller. In this state, no operation is 
carried out. The implementation of the controller is such that every operation must 
begin and end with the NOP as shown in Figure 4.6. This ensures that every operation 
starts from a known state by triggering a reset of the internal signals. 
4.2.2 Readback (RBK) Operation – Opcode 1 
This operation is used to read back configuration data from the CMEM. CMEM 
readback is an important functionality used for SEM, especially readback scrubbing 
(see Section 3.2.2). Each RBK operation retrieves a frame of pad data (zeroes) before 
the actual configuration frame data, incurring an overhead of 101 clock cycles. At the 
recommended ICAP clock frequency (fICAP_MAX) of 100 MHz [49], this is 1.01 µs for 
______________ Chapter 4 – Configuration Memory Access Framework for Reliable RC 
 97 
each readback. This overhead is unavoidable but can be amortized over many 
contiguous frames if many frames are read in a single operation. The most important 
function of readback is to read the CMEM content for soft error check. The RBK 
operation requires the user to set the FAR address for readback and the number of words 
to read, pad frame inclusive (see Table 4.3). 
Table 4.3: RBK operation parameters 
Operation Parameters IBUF Address Comments 
RBK 
RBK_FAR 14 (0x00E) The number of words 
excludes the pad frame NUM_OF_WORDS 16 (0x010) 
 
The RBK operation uses the OSS sequence, followed by the CFRT template, and 
concluded with the OES sequence. Before the OES is loaded, the ICAP is switched to 
the read mode and readback data is available deterministically three clock cycles after 
asserting icap_en. The read-back data is stored in the IBUF from address 0x073. Since 
the frame data buffer space is only 9 frames, it means only 9 frames can be read in a 
single operation. The pad frame is discarded and never stored in the IBUF. It is certainly 
possible to read more than 9 frames in a single operation if the IBUF is implemented to 
use more BRAMs. The read-back data can, as well, be transferred from the IBUF to an 
external memory (if necessary) to free up the IBUF.  
4.2.3 Configuration (CFG) Operation – Opcode 2 
The CFG operation is for loading tasks’ bitstreams to the CMEM. This operation 
intrinsically makes provision for circuit relocation; that is, every configuration request 
is treated as a relocation request. There are two modes for the CFG operation – Basic 
CFG and MFW-based CFG. The Basic CFG uses the sequence and template 
combination of [OSS + CFWT + Uploaded Data (multiple frames) + OES] while the 
MFW-based CFG uses the combination of [OSS + CFWT + Uploaded Data (single 
frame) + MFWT + OES]. 
Up to three target frame addresses (see Table 4.4) can be supplied when using the 
MFW-based CFG for configuration, in which case the configuration data has to be 
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loaded frame-by-frame. Because it uses the CFWT, the Basic CFG incurs a pad frame 
(see Appendix A.3). This is not the case for MFW-based CFG and as such, it is more 
suitable for TMR and proves to be more efficient for small-sized tasks. The TMR 
configuration of a task can be more efficient when the MFW-based CFG is used, in 
which case the task can be duplicated or triplicated in a single configuration operation. 
Otherwise, the Basic CFG mode is used to configure the same task in multiple CFG 
operations. 
Table 4.4: CFG operation parameters 
Operation Parameters IBUF Address Comments 
CFG 
DEVICE_IDCODE 25 (0x019) If  MFW-based TMR is not 
needed, the number of 
FARs (indicated on the 
cfg_count port) can be 
ignored  
CONFIG_FAR_1 29 (0x01D) 
CONFIG_FAR_2 54 (0x036) 
CONFIG_FAR_3 68 (0x044) 
 
If there is no intention to use the MFW feature, only the CONFIG_FAR_1 address 
has to be supplied and cfg_count should be disregarded. This is because, the IFSM 
automatically detects the number of frames to write as the bitstream is being uploaded 
to the ICAP and automatically determines whether to use the Basic CFG or MFW-
based CFG. When the number of words is more than a single frame (101 words), then 
it knows the MFW cannot be used and it ignores CONFIG_FAR_2, CONFIG_FAR_3, 
and the value on the cfg_count port. 
The CONFIG_FAR addresses in Table 4.4 are actually offset addresses. For 
configuration or relocation to work successfully, the task is expected to be initially 
floor-planned during the design phase, at the top-leftmost corner of the bottom half of 
the FPGA (see Figure 4.8). Column and row offsets from this location are then stated 
in their respective fields in the CONFIG_FAR addresses. In Figure 4.8, N is chosen as 
-1 so that the first row has Y=0. 
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Figure 4.8: FPGA row and column addressing for task locations 
4.2.4 Read Modify Write (RMW) Operation – Opcode 3 
The RMW operation combines the RBK and CFG operations for a highly-abstracted 
readback and configuration in a single operation. This is a useful feature for task and 
data relocation. For instance, a method of PBR is to read back an already configured 
task and configure it somewhere else on the chip in runtime as demonstrated in [147] 
and [148]. Once a task is relocated (by any means), it might be necessary to save the 
context of the task and restore it by copying changeable user memory data in FFs, LUT-
RAMs, SRLs, and BRAMs from the original location to the new location. To ensure 
that relocated task contexts are not lost, the circuit in the original location should not be 
blanked until the data has been relocated as well. The RMW operation uses the template 
combination of [OSS + CFRT + Optional Save_Data Bit Toggling + MFWT + OES]. 
As such, source and destination frame addresses are set in the respective templates. 
A special step is taken when a BRAM content frame is being RMWed; there are 
save_data bits in the frame and these have to be toggled to enable the BRAM contents 
corresponding to that frame to be updated. There is a save_data bit is at bit position 17 
of the 5th word in every successive 10 words in every BRAM frame. When the frame 
is read back, the bits show up as OFF (‘1’). The IFSM turns them ON (‘0’) while writing 
the frame read-back frame data to the target frame address. This is done without stalling 
the ICAP.  
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4.2.5 Blanking (BLK) Operation – Opcode 4 
The BLK operation is useful for removing an already configured circuit. A circuit can 
be removed to reduce power consumption if it is no longer needed. To blank a circuit 
region, a normal black box bitstream generated by Vivado can be used, but for each 
circuit configured on the FPGA, a blanking bitstream like this would have to be kept in 
memory, thereby increasing the size requirement of the external memory. On the other 
hand, the BLK operation simply requires the starting frame address and the number of 
frames to blank. 
Since a blanking bitstream is composed basically of zeros, an iterative writing 
procedure is used by the ICAP FSM. Once the user specifies the START_FAR value 
and the NUM_OF_FRAMES at the addresses indicated in Table 4.5, the IFSM 
automatically generates the other FAR values. In addition, the BLK circuit utilizes the 
MFW feature to reduce configuration time. Basically, we write multiple addresses with 
a single frame of zeros, thereby saving a huge time. In order to reduce logic resources 
used, the BLK uses the CFG operation’s circuit for the MFW part. That is, the BLK 
operation shares IFSM states with the CFG operation. A BLK operation uses the 
sequence and template combination of [OSS + CFBT + 101 Blank Words + MFWT + 
OES]. 
Table 4.5: BLK operation parameters 
Operation Parameters IBUF Address Comments 
BLK 
DEVICE_IDCODE 70 (0x046) 
The number of frames 
includes the starting frame 
START_FAR 74 (0x04A) 
NUM_OF_FRAMES 77 (0x04D) 
 
4.2.6 Register Read (RGR) Operation – Opcode 5 
The RGR operation provides an easy access to the FPGA’s internal registers. It uses 
the sequence and command combination of [OSS + RGR command + Readback Event 
+ OES]. A user can set the 5-bit address (see Table 2.3) of the register to read on the 
rgr_addr input port of the CFG Controller and set the Opcode to 4. The ICAP FSM 
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reads the register and returns the value to the IBUF_DATA_ADDR address. The RGR 
capability can be utilized to diagnose the FPGA in runtime. For instance, if a 
configuration error occurs, the STAT register can be queried to know the source of 
error. For writing a register, the CWR operation can be used.  
4.2.7 Custom Write (CWR) Operation – Opcode 6 
The CWR operation allows the user to write runtime-generated data into the 
configuration memory. Since the CFG operation works with the configuration data 
stored in an external memory and moved into the IBUF, it does not directly support 
writing data generated at runtime. The CWR is the solution to this. Data buffered on 
the IBUF from address 0x05A (see Table 4.6) can be written to the configuration 
memory. The number of words for the CWR is set on IBUF address 0x04E. 
Table 4.6: CWR operation parameters 
Operation Parameters IBUF Address Comments 
CWR 
NUM_OF_WORDS 78 (0x04E) Allows the loading of 
dynamically-generated data CONFIG_DATA 90 (0x05A) 
 
The CWR operation can be used for device diagnosis by allowing the user to load 
dynamic data and indeed, this can be more efficient than loading data from an external 
memory, especially for small chunks of command packets. From address 0x05A, 25 
memory locations are reserved for the user to keep frequently-used command words 
(see Figure 4.5). The memory locations are just before the IBUF_DATA_ADDR 
(0x073) and are never overwritten by the IFSM. The CWR can also be used in 
conjunction with the RBK operation for fault injection. A frame can be read back and 
stored in the IBUF. A bit of interest can then be flipped and the frame written to the 
CMEM using the CWR operation. 
The number of words being written in a CWR operation could also be monitored 
for confirmation of alignment to a frame of configuration words. However, this is not 
necessary as any incomplete loading would trigger a configuration error which would 
be picked up by the CMC. Nevertheless, the user needs to ensure the correct loading of 
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commands and that frame data words are properly aligned to 101 words. For the CWR 
operation, the template usage is as follows: [OSS + User-Generated Commands & Data 
+ OES]. 
4.2.8 Abort (ABT) Operation – Opcode 7 
Though the ICAP interface has the capability to abort an ongoing operation, to the best 
of our knowledge, this has not yet been fully explored and reported in the literature. 
This capability ensures that if an ongoing operation is deemed to be no longer required 
due to a change in the dynamics of the system, the system does not waste precious ICAP 
bandwidth completing the operation. The operation can be immediately stopped and a 
new one started. The readback abort capability is used in the SEM operation (see 
Section 4.3.2) to stop readback when a soft error is detected. An abort is triggered by 
changing the icap_rw_en signal while the icap_en signal is asserted (= ‘0’). For 
readback, abort ends when the icap_en is deasserted, while for configuration, it ends 
after four clock cycles. Note that the ABT operation does not follow the execution and 
user flows of Figure 4.6 and Figure 4.7. The ABT can be specified on the opcode port 
at any time during an active operation. It can as well be triggered internally by the 
IFSM. 
4.3 Support for Error Mitigation 
The diagnosis and correction of errors is an important feature that should be supported 
by an ICAP controller. Depending on the nature of error mitigation sought, the 
implemented operations can be used for both SEM and HEM. The CFG operation can 
be used for blind scrubbing while the combination of the RBK and CFG operations can 
be used for readback scrubbing of the CMEM. For HEM the PBR functionality offered 
by the CFG operation can be used to relocate a task to a damage-free region in case of 
hard errors affecting its original partition. The 7 series FPGA also has an internal 
Readback CRC circuitry that simplifies readback scrubbing (see Section 3.2.2). The 
Readback CRC requires access to the ICAP but only when the user design has 
relinquished control by issuing the DESYNC command. However, the user has no 
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control on the selection of frames or chip area for scanning. The following subsections 
present the SEM features implemented by the configuration controller. 
4.3.1 Readback Scrubbing Support – SEM Operation (Opcode 8) 
The CFG operation can be used by a user-determined scrubber to perform blind 
scrubbing. However, for readback scrubbing, a distinct operation (SEM operation) is 
implemented to simplify the process. For the SEM operation, the configuration 
controller uses the FRAME_ECC primitive in conjunction with the RBK and CFG 
operations. According to [62], it is uncommon for an error to escape being detected by 
ECC and be found only by CRC. As such, the configuration controller relies solely on 
the frame ECC for error detection. The Readback CRC is not used for the reasons that 
will be presented in Section 4.3.2. 
For the SEM operation, the user needs to specify the RBK_FAR and 
NUM_OF_WORDS at IBUF addresses 0x00E and 0x010 respectively (see Table 4.3). 
During readback, a copy of the current frame being read is kept in the IBUF. At the end 
of each fame readback, the FRAME_ECC drives its ECCERROR signal High if an 
error is found. For a single-bit error, the flipped bit is corrected by the IFSM using the 
information provided by the FRAME_ECC, and written back to the CMEM. 
To avoid the accumulation of the inherent overhead of 1.01 µs per each readback 
for contiguous frame readback, the readback command can be issued for a chip area of 
interest and the FRAME_ECC continuously monitored for an indication of error. 
Immediately an error is indicated, the ongoing readback is aborted in 5 clock cycles, 
which is only 5% of the 101 that would be incurred if readback was frame by frame. A 
single-bit error is indicated on the ECCERRORSINGLE port of the FRAME_ECC as 
a ‘1’. The index of the 32-bit frame word that contains the flipped bit is reported by 
SYNWORD[6:0] while SYNBIT[4:0] points to the bit position in the word. To save 
time, rather than flip the erroneous bit inside the IBUF, and as such incur BRAM read 
and write cycles, the affected bit is flipped when the frame is being written back to the 
CMEM. In the terminology of the Xilinx’s SEM IP [62], the SEM operation has support 
for both Repair and Replace correction methods. The Repair method can correct single-
bit errors while the Replace method can correct multi-bit errors but requires access to a 
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golden bitstream stored externally. Multi-bit errors are detected by checking that 
ECCERROR is a ‘1’ when ECCERRORSINGLE is a ‘0’ and alerted to the user on the 
ecc_mbu_error port of the IFSM, with the erroneous FAR presented on the 
ecc_error_far port (see Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1). When a single or double-bit error is 
found the FRAME_ECC asserts the ECCERROR signal. The CRCERROR is used to 
signal a CRC error and is useful when the Readback CRC is used. 
It is important to note that the FRAME_ECC detects errors by checking if the frame 
being read has changed from the original configured value, its error detection does not 
cover changeable memory cells like FFs, LUT-RAMs, SRLs, and BRAMs. As such, 
LUT-based memories are masked using the GLUTMASK_B bit during readback (see 
the CFRT template in Appendix A.2). BRAM contents are bypassed by the ECC circuit 
during readback. 
4.3.2 Selective-Area Scanning for Soft Error Mitigation 
In reliability-centric systems, the ICAP has to be shared between two important system 
functions, namely, task configuration and SEM. These two functions are indispensable 
in reliable systems and the problem of multiplexing access to the ICAP between them 
is thus an important one. 
It is obvious that since the ICAP is a single resource, a bottleneck or contention 
might arise if the sharing of this resource is not well coordinated, especially when real-
time requirements are considered. For instance, if the ICAP is occupied by more 
configuration processes, then reliability can be affected, as the rate at which the chip is 
scanned reduces. At the same time, too much dedication of the ICAP resource to error 
mitigation can delay tasks from being configured. In severe cases, this can result in 
missed task execution deadlines, a situation that is particularly intolerable in real-time 
systems (e.g., planetary rovers). 
The maximum theoretical throughput of the ICAP is 400 MB/s.  Based on the 
recommendation by Xilinx, more than 99% of this bandwidth should be dedicated to 
SEM [187] for a full device coverage.  Since reconfiguration time is limited (< 1% of 
400 MB/s) this might necessitate a bigger FPGA than would normally be required if 
tasks could be swapped in and out more often.  This could increase device cost. The 
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Xilinx SEM IP cannot be pre-empted. However, it is impractical to have a 100% 
occupation of the FPGA, that is, there are always chip areas unused at any given time.  
Also, in mixed-criticality systems, the tasks have varying degrees of reliability 
constraints [127][200].  As such, selecting only the occupied areas for scanning, rather 
than the entire chip, reduces SEM mitigation time, thereby releasing more time for 
reconfiguration.  Further restrictions can also be applied, where more frequent scanning 
occurs for those areas on the chip occupied by critical tasks; with relatively non-critical 
tasks scanned less frequently since the failure of a non-critical task is deemed not 
detrimental to the system.  Any soft errors in areas not currently occupied are repaired 
when those areas are configured with new tasks. 
It should be noted that the recommendation in [187] that SEM coverage time 
should be > 99% is based on a continuous scanning of the entire chip area. However, 
instead of scanning the entire FPGA in each SEM cycle, we propose that only the areas 
where tasks are configured be scanned to reduce the time spent on SEM. This requires 
tasks to be floor-planned to occupy only as much area as required. Since the internal 
Readback CRC engine of the FPGA cannot be directed to scan a specific area, a custom 
SEM controller that is able to do so is required. However, the developed configuration 
controller already has a readback scrubbing functionality. As such, by performing 
readback scrubbing using a selective-area scanning, it is possible to reduce the amount 
of time dedicated to device-wide SEM and make more time available for 
reconfiguration. 
The idea is to use the SEM operation to readback-scrub only the regions occupied 
by tasks by specifying a contiguous number of frames. For multiple contiguous frame 
readback, the IFSM aborts readback once an error is flagged by the FRAME_ECC. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that the FRAME_ECC primitive asserts its 
SYNDROME_VALID signal for one clock cycle at the end of each frame of readback. 
To ensure a correct abort of readback, the IFSM checks SYNDROME_VALID in 
conjunction with the ECCERRORSINGLE signal to ensure that a complete frame has 
been read back before triggering an abort and carrying out further operations. In 
addition, to simplify the tracking of the location in the IBUF of the erroneous read-back 
frame, the same frame location in the IBUF (from address 0x073 to address 0x0D7) is 
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used all the time for buffering no matter how many frames are being checked in a single 
selective-area SEM operation. 
Moreover, the FRAME_ECC can be configured to store on its FAR output, the 
frame address (stored in a special register called Error Frame Address Register 
(EFAR)) where an error is last found or the frame address that is read last. The former 
is especially useful when a contiguous number of frames is read back in a single 
operation, in which case it becomes ambiguous to rely only on the error signals on the 
FRAME_ECC ports. However, the combination of SYNDROME_VALID and 
ECCERRORSINGLE are relied on in this work, in which case, it is inconsequential 
whether the FAR or the EFAR is reported on the FAR output as both are the same when 
the readback is aborted at the end of the frame in which an error is detected. 
4.3.3 Fault Injection Support 
To perform a fault injection analysis using the CAM, the RBK and CWR operations 
are called upon. A target frame is read back and a bit is flipped by accessing the IBUF 
through the Operation Controller interface. CMEM write (WCFG) commands (see 
Figure 4.9) are loaded into the last 9 locations of the CWR’s frequent command 
memory space in the IBUF. In conjunction with the already read-back frame stored at 
IBUF_DATA_ADDR and zeroes in the remaining IBUF locations, this forms a 
complete frame write operation bitstream consisting of commands, a frame of data, and 
a pad frame, with the OES sequence loaded by the IFSM to complete the operation. 
A subsequent RBK operation is then used to confirm that the bit has been flipped 
in the CMEM. This check can as well be done by performing an SEM operation, which 
reads back the target frame and corrects the single-bit error caused by the flipped bit. 
However, since this is all transparent to the user, the original flipped position can still 
be checked in the IBUF after the SEM operation completes. A final RBK can be 
performed to confirm that the bit flip has been corrected. 
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Figure 4.9: CWR frequent commands for fault injection 
4.4 Configuration Error Monitoring and Recovery 
To improve the availability of the ICAP controller and the host device when deployed 
in a high-end application, it is important to be able to detect errors during configuration 
operations. To do this, a diagnosis of the configuration status can be done by monitoring 
the un-swapped least significant byte D[7:0] of the ICAP’s output port.  According to 
[37], the least significant nibble D[3:0] of this byte is supposed to be fixed to “1111”.  
However, this is found to be otherwise; the bits are actually fixed to “1011” for an 
unknown reason.  Apart from this, the other status bits are as expected (see Table 4.7).  
Bits 7 and 6 are used to monitor configuration error and the status of the ICAP 
synchronization respectively. While there are other status bits only these two are 
required to detect configuration errors. 
The CFG Controller continuously monitors the configuration error status bit and 
once an error is detected, the operation is halted; the STAT (status) register of the FPGA 
is immediately read and presented on the IBUF for the user’s attention.  Table 4.8 shows 
the STAT register bits of interest.  If the cause of the error is determined to be the CRC, 
in which case an incorrect pre-computed CRC checksum has been loaded, the user can 










Write 1 word to the IDCODE register
IDCODE value = xxxxxxxx
Write 1 word to the CMD register
WCFG command
Write 1 word to the FAR register
FAR value = xxxxxxxx
No operation word
Type 1 write to the FDRI (no word)
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by 0x00000007). This can be done with the RGR operation without taking the device 
offline. However, if there is an IDCODE error the entire device has to be reconfigured 
or a fallback reconfiguration used [47]. An IDCODE error occurs if there is an attempt 
to write the FDRI register without a successful device ID check. 







ICAP Sync Status 
0x9B 0xD9 No error Not synched 
0xDB 0xDB No error Synched 
0x5B 0xDA Error Synched 
0x1B 0xD8 Error Not synched 
 
Table 4.8: Description of the 7 series FPGA’s status register 
Name Bit Index Description 
ID_ERROR 15 
Attempt to write to FDRI register without successful 
DEVICE_ID check.  
0: No ID_ERROR, 1: ID_ERROR 
CRC_ERROR 0 0: No CRC error, 1: CRC error 
 
It might be worth noting that configuration error detection in the ICAP of the 
UltraScale architecture is more straightforward. A dedicated Active-High PRERROR 
port on the ICAP can be monitored to check if there has been an error during partial 
reconfiguration [201]. Nevertheless, the STAT register still has to be read in order to 
know the source of error. 
4.5 Resource Utilization and Performance Evaluation 
The resource utilization of the proposed ICAP controller and by extension, the CAM, 
is greatly influenced by the coding style used where configuration sequences, 
templates, and circuitries (in the form of states of the IFSM) are reused as much as 
possible. This has given rise to a relatively small resource footprint considering the 
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rich feature set. This has not been at the expense of throughput with the various CMEM 
read and write operations incurring time overheads within and lower than the range of 
state-of-the-art controllers. 
4.5.1 Resource Utilization Evaluation 
Table 4.9 shows the resource utilization of the CAM. The ICAP controller consumes 
only 234 slices and 1 BRAM36 for all the implemented features and operations. This 
represents a very small resource footprint even for the smallest of devices, thanks to 
the efficient coding style employed. For instance, this utilization is only 24.95% on 
the smallest 7 series device (Spartan-7, XC7S6) and a minute 0.17% on the biggest 7 
series FPGA (Virtex-7, XC7VH870T ). With this footprint, a TMR implementation to 
harden the controller against errors would triplicate the utilization to 702 slices, which 
is still small enough to be accommodated in the smallest of 7 series devices, with 
enough FPGA real estate available for user designs. 
For bitstream data transfer from an external memory to the IBUF, this work has 
proposed the use of a DMA-capable Data Mover to ensure that the host processing 
system is not bogged down with data transfers. The free space in the IBUF can also be 
monitored as the IFSM loads frame data from the IBUF to the CMEM. The Data Mover 
can thus, transfer bitstreams into the IBUF in close step with the IFSM. The Data Mover 
is implemented with an AXI Central DMA [202] and the entire Buffer Arbiter 
consumes a total of 377 slices with 1 BRAM36 used as the IBUF. As such, the entire 
CAM consumes a total of 611 slices. 
Table 4.9: Resource utilization of the CAM in the 7 series FPGA 
Resource ICAP Controller Buffer Arbiter CAM 
Flip-Flops 330 1,145 1,475 
LUTs 654 974 1,628 
BRAM36s 0 1 2 
Slices 234 377 611 
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The resource overhead can be further reduced in a ROS in which some of the 
implemented operations are not required. Nevertheless, the controller is small enough 
to be used as is without trimming the functions in RTL. In terms of comparison with 
existing ICAP controllers, it is not a straightforward affair as varied differences between 
the features used and the devices targeted. Nevertheless, a closely-related work, but one 
implemented for the Virtex-4 FPGA, is the controller in the Internal Configuration 
Manger (ICM) developed in [203], where a total of 803 slices are used. A lighter version 
of this controller is presented in [167], with an utilization of 609 slices. The AC_ICAP 
[166], which is based on the 7 series family has a fewer set of features, yet consumes 
690 slices even with the features trimmed. Table 4.10 shows the comparison of the 
ICAP controller in CAM to these related controllers and others. An improvement in 
resource utilization which ranges from about 20% to 71% is observed, noting that most 
of the compared controllers provide only a subset of the functionalities that CAM’s 
ICAP controller provides.  
Table 4.10: Resource overhead comparison of ICAP controllers 
Controller Device 
Resource 
Slices FFs LUTs BRAMs 
ICM [203] Virtex-4 803 - - 1 
AC_ICAP [166] 7 series 690 1161 1667 7 
Xilinx PRC [204] 7 series - 1203 1170 0 
AXI_HWICAP [205] 7 series 291 688 538 0 
CAM (This Work) 7 series 234 330 654 1 
 
4.5.2 Throughput Evaluation 
For throughput evaluation, the correct functionalities of the operations of the controller 
are confirmed by using configuration frame data prefetched into the IBUF. This also 
allows for the characterization of the raw speed performance of the controller. For the 
various operations of the ICAP controller, Table 4.11 shows the times measured for an 
operation on a single frame (404 bytes). The ICAP is clocked at its recommended 
maximum frequency (fICAP_MAX) of 100 MHz. Measurements are taken by adding a 
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clock cycle counter to the controller and using the Xilinx Integrated Logic Analyzer 
(ILA) [206] to observe the counter’s value. 
Table 4.11: Time overheads for the operations of the ICAP controller at 100 MHz 
Operation on 1 Frame 
Latency (µs) 
Original Rolling Optimized 
Readback 2.49 2.38 2.30 
Configuration (Basic-CFG) 2.61 2.54 - 
Configuration (MFW-based, non-BRAM) 1.71 1.64 - 
Configuration (MFW-Based, BRAM) 1.79 1.72 - 
Read Modify Write  (non-BRAM) 3.83 3.72 3.64 
Read Modify Write (BRAM) 3.91 3.80 3.72 
Blanking (non-BRAM) 1.56 1.45 1.41 
Blanking (BRAM) 1.64 1.53 1.49 
Register Read 0.37 0.26 0.22 
Custom Write (WCFG+1 frame + 1 pad) 2.55 2.44 2.40 
Operation Abort 0.05 0.05 0.05 
SEM Scan (no error detected) 2.49 2.38 2.30 
SEU Detection and Correction 3.79 3.68 3.56 
MBU Detection 2.49 2.38 2.30 
MBU-Triggered Frame Replacement 1.71 1.64 - 
 
The “Original” latencies Table 4.11 refer to the exact overhead measured with the 
ICAP controller used as is. However, because it is possible to leave the ICAP 
synchronized and allow one operation to “roll” to the other one without ICAP 
desynchronization, the SYNC words in the OSS sequence and the DESYNC words in 
the OSS can be trimmed. The overheads in this case are shown in the “Rolling” column 
in Table 4.11. In addition, the GLUTMASK_B command packets can be bypassed or 
set to a default value in the full bitstream if the setting will not change in runtime. 
Therefore, the “Optimized” column refers to the operations carried out with the 
GLUTMASK command packets trimmed in addition to “Rolling”. 
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When a BRAM frame is loaded using the MFW template, eight NOOP words are 
written after the MFW command (see Figure A.6 in Appendix A). This accounts for the 
different timing behaviours reported for BRAM frames for any operation that uses the 
MFW feature. Considering the basic read and write operations, Basic CFG 
understandably has the greatest latency of 2.61 µs for a single frame because of the pad 
frame. Likewise, the RBK operation clocks in at 2.49 µs. A non-BRAM frame writing 
incurs the lowest configuration time of 1.71µs when the MFW-based CFG is used. 
For the BLK operation, a single frame can be blanked in 1.56 µs for a non-BRAM 
frame and 1.64 µs for a BRAM frame. Compared to using a normal blanking bitstream, 
the BLK operation saves at least 40% configuration time for a single frame. This figure 
would increase as the number of frames blanked in a single operation increases. 
SEM scan (for both an SEU and an MBU) clocks in at 2.49 µs for a single frame 
and 1.01 µs for each additional frame in a selective-area operation on a contiguous 
number of frames. A single-bit upset can be detected and corrected in only 3.79 µs 
while a frame that has suffered an MBU can be replaced in 1.71 µs per erroneous frame 
(with the golden frame already fetched into the IBUF). The time for an MBU 
correction by replacement is heavily influenced by the time needed to access the 
external memory and transfer data. The time shown here does not consider the frame 
data movement overhead. Nevertheless, once the golden frame is moved into the 
IBUF, the time to write it is constant at 1.71 µs. 
The latency in bitstream transfer from an external memory to the IBUF depends 
on the specific data transfer method used. Bitstream transfer takes a latency of 3.993 
ms to transfer bitstream data from an external SD card in an example CDMA transfer 
of 2 kB.  
Table 4.12 shows the comparison of the latencies of the basic read and write 
operations on a single frame. The ICAP controller in this work proves to be 
comparatively better, providing an improvement of about 30% in configuration latency 
and about 4% for readback. It is worthy of note that the ICM is targeted at Virtex-4, 
which has only 41 32-bit words in a frame. As such, the times reported here show that 
CAM is far more time-efficient considering that a frame in the 7 series is 101 32-bit 
words. 
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Table 4.12: Comparison of the basic operation timing behaviours 
Controller Device 
Operation Latency (µs) 
Read Frame Write Frame 
This Work 7 series 2.30 1.64 
AC_ICAP [166] 7 series 2.39 2.33 
ICM [203] Virtex-4 2.28 1.95 
 
The configuration throughput of the proposed controller is measured by using tasks 
with various area utilizations and the calculated throughputs averaged out to get a more 
representative value (see Table 4.13). From this, the average throughput of the proposed 
ICAP controller is evaluated as 379.70 MB/s, which just short of the theoretical 
maximum bandwidth (400 MB/s) of the ICAP at 100 MHz. This throughput is only 
achievable when the IFSM is not stalled at any time waiting for bitstream transfers from 
the external memory. The buffer free space monitoring proposed is a mechanism that 
can be exploited to ensure that frame data is made available as soon as possible to avoid 
stalling the IFSM. 
Table 4.13: Configuration throughput evaluation 
Task 





(MB/s) CLB BRAM DSP 
Task 1 2 0 0 29 74.32 379.67 
Task 2 3 1 0 105 270.36 379.52 
Task 3 4 1 1 131 335.00 379.90 
Average Throughput 379.70 
 
In order to provide a quick means of evaluating the expected configuration time of 
a task that is to be configured using the proposed CAM raw throughput, bitstreams are 
generated for the smallest RMs and FPGA resource block types and these are used to 
construct templates (equations) for determining partial bitstream size (see Table 4.14). 
The purpose of this is to support external memory storage budgeting and pre-
implementation evaluation of a task’s configuration throughput. 
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Table 4.14: Partial bitstream size evaluation template for the Basic CFG operation 
Partition  Partial Bitstream Size (Bytes) 
Single 
Block Type N = Num. of Frames N = Block Columns 
CLB 
500 + 404 * N 
500 + 404 * 36 * N 
DSP 500 + 404 * 28 * N 
BRAM 500 + 404 * 128 * N 
Multiple 
Block Pair Type N = Num. of Frames N = Block Pairs 
CLB-CLB 
500 + 404 * N 
500 + 404 * 72 * N 
CLB-DSP 500 + 404 * 64 * N 
CLB-BRAM 936 + 404 * (NCLB + NBRAM) 936 + 404 * 192 * N 
Slice 
Slice-Based Partition, N = Number of Block Pairs 
936 + 404 * (72 * NCLB-CLB_PAIRS + 64 * NCLB-DSP_PAIRS + 192 * NCLB-BRAM_PAIRS) 
 
These equations can be used to evaluate any task whose area occupation is known 
without actually generating bitstreams or using the controller. This would prove 
invaluable for a rapid system design and offline evaluation. Given resource utilization 
breakdown of a task in terms of CLBs, BRAMs, and DSPs, it becomes quite 
straightforward to estimate the bitstream size overhead and configuration timing 
behaviour of the controller for the task. However, a true reflection of the bitstream size 
would be that calculated from the utilized slice reported by Vivado as there is usually 
no 100% utilization of the CLBs in an RP. Thus, Table 4.14 also provides an equation 
for a slice-based partitioning. 
The task bitstreams used for constructing the equations follow the format presented 
in Figure A.5 of Appendix A. This format does not include setup commands like 
GLUTMASK_B setting. If a task in question has to use certain setup commands the 
number of words (converted to bytes) before the occurrence of 0x30002001 can be 
added to the bitstream size. Note that the SYNC words and the WCFG command 
packets should not be included. 
In addition, it is possible to construct equations for the latencies of relevant 
operations of the controller as shown in Table 4.15. Therefore, given the resource block 
type and the number of frames (N), the latencies for a given task can be easily computed 
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and in conjunction with Table 4.14, the operation throughputs can be also be 
determined. For the Basic CFG operations in Table 4.15, the pad frame is not counted 
as part of the number of frames and note that the RMW can only relocate one frame at 
a time to multiple frame address locations (L). N is the number of frames to access in a 
single operation. 
Table 4.15: Latency templates for selected operations of the ICAP controller 
Operation 
Time for 1 
Frame (µs) 
Latency for N Frames & L 
locations (µs) 
Readback 2.49 1.48 + 1.01N 
Configuration (Basic-CFG, 1 block type) 2.61 1.60 + 1.01N 
Configuration (Basic CFG, 2 block types)  4.73 3.72 + 1.01N 
Read Modify Write  (non-BRAM) 3.83  (3.72 + 0.11L)*N 
Read Modify Write (BRAM) 3.91 (3.72 + 0.19L)*N 
Blanking (non-BRAM) 1.56 1.47 + 0.09N 
Blanking (BRAM) 1.64 1.47 + 0.17N 
SEM Scan 2.49 1.48 + 1.01N 
 
4.5.3 A Case-Study Application 
To evaluate the ICAP controller with a practical application and illustrate the advantage 
of the proposed selective-area scanning, we draw a case study from the NASA JPL’s 
Compositional InfraRed Imaging Spectrometer (CIRIS) [207] implemented on a Zynq-
7000 (XC7Z100) FPGA. The CIRIS is one of the new-generation NASA instruments 
proposed to search for life indicators in Jupiter’s moon, Europa [208]. The total 
resource usage of the CIRIS data processing task is 7,781 slices, 164 DSP48s, and 176.5 
BRAM36s [209] (see Table 4.16). A floorplan on the XC7Z100 chip that would 
accommodate all the resources (especially the BRAM36s) requires a selection of a 
larger region than required by the slices and DSP48s alone. This translates to area 
occupations of 20.19% for slices, 23.76% for DSP48s, and 26.49% for BRAM36s. This 
is equivalent to 48 CLB-CLB pairs, 24 CLB-DSP pairs, and 20 CLB-BRAM pairs. 
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Table 4.16: Resource utilization of the CIRIS data processing circuit 
Component Slices DSP48s BRAM36s 
CIRIS Data Processing Circuit [209] 7,781 164 176.5 
Selectable Resources 14,000 480 200 
Available in the XC7Z100 chip 69,350 2,020 755 
Percentage Resource Used 11.22% 8.12% 23.38% 
Percentage Area Occupied 20.19% 23.76% 26.49% 
Configuration Frames 5,040 672 2,560 
Total Configuration Frames (from Block Pairs) 8,832 frames 
Partial Bitstream Size 3,485.41 kB 
 
By using Table 2.11 we estimate that a total of 8,832 frames are needed for 
configuring or reading back the task. This gives a PB size of 3.4 MB and a Basic-CFG 
configuration time of 8.9240 ms, with a throughput of 381.42 MB/s. A selective-area 
SEM operation would scan these frames in 8.9218 ms while the Xilinx SEM IP [62] 
would still incur the full device scan time of 34.3 ms. This is a saving of 25.38 ms 
(74%) of ICAP access time and this can be allocated to reconfiguration (see Table 4.17). 
Table 4.17: Configuration and scan times for the CIRIS task 




Scan Time (the SEM operation in this work) 8.92 
SEM Scan (Xilinx SEM IP) [62] 34.30 
Time Saved for Reconfiguration 25.38 
Percentage Time Saved 74% 
 
It should be noted that the more occupied the FPGA is, the lower would be the time 
saved, and indeed, there are other circuits that may be critical in the spectrometer 
example used [210]. However, if the FPGA is fully occupied, which is an unlikely 
situation, advantage can be taken of the different criticalities of the tasks to scan the 
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more critical ones more often and the less-critical ones less. This is possible because 
our ICAP Controller’s SEM engine allows selective-area scanning. The time saved can 
be put towards task reconfiguration. Since there is more time for reconfiguration, more 
tasks can share the FPGA in time and space, and the size requirement for the chip would 
be lower leading to cost savings while not compromising reliability. 
4.6 Chapter Summary 
A high-performance and reliable configuration controller is an indispensable 
component of reconfigurable systems, especially those that are based on FPGAs. This 
chapter has presented a configuration controller that implements functionalities that are 
crucial for task loading and deloading, and several reliability-enhancing functionalities 
(e.g., SEU and MBU mitigation and internal register reading for device diagnosis) for 
reconfigurable computing. Without loss of generality, the Xilinx 7 series FPGA family 
has been used as a target for the proposed controller. Resource utilization and 
throughput evaluations have revealed that this controller outperforms similar state-of-
the-art controllers saving up to 71% area overhead and having 30% less configuration 
latency for a single frame, with an average throughput of 379.70 MB/s for contiguous 
number of frames. Benchmarking templates are also provided, targeting an easy 
evaluation of hardware tasks' bitstream size and configuration overhead with the aim 
of easing system design when the proposed configuration controller is to be deployed. 
While reliability and availability have been some of the key focus, the proposed 
controller is generic enough to find application in a wide variety of scenarios. The 
reliability of the controller itself can be easily improved by adopting a TMR 
implementation. This does not have a serious impact on resource footprint because the 





Chapter 5  
Secure and Efficient Hardware 
Task Relocation Framework for 
Reconfigurable Computing 
One key RC service, which has not been given prime attention is security [24] even 
though research works already appeared almost two decades ago highlighting the need 
for circuit protection [20]. Meanwhile, the fact that FPGAs are now being used in high-
end applications has served to increase interests in FPGAs and the value of IP cores 
that run on them, thanks to the adoption of FPGAs by tech giants like Microsoft [39] 
and Baidu [40]. IP core vendors pay heavily in monetary terms and development time 
to design these IP cores. As a result, the protection of this investment is of paramount 
importance. However, malicious attacks on FPGAs have aimed to exploit the security 
shortcomings of FPGAs to allow attackers to steal these IPs or cause undesirable 
effects. 
As a deterrent to these attacks, major FPGA manufacturers (like Xilinx) have 
introduced secure bitstreams, which are bitstreams protected with both authentication 
and encryption (see Section 2.3). However, as FPGA programming technology and 
techniques evolve, renewed thoughts have to be given to the impact of encryption on 
the format of bitstreams and how this affects emerging hardware task management 
techniques. This is the case with PBR, which is often deployed for permanent damage 
mitigation. As existing PBR methods are not amenable to encrypted PBR (see Section 
3.2.4), excessive resource and time overheads can result in a bid to ensure the 
continuous protection of IP cores in the face of PBR. This chapter delves further into 
these issues and presents a novel resource- and time-efficient PBR mechanism to 
address the situation.  
The techniques and mechanisms reported in this chapter have been included as part 
of the author’s publications [211] and [212]: 
5 
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 A. Adetomi, G. Enemali, and T. Arslan, ‘Relocating Encrypted Partial 
Bitstreams by Advance Task Address Loading’, in 25th Annual IEEE 
Symposium on Field-Programmable Custom Computing Machines (FCCM 
2017), 2017, pp. 188–191. 
 A. Adetomi, G. Enemali, and T. Arslan, ‘Towards an Efficient Intellectual 
Property Protection in Dynamically Reconfigurable FPGAs’, in 2017 Seventh 
International Conference on Emerging Security Technologies (EST), 2017, 
pp. 150–156. 
5.1 The Challenges with Encrypted PBR 
With respect to partial bitstream relocation, there are a few challenges with the Xilinx’s 
secure bitstream format. One limitation with the use of encrypted partial bitstreams in 
the 7 series FPGAs lies in the restriction on the configuration interfaces. The readback 
of the configuration memory through the JTAG and SelectMAP interfaces is not 
possible when an encrypted bitstream is loaded into the device.  While this restriction 
does not apply to the ICAP interface; nevertheless, the configuration bandwidth is 
reduced by a factor of four to a theoretical value of 100 MB/s as the ICAP interface 
only accepts encrypted bitstreams through its 8-bit input bus [47].  This increases the 
configuration overhead during relocation and is a price that must be paid to ensure 
bitstream security in the 7 series. Indeed, Xilinx has addressed this in the UltraScale 
architecture, which ships with an ICAP that only supports a 32-bit port width for both 
unencrypted and encrypted bitstreams [201]. 
Moreover, the state-of-the-art vendor secure bitstream format introduces a 
bottleneck for PBR. PBR requires the runtime manipulation of the bitstream’s frame 
addresses before it is delivered to the configuration interface.  As such, access to the 
readable plaintext decrypted bitstream is needed. However, the frame addresses are 
specified in the encrypted portion of the secure bitstream and are as such, in cyphertext 
format. Meanwhile, to prevent a breach of security during reconfiguration, the on-chip 
decryptor in the FPGA feeds the plain decrypted data directly to the configuration 
interface; and as such, access to the decrypted data is denied.  To overcome this, a 
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custom dedicated AES decryptor circuit can be used. However, this circuit usually takes 
a considerable amount of FPGA resources [213] [214] and time (see Sections 5.6 and 
5.7). 
To address this issue in a resource-efficient and time-saving manner, a secure 
bitstream format that is friendly to relocation is required. Moreover, there is usually 
more than one instance of frame address loading. This means a user cannot simply state 
a FAR address before loading the encrypted frame data, we have to split the bitstream 
into a number of parts corresponding to the number of frame addresses in the bitstream.  
For each section, the FAR is loaded unencrypted before the encrypted configuration 
data. This calls for a unique software that can accept an unencrypted bitstream, remove 
the FAR loading commands, split the bitstream, and perform other necessary bitstream 
manipulations; and a unique configuration controller that can generate the FAR address 
in runtime and load the bitstream parts after loading the corresponding generated FAR 
addresses. 
5.2 Relocation-Aware Secure Bitstream Format 
An experimental study of the reconfiguration of Xilinx FPGAs reveals that the frame 
address which points to the location to be configured in the FPGA can be written to the 
FAR in a separate command sequence in advance of the frame data loading itself.  
Having observed that the FPGA remembers the content written to the FAR, the 
proposed solution to expensive encrypted PBR involves using a software algorithm to 
remove the FAR loading command and the FAR address itself from the bitstream 
before it is encrypted and issuing this unencrypted command inside the FPGA in 
runtime through the ICAP configuration port. 
To understand why this is possible, it is fitting to note that the FPGA would 
normally wipe off the configuration memory when an unencrypted data loading is 
initiated subsequent to the loading of an encrypted bitstream.  However, because the 
ICAP is a trusted interface, it is allowed to read back data and also write unencrypted 
data even when encryption is used. Meanwhile, in order not to compromise security, 
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the ICAP signals are not routed out of the FPGA [47] and the user is prevented from 
issuing readback commands when encryption is used. 
Since the proposed approach to encrypted PBR involves loading the task’s plain 
unencrypted frame address in advance of the encrypted frame data, this scheme can be 
appropriately named Advance Task Address loading (ATAL). The unique secure 
bitstream format used proposed for ATAL is depicted in Figure 5.1. In contrast with 
the Xilinx secure bitstream format, which has the frame address inside the encrypted 
body, the ATAL format does not contain any frame address information. The frame 
address is generated on-chip when needed. The bitstream is reformatted into a global 
preamble and a number of body parts depending on the number of frame addresses in 
the original bitstream. Each body part contains a local preamble, a local body, and local 
postamble. Like in the Xilinx secure format, only the body and the postamble are 
authenticated and encrypted. The following subsections provide more details about the 
different sections of an ATAL-formatted bitstream. Note that while an encrypted 
bitstream is loaded through the ICAP one byte per clock cycle, references to a “word” 
of data in the bitstream still retain the original meaning of 32 bits. 
 
Figure 5.1: Secure bitstream formats from Xilinx and for ATAL 
Global Preamble
(Length of Preamble, No 
of Body Parts, Sync, 
Setup)
Local Body
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HKEY – HMAC Key
MAC – Message Authentication Code
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Unencrypted and Unauthenticated
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5.2.1 Global Preamble 
The global preamble is similar to the preamble in the Xilinx bitstream format as it is 
composed of bus width auto detection words (0x000000BB followed by 0x11220044) 
and the synchronization word (0xAA995566). For the 8-bit interface enforced by the 
use of encryption, the internal configuration bus width auto detection logic would 
properly align by finding 0xBB followed by 0x11 on bits [7:0] of the ICAP’s output. 
Apart from the above, the ATAL’s global preamble also has prepended, the number 
of bytes in the global preamble (N_BYTS_GPMBL) and the number of body parts 
(N_BDY_PRTS) in the entire bitstream, both concatenated in the same 32-bit word. 
Bits [31:24] are used to keep N_BYTS_GPMBL, allowing for up to 256 bytes (64 
words) in the preamble, while bits [23:0] are used to store N_BDY_PRTS, allowing for 
up to 16,777,216 body parts. As many as 24 bits are reserved for N_BDY_PRTS to 
cater for the many body parts expected when a compressed bitstream is parsed by 
ATAL. For instance, the largest documented 7 series FPGA (7VH870T) (at the time of 
writing) has a configuration bitstream length of 294,006,336 bits [47]. This is 
approximately 90,968 frames assuming the entire content of the bitstream is frame data. 
The worst-case compression scenario would produce a compressed bitstream with 
90,968 frame addresses and thus, body parts. This is well below the maximum 
N_BDY_PRTS in ATAL. 
5.2.2 Local Preamble 
Since in the un-split Xilinx-formatted encrypted partial bitstream (Figure 5.1), the entire 
body of commands and data share the same preamble, which includes some FPGA 
setup commands, the instruction to enable the AES decryptor and load the encryption 
key from the eFUSE or the BBRAM, the AES IV loading, and the DWC loading, each 
of the body parts must also have a similar local preamble for proper synchronization 
with the decryption circuit in the internal configuration logic of the FPGA. Four words 
are used for the use-encryption command, five words for loading the IV, and two words 
for the DWC packet. These additional words are added to the beginning of each body 
part as a part of a local unencrypted preamble. 
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Figure 5.2 shows the composition of the local preamble. Bit 6 of the CTL0 register 
has to be set to ‘1’ to instruct the FPGA that the internal AES decryptor engine should 
be enabled. Also, a selection of the key storage option (EFUSE_KEY = ‘0’ for BBRAM 
or ‘1’ for eFUSE) at bit position 31 of CTL0 has to be made. All the variable fields are 
automatically filled in by ATAL’s software algorithm (see Section 5.3) 
 
Figure 5.2: Composition of the local preamble of an ATAL-formatted bitstream 
5.2.3 Local Body 
The local body contains the encrypted configuration commands and frame data. When 
compared with the Xilinx secure bitstream format, the key difference is that there are 
no frame addresses in the local body of ATAL-formatted bitstream. The frame address 
loading commands and the respective FAR values are removed before authentication 
and encryption and auto-generated on demand in runtime. 
Moreover, a careful examination of the unencrypted and encrypted bitstreams 
generated with Vivado reveals that the FPGA setup commands like resetting the CRC 
and loading the device IDCODE in the preamble of the unencrypted version are no 
longer included in the unencrypted preamble of the encrypted bitstream. Since these 
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bitstream body part essentially becomes a standalone encrypted PB without device sync 
and setup commands. As such, ATAL’s CRC coverage is at the body part level. The 
RCRC command is added to the header of each local body before encryption. In 
addition, since every write to the FDRI requires a successful device ID check, the 
IDCODE command is included in the header of each local body of every body part. 
Other user-determined FPGA setup commands retrieved from the original bitstream are 
added to the header as well. 
Noting that one of the aims of encryption is to hide the content of the bitstream 
from the prying eyes of attackers, it would be good to reveal only the information 
necessary to inform the configuration interface that encryption is being used. This is 
what Xilinx has done in their secure bitstream format and the same tradition is kept to 
in this work. As a result, all the commands in the preamble retrieved from the 
unencrypted bitstreams are also encrypted along with the first body part. This leaves 
the local headers and the new preamble added for instructing the FPGA to use 
decryption as the only unencrypted parts of the processed bitstream. 
5.2.4 Local Postamble 
The local postamble is composed of footer commands, with the HKEY and MAC 
appended. The footer holds the command to load the CRC register with the recalculated 
CRC value. There is one special FAR loading in the postamble of both plain and 
encrypted Xilinx-formatted bitstreams. The value of the frame address loaded is 
0x03BE0000. This represents a column address of 0, top-half row address of 31, and a 
block type of ‘111’, which does not correspond to any known or documented resource 
type in the FPGA. The choice of extreme values for the FAR fields suggest that 
0x03BE0000 is meant for some form of internal synchronization. It would not be 
surprising to have no Xilinx FPGA with up to 32 rows in the top half of the device. 
Keeping in line with this, the ATAL-formatted encrypted bitstream includes in the local 
postamble of the last body part the packet 0x3000200103BE0000 just before the RCRC 
command.  
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5.3 Software Interface for Bitstream Reformatting 
The FPGA vendor’s bitstream generation tool would not accept an existing bitstream 
as an input to the synthesis and implementation flow and even if it did, one would not 
be able to direct it to reformat the bitstream into the unique relocation-friendly ATAL 
format being proposed. Therefore, a special offline-executed algorithm is needed to 
perform the operation of reformatting the bitstream. We have named this algorithm 
Splixbit as an abbreviation of “splitting a bitstream” into parts. 
Figure 5.3 summarizes the execution flow of the Splixbit software in converting a 
partial bitstream to an ATAL-formatted one. After loading the bitstream, the tool first 
processes the header to confirm that the file loaded is a partial bitstream; an error is 
thrown if that is not the case. After the header is extracted, the bitstream is split into a 
preamble (sync and setup commands), a number of body parts depending on the number 
of frame addresses, and a postamble (DESYNC and CRC check commands). The 
formatting of the bitstream parts includes removing the FAR command and frame 
address, removing the DESYNC command packet, recalculating the CRC value. Other 
necessary steps like the addition of IDCODE command are carried out. Next, the 
HMAC-SHA-256 hashing and AES-CBC-256 encryption are applied to the separate 
parts, after which the encrypted bitstreams are combined into a single bitstream.  
 










Check to confirm that the 
bitstream specified is partial 
and unencrypted
Split the bitstream into parts 
according ot the ATAL’s 
format
Remove the FAR 
commands, recalculate the 
CRC values, and prepend 
and append the HKEY to 
each body part
Combine the parts into one 
bitstream file. Parts are 
identified in runtime by a 
number of words inserted 
before each part
_______ Chapter 5 – Secure and Efficient Hardware Task Relocation Infrastructures for RC 
 126 
The following subsections provide more details and related technical 
considerations for the algorithm’s software interface: 
5.3.1 Splixbit File Input 
For data input to the Splixbit software, the user can supply both encrypted and 
unencrypted partial bitstreams. In the case of encrypted bitstreams, the software tool 
first decrypts the bitstream before performing the necessary splitting, encryption and 
formatting. Being able to supply encrypted bitstream to the software may be useful in 
situations where there is no access to the original design in order to generate the 
unencrypted bitstream. In this case however, the user has to present the tool with the 
original encryption key file generated by the implementation tool. It is expected that 
the user should have this since it is needed to load the AES key into the FPGA. 
There are different bitstream file format options available in the Vivado. These 
options, accessible via Bitstream Settings in Vivado, can be used to direct the tool to 
generate some other useful files apart from the BIT file, which is the default binary 
bitstream file used for configuration through the Hardware Manager of Vivado. Some 
of these files are the raw bit (RBT) file, which contains the same information as the BIT 
file but in ASCII format, the mask (MSK or MSD) file, useful for verifying readback 
data, the readback (RBB or RBD) file, useful for bitstream verification; and the binary 
(BIN) file, which is similar to the bit file but without the header information. Since the 
header information is not actually uploaded to the FPGA but is used by other Xilinx 
tools, ATAL could do with the BIN file. 
However, the Splixbit algorithm requires the knowledge of the device type in order 
to prepare the encryption key file (NKY file) correctly. The device type is contained in 
the header; as such, it is more convenient to retrieve it if the user supplies a BIT file. In 
order to understand the information in the header and retrieve the device type, we have 
examined the contents of both unencrypted and encrypted, full and partial bitstreams of 
7 series FPGAs. Our findings are presented in Table 5.1. When the bitstreams are 
viewed using a HEX to ASCII editor, distinct sections, mostly delimited by semicolons 
and alphabets from ‘a’ to ‘e’, are noticed in the header before the configuration interface 
synchronization words. 
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To retrieve the target device type, a regular expression (regex) is used to search the 
ASCII-representation of the BIT file. The regex used depends on the type of file 
whether encrypted or unencrypted. The usage of regex in this work is pretty standard 
and based on the Regex class in the .NET Framework. It should be noted that full 
bitstreams are not manipulated by the software tool, they are included in Table 5.1 only 
for comparison and general understanding. 
Table 5.1: Bitstream header information (bitstream generated in Vivado 2015.2) 
Field 
Bytes 









16 File Declaration and Header 








1 aNA Delimiter aNA Delimiter 
13 aNA aNA BLANKING=TRUE aNA 
1 aNA aNA Delimiter aNA 
17 User ID 
1 Delimiter 
12 aNA aNA PARTIAL= TRUE 
PARTIAL= 
TRUE 
1 aNA aNA Delimiter Delimiter 
61 Tool Version, Target Device, Date, and Time 
a
NA – Not Applicable 
5.3.2 CRC Recalculation 
If the user enables CRC check, the Vivado calculates the CRC value of the entire 
bitstream command and data and appends it to the bitstream (in the postamble of an 
unencrypted bitstream).  Any modification to the bitstream while it is in transit to the 
configuration interface leads to a CRC error. Because ATAL involves a deliberate 
modification of the bitstream, the precomputed CRC is effectively rendered void. A 
simple solution would be to disable the CRC functionality in Vivado.  However, this 
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would be counterintuitive to bitstream integrity. Therefore, to preserve this 
functionality, the CRC is calculated on each of the body parts using the software and 
the RCRC and load CRC (0x30000001 followed by the 32-bit CRC checksum) 
commands are inserted at the beginning and end respectively of each of the body parts. 
The CRC is recalculated using the CRC-32 polynomial: x32 + x28 + x27 + x26 + x25 
+ x23 + x22 + x20 + x19 + x18 + x14 + x13 + x11 + x10 + x9 + x8 + x6 + 1 [59], which is the 
CRC-32C (Castagnoli) polynomial 0x1EDC6F41 (normal) or 0x82F63B78 (reversed). 
The .NET Framework does not come with a built-in CRC checksum calculation library. 
As such, a custom code implementation is used. 
5.3.3 HMAC-SHA Authentication and AES-CBC Encryption 
The HMAC-SHA-256 hashing and AES-CBC-256 encryption are applied to the 
separate body parts, after which the encrypted bitstreams are combined into a single 
bitstream file. For the HMAC authentication and AES encryption the HMACSHA256 
and RijndaelManaged classes of the .NET Framework are used. Padding words are used 
to ensure that data lengths are a multiple of 128 bits for encryption and 512 bits for 
authentication, as required for simplifying the MAC computation [43]. 
5.3.4 Splixbit Graphical User Interface Description 
Figure 5.4 shows a screenshot of the Splixbit software interface. The entire software 
was written in C# as a Windows Form Application. There is a main textbox for 
displaying the unencrypted bitstream loaded into memory. Three text input boxes are 
provided for the AES key, AES IV, and the HMAC key. In addition, there is an Options 
box; the user can choose to allow the software to generate the keys and IV, supply them 
as inputs through the text boxes, or specify a key file (NKY file). Clicking the Load Bit 
File button opens a file dialog window for the user to specify the bitstream file. After 
this, the Execute button can be pressed to process the bitstream. A few error control 
dialogs have also been coded in to aid usage. All the operations carried out are captured 
in the log output at the bottom of the interface. 
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Figure 5.4: Screenshot of the Splixbit software interface 
5.4 Hardware Support for Encrypted PBR 
In order to deliver the Splixbit-formatted bitstream to the internal configuration 
interface of the FPGA in run time, a unique configuration flow is required. Existing 
ICAP controllers cannot be used to directly load an ATAL-formatted bitstream because 
of the special requirement of specifying plain frame addresses at different points in the 
bitstream loading. It is pertinent however, to mention that an existing controller that is 
able to load a Xilinx-formatted encrypted PB would require only a few modifications 
to get it up and running as far as ATAL is concerned. 
5.4.1 Configuration Controller 
To control the bitstream loading, a unique ICAP controller (Splixbit hardware) is 
required. The Splixbit hardware is a minimalistic version of the ICAP controller in 
Chapter 4, implemented to demonstrate the feasibility of ATAL. There are inevitable 
similarities between the two. For instance, bitswapping is still required at the input and 
output of the ICAP. However, a main difference is that the ICAP input for a secure 
bitstream is restricted to an 8-bit width. This necessitates that the initial 32-bit word that 
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could be loaded in one clock cycle is now loaded in 4 clock cycles, with the most 
significant byte loaded first. The effect is the quadrupling of reconfiguration time. The 
scaled-down version of the ICAP controller is shown in Figure 5.5. 
   
Figure 5.5: Configuration controller for loading Splixbit-formatted bitstreams 
The BRAM-based IBUF is implemented as a two-port memory with one port 
connected to the Data Mover and configured to have a 32-bit data width. This allows 
the bitstream to be transferred at a much faster rate than the IFSM loads it. The other 
port of the IBUF is configured for 8-bit data access and connected to the IFSM. This 
arrangement forces byte loading to take an order where the four bytes in each word are 
read from the high byte address to the low byte address and the ibuf_addr_pntr 
advanced by 7 to fetch the next word. 
For PBR, the FAR command detection and FAR modification circuits are not 
included. Since the FAR command is no longer in the bitstream, the user is expected to 
provide frame addresses for the bitstream body parts at appropriate points in the 
operation. Moreover, the IBUF is simply used for bitstream buffering as no operation 
sequences and templates are stored in it. The only sequence needed is the first three 
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VHDL constants) in RTL. The OSS is needed to resynchronize the configuration 
interface after a configuration error detection. 
Moreover, from the standpoint of configuration error monitoring, in addition to 
CRC and IDCODE errors, a further factor can be a source of error. The internal 
configuration logic throws a DEC_ERROR if there is an attempt to write to the FDRI 
register before or after a decrypt operation. A ‘1’ at bit position 16 of the STAT register 
indicates a DEC_ERROR while a ‘0’ indicates otherwise. 
In terms of the operations of the IFSM, the only operations retained in the Splixbit 
hardware are configuration for PBR support and the ABT operation for aborting 
configuration. However, the opcodes are no longer used for selecting operations; the 
default operation when the icntrlr_en is asserted is the CFG operation and an abort can 
be triggered by setting the abort port to ‘1’. Figure 5.6 shows the control interface of 
the Splixbit hardware’s IFSM and highlights the ports not found on the previous IFSM 
of Figure 4.2. The icntrlr_err_src is a 3-bit port used to alert the user to the three sources 
of a configuration error. CRC error, IDCODE error and DEC error are reported 
respectively on bits 0, 1, and 2. 
  
Figure 5.6: Key ports of the Splixbit hardware’s finite state machine 
5.4.2 Configuration Flow 
It is necessary to organize the ATAL-formatted bitstream loading in the order of global 
preamble, FAR addresses, and body parts as described by the flowchart. As such, the 
operation of the Splixbit hardware’s IFSM follows the flowchart of Figure 5.7. Once 
enabled, the IFSM first retrieves N_BYTS_GPMBL and N_BDY_PRTS from the first 
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(Sync and Setup) commands to the ICAP. Appendix C presents example waveforms of 
the Splixbit hardware’s IFSM parsing the global preamble of an ATAL-formatted 
bitstream.  
 
Figure 5.7: Splixbit configuration flow for encrypted bitstreams 
The IFSM then loads a new unencrypted frame address supplied through the 
processor before loading its corresponding local preamble and encrypted frame data. 
To ensure that configuration does not stall on waiting for an address, the first frame 
address is supplied before configuration starts, and subsequent frame addresses 
immediately after a previous one is loaded. Proper handshaking between the processor 
and the IFSM ensures this. The ports set_new_far, new_far_addr and new_far_avlbl 
are used for this handshaking. The IFSM asserts set_new_far when a new FAR loading 
is anticipated, the user should provide the new frame address on the input port 






















_______ Chapter 5 – Secure and Efficient Hardware Task Relocation Infrastructures for RC 
 133 
deasserts set_new_far. The user should deassert new_far_avlbl as soon as set_new_far 
goes low. 
Between the frame address and the encrypted frame data loading, the local 
preamble is processed to retrieve (from the DWC) the length of the encrypted data to 
load, and to write the Use-Encryption commands. Both the local body and the local 
postamble are all part of the same encrypted block of data and are loaded in a single 
operation. The cycle of address loading, local preamble processing, and local body and 
postamble loading continues until all the body parts have been loaded. 
5.4.3 Loading Termination 
The fact that we are dealing with encrypted bitstreams calls for certain considerations. 
Since a state machine (IFSM) controls the sending of data to the ICAP, it is important 
for it to know when to stop loading data. The End of Startup (EOS), an Active-High 
signal on the STARTUP primitive of the FPGA would have been the perfect signal to 
monitor. This signal goes high at the end of start-up after configuration, indicating that 
the FPGA is ready for operation [47]. However, our experiments with this primitive 
revealed that the EOS signal remains asserted after the configuration of the full 
bitstream and does not toggle during dynamic partial reconfiguration. In [37], Xilinx 
recommends monitoring the configuration bitstream for the DESYNC word 
(0x0000000D) that signals to the configuration interface that data has been completely 
delivered. In our case, this word is already encrypted; as a result, we monitor the number 
of words configured to know when configuration has finished. 
It would be a lot convenient to have a signal like the EOS on the ICAP primitive 
of the 7 series FPGAs. It is worthy of note however, that Xilinx has introduced this 
mechanism in the UltraScale architecture – there is on the ICAP interface, a PRDONE 
signal that goes High on PR completion [37]. Unlike in an unencrypted bitstream, the 
FAR command header 0x30002001 issued to load the frame address is not visible to 
the IFSM. As a result, the IFSM is in the dark as to when to insert a new frame address 
for PBR. The IFSM needs to know when the preamble has been loaded so as to load 
the FAR before loading each of the body parts. Moreover, the IFSM needs to know 
when the last body part has been loaded in order to stop the insertion of frame addresses. 
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By looking for the loading of the DWC command header (0x30034001), the IFSM 
retrieves the number of words to configure for the body part instance and uses the 
number of body parts retrieved from the global preamble to know when to terminate 
bitstream loading. 
5.4.4 Resource Utilization and Latency of the Splixbit Hardware 
Table 5.2 presents the resource utilization of the Splixbit ICAP controller and the Data 
Mover. Only 121 slices and 1 BRAM are used.  The controller is adapted for the three 
proposed solutions. For a test bitstream of a CLB-BRAM RM (64 frames + 128 frames 
+ 2 pad frames = 194 frames), a configuration (relocation) latency of 806 µs is obtained. 
For the same RM with an unencrypted bitstream, the relocation latency would be 
197.64 µs (calculated using 194 frames in Table 4.15). As earlier noted (see Section 
5.4.1), the ICAP’s interface of the 7 series FPGA only accepts encrypted bitstreams at 
8 bits per clock cycle as against 32 bits in the unencrypted bitstream. Therefore, the 
configuration latency has quadrupled compared to that of the CAM’s ICAP controller 
(see Table 4.11). 
Table 5.2: Resource usage of the data mover and the ICAP controller 
Resource Type 
Component 
ICAP Controller Data Mover Total 
LUTs 482 974 1.456 
Flip-Flops 215 1,145 1,326 
BRAM36s 1 0 1 
Slices 121 377 498 
5.5 Evaluation of ATAL’s Bitstream Size Overhead 
The size of an ATAL-formatted encrypted bitstream increases slightly when compared 
to the original format from Xilinx. This is because of the additional Use-Encryption 
words but this increase in bitstream size is negligible when the average size of a PB is 
considered. Indeed, not more than 108 bytes are incurred for any design bitstream 
considering that only a maximum of two body parts are expected. Referring to Table 
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2.11, the minimum reconfiguration frame is 64 for a CLB-DSP pair (plus one pad frame 
when the MFW is not used) and this is equivalent to 26,260 bytes, not considering user-
determined setup commands, which are common to both Xilinx- and ATAL-formatted 
PBs. The overhead for this CLB-DSP pair is 20 bytes and is only 0.08%. As the design 
size grows, this overhead is expected to go much lower. 
5.5.1 Uncompressed Bitstreams 
Table 5.3 shows the maximum ATAL overhead for the various reconfiguration frames 
of the 7 series FPGA for uncompressed bitstreams. The reconfiguration frame is the 
minimum selectable resources for PR (see Section 2.2.2). The bitstream sizes (frame 
data sizes) for the resource block pairs are estimated from the number of configuration 
frames only without considering the usual preambles, postambles, and the FAR and 
WCFG command packets, which are always in the bitstream whether or not ATAL is 
being used for formatting. 
Table 5.3: Bitstream size overhead of ATAL for an uncompressed encrypted bitstream 
Evaluation Parameters 
Reconfiguration Frames 
CLB-CLB CLB-DSP CLB-BRAM 
Number of Configuration Frames  72 + 1 pad 64 + 1 pad 192 + 1 pad 
Number of ATAL Body Parts 1 1 2 
Frame Data Size (Bytes) 29,492 26,260 77,972 
𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ (Bytes) 20 20 88 
Max Percentage 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ (%) 0.07 0.08 0.11 
 
The bitstream size overhead of ATAL is determined as the bytes loaded for the 
Use-Encryption commands (see the local preamble of Section 5.2.2) plus the one length 
word in the global preamble (see Section 5.2.1) and two words each for the IDCODE 
and RCRC packets (see Section 5.2.3). This implies a total of 18 words (72 bytes) for 
the first frame and 17 words (68 bytes) for the subsequent frames since the global 
preamble is included once. However, in the Xilinx-formatted encrypted PB, the Use-
Encryption words are also used. That means in an ATAL-formatted bitstream the first 
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frame actually incurs 5 words (20 bytes). The overhead in bytes, of ATAL (𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ) 
can thus be described by Equation (5.1): 
 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ = 20 + 68 × (𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝐵𝑜𝑑𝑦 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑠 − 1) (5.1) 
5.5.2 Compressed Bitstreams 
Table 5.4 shows the ATAL overhead for the various reconfiguration frames of the 7 
series FPGA for compressed encrypted bitstreams. When ATAL is used to format a 
compressed bitstream, the bitstream size overhead is quite different from that of the 
uncompressed bitstream. Many body parts (at least the number of frame addresses in 
the bitstream) are expected. At the same time, the local preambles in these body parts 
are sure to increase the size of the bitstream slightly. This increase is estimated at 68 
bytes per frame, which is the same as the overhead incurred per body part, implying a 
16.83% increase in bitstream size per frame. 
Table 5.4: Bitstream size overhead of ATAL for a compressed encrypted bitstream 
Evaluation Parameters 
Reconfiguration Frames 
CLB-CLB CLB-DSP CLB-BRAM 
Number of Configuration Frames  72 64 192 
Best-Case Evaluation 
Number of ATAL Body Parts 1 1 2 
Frame Data Size (Bytes) 404 404 808 
𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ (Bytes) 20 20 88 
Percentage 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ (%) 4.95 4.95 10.89 
Average Percentage 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ (%) 7.92 
Worst-Case Evaluation 
Number of ATAL Body Parts 72 64 192 
Frame Data Size (Bytes) 29,088 25,856 77,568 
𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ (Bytes) 4,848 4,304 13,008 
Percentage 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ (%) 16.67 16.65 16.77 
Average Percentage 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ (%) 16.72 
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Regardless of the combination of resource blocks, the maximum 𝐴𝑇𝐴𝐿𝑜𝑣ℎ cannot 
practically exceed 16.77%, which is the overhead for the largest reconfiguration frame. 
However, in theory, it cannot exceed the per-frame overhead of 16.83%. 
5.6 Configuration Strategies for Secure Task Relocation 
Having identified earlier, the conflict between keeping bitstreams in cypher format and 
PBR requiring plain bitstreams, in the following subsections, three techniques that can 
be used to relocate encrypted PBs are investigated and evaluated. The first involves 
using a dedicated on-chip custom-built decryptor engine, the second approach involves 
an initial configuration followed by intermediate readback before relocation, while the 
third is based on the ATAL approach. 
5.6.1 Intermediate Dedicated On-Chip Decryption (IDOD) 
In this method, a dedicated on-chip AES decryption circuit is used to first decrypt the 
bitstream, then PBR is carried out by modifying the plain address in the decrypted 
bitstream. Bitstream security is not compromised since the decryption is done inside 
the FPGA. However, a security attack like side-channel analysis [215] can potentially 
be used to extract the AES key and eventually steal the IP. This is not peculiar to user-
implemented decryption circuits, even the Xilinx’s internal decryptor is susceptible to 
this attack as successful attacks on it have shown [216]. Several implementations of 
AES decryptor have been reported in the literatures. One fitting for this use-case should 
ideally be resistant to side-channel attack. 
The main disadvantage of the method presented here is that the decryptor consumes 
additional FPGA resources apart from the relocation engine itself. Figure 5.8 shows the 
configuration and timing model for this method. Apart from the time durations for 
moving data from the external storage (𝑡𝑚𝑜𝑣) and for unencrypted configuration 
(𝑡𝑢_𝑐𝑓𝑔), time is also incurred for the decryption (𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑐). The value of 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑐 can be reduced 
at the expense of increased area by pipelining the decryption. The total time required 
for relocating a PB (𝑡𝑝𝑏𝑟) with this method can be described by Equation (5.2). 
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Figure 5.8: Model for relocating encrypted partial bitstreams by using a dedicated decryption 
circuit for intermediate decryption 
 𝑡𝑝𝑏𝑟 = 𝑡𝑚𝑜𝑣 + 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑐 + 𝑡𝑢_𝑐𝑓𝑔 (5.2) 
5.6.2 Initial Configuration and Intermediate Readback (ICIR) 
This involves the initial configuration of an encrypted PB followed by readback and 
then reconfiguration. Though an encrypted bitstream is used for the initial 
configuration, the FPGA allows the ICAP to read back unencrypted data. The 
configuration data can then be written to a different frame address generated in runtime. 
To ensure that bitstream security is intact, the ICAP signals should never be routed out 
of the FPGA. In this method, additional time overheads are incurred for the initial 
configuration and the intermediate readback. Figure 5.9 shows the model for this 
method while its latency equation can be seen in Equation (5.3). The main contributors 
to PBR latency here are the times used for the initial encrypted configuration (𝑡𝑒_𝑐𝑓𝑔) 
and intermediate readback (𝑡𝑟𝑏𝑘). 
 
Figure 5.9: Model for relocating encrypted partial bitstreams by initial configuration 
followed by intermediate readback and final reconfiguration 
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It should be noted that the idea of relocating an already configured bitstream has 
already been reported in [147]. However, it was not applied as a means of relocating 
encrypted partial bitstreams. 
5.6.3 Advance Task Address Loading (ATAL) 
The configuration model for ATAL is the same as that in Figure 5.9 but for the timing, 
there are no initial encrypted configuration and intermediate readback times as shown 
in Equation (5.4). There is only an encrypted configuration after the data movement. 
One limitation with ATAL has to do with the fact that the ICAP in the 7 series FPGAs 
only accepts encrypted data on bits 7 to 0 of its 32-bit input port [47], making 𝑡𝑒_𝑐𝑓𝑔 
more than 𝑡𝑢_𝑐𝑓𝑔. However, this also affects method 2 since the initial configuration is 
that of an encrypted bitstream. 
 𝑡𝑝𝑏𝑟 = 𝑡𝑚𝑜𝑣 + 𝑡𝑒_𝑐𝑓𝑔 (5.4) 
5.7 Evaluation of the Configuration Strategies 
In order to quantitatively compare the three methods for relocating encrypted PBs, 
uncompressed and compressed bitstreams are generated for a 2.4-GHz wireless 
communication application and used as the basis for determining the relocation 
latencies. Both plain and encrypted PBs are generated using Vivado. The application’s 
RM/RP amounts to a CLB-BRAM pair which is equivalent to 194 configuration frames 
(64 CLB/INT frames, 128 BRAM frames, and 2 pad frames). With 101 32-bit words in 
each frame of the 7 series FPGA, the unencrypted configuration data for the application 
is a total of 19,594 32-bit words, not considering the configuration commands. 
In the analyses that follow, it should be noted that the data movement time (𝑡𝑚𝑜𝑣) 
has not been considered since it is the same (3.993 ms, measured using the Zynq 
processor’s internal timer) for all the three methods. There are slight differences in the 
lengths of the final bitstreams. However, with respect to the transfer time by the Data 
Mover, all the bitstreams can be moved into the FPGA in the same amount of time. 
This is because of the contiguous nature of the data movement. 
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5.7.1 Evaluation of IDOD 
In terms of area utilization, it is certain that this method uses the most resource because 
of the need for a decryption circuit. The other two methods simply require the Data 
Mover and the ICAP Controller. From the work in [217], we estimate a resource usage 
of 5081 slices for an AES-256 decryptor targeted at the 7 series FPGA. When this usage 
is combined with the usage for the Data Mover and the ICAP Controller, the total usage 
comes up to 5579 slices. 
In order to estimate the decryption time, 𝑡𝑑𝑒𝑐, the decryption latency of 41 clock 
cycles (197.5 ns) per block reported in [217] is used. The encrypted portion of the 
encrypted bitstream of the test application amounts to 19,784 32-bit words, which is 
equivalent to 4,946 AES blocks (with a block being 128 bits). This is different from the 
unencrypted word count because padding words are used before authentication and 
encryption to ensure that data lengths are a multiple of 128 bits for encryption and 512 
bits for authentication, required for simplifying the MAC computation [43]. Assuming 
no pipelining is used, we estimate a total decryption latency of 4,946 multiplied by 
197.5 ns, that is, 976.84 µs. This would reduce with pipelining, but the reduction would 
depend on the pipeline depth. 
For an unencrypted frame data, the configuration time of the Splixbit ICAP 
controller is the same as that of the one in Chapter 4. Therefore, from Table 4.15, the 
configuration time is computed as 197.64 µs and from Equation (5.1), 𝑡𝑝𝑏𝑟 can be 
estimated as 1,174.48 µs. The comparison of this with those of the other methods is 
presented in Table 5.5. 
5.7.2 Evaluation of ICIR 
The resource overhead incurred with this method is that of the Data Mover and the 
ICAP Controller, which is a total of 498 slices, and is much lower compared with that 
for IDOD (see Table 5.5). For the 194 frames required for the application, from Table 
4.15 and real-life measurement, the estimates for 𝑡𝑟𝑏𝑘, 𝑡𝑢_𝑐𝑓𝑔, and 𝑡𝑒_𝑐𝑓𝑔 are 195.4 µs, 
197.64 µs, and 806 µs (measured) respectively. This totals 1,199.04 µs for 𝑡𝑝𝑏𝑟 
according to Equation (5.3). This is the worst relocation latency of the three methods. 
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5.7.3 Evaluation of ATAL 
Like ICIR, the resource usage here is only 498 slices, which represents a resource 
saving of more than 90% compared to IDOD. It should be noted, however, that the 
ICAP controller includes a readback functionality which is not needed in ATAL. 
Removing this functionality would reduce the usage by a few slices. For the relocation 
latency estimation, a value of 806 µs for the application’s RM was measured. This value 
is the lowest of all the three methods, offering an average time saving of 32% over the 
IDOD and ICIR methods. This is because only a single configuration is done, with no 
intermediate decryption or configuration and readback, making ATAL the most 
resource and time-efficient of all the three. 
The 𝑡𝑒_𝑐𝑓𝑔 for ICIR and ATAL are as high as they are because encrypted bitstreams 
can only be configured 8 bits per clock cycle. This is a limitation in the 7 series FPGA 
and has been addressed in the UltraScale, where the entire 32-bit interface can be used 
[218]. Applied to the UltraScale then, all the other values in Table 5.5 would be the 
same apart from 𝑡𝑝𝑏𝑟 for ICIR and ATAL methods, which would reduce to estimated 
values of 594.54 µs and 201.5 µs respectively, but resulting in time savings for ATAL 
of 83% and 66% over the IDOD and ICIR methods respectively. 
Table 5.5: Comparison of the three methods for resource usage and relocation latency 
Parameter IDOD ICIR ATAL 
Utilization 5579 slices 498 slices 498 slices 
Relocation Latency, 𝑡𝑝𝑏𝑟 1,174.48 µs 1,199.04 µs 806 µs 
5.8 The Security Implications of ATAL 
It is important to consider the security implication of using ATAL secure PB format. It 
used to be that only the FDRI data of the bitstream was encrypted in the Virtex-5 secure 
bitstream format [43]. On the contrary, in the 7 series FPGA, only the Use-Encryption 
commands are in plain format. In the ATAL format, the only plaintext content that 
reveals design-related information is the number of body parts, which reveals the 
number of resource types used and nothing more. That is all that the attacker can glean 
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about the design and the author reckons that until proven otherwise, not so much can 
be done with this information in terms of stealing the design or attacking the device. 
To understand what the attacker would know from the number of body parts, refer 
to Table 2.2, and note that the CLB, I/O blocks and clock routing resources share the 
same block type of ‘000’, while BRAM content uses the block type of ‘001’. The Xilinx 
documentation does not indicate the block type for DSPs, but an inspection of 
bitstreams generated in Vivado reveals that the DSP shares the same block as CLBs. 
When the bitstream compression feature is not used, the only frame addresses in the 
bitstream are those for the combination of resource blocks used by the design. In such 
bitstreams, a maximum of two frame addresses (for BRAM blocks and 
CLB/DSP/IO/CLK blocks) and thus, a maximum of two body parts, can be expected. 
Moreover, while packing the bitstream parts into a single bitstream file, plain FAR 
command and frame addresses can be included right in the local preambles to simplify 
the design of the Splixbit hardware and bitstream loading. However, this would give 
far too much information away about the design. Once a specific FAR value is known, 
an attacker with a fair understanding of the FPGA architecture would know exactly 
what resource is used and where it is on the chip. The device is then more prone to 
sophisticated attacks like probing the chip with a scanning electron microscope [43]. 
As such, it is far more secure to specify the FAR value in runtime. 
5.9 Chapter Summary 
PBR is a technique that can be used in FPGAs to reduce external bitstream storage 
requirement and facilitate adaptability. However, because of the recent increase in the 
uptake of FPGAs, bitstream authentication and encryption have been introduced to 
secure FPGA-based IPs. PBR meanwhile, can only be carried out on plain bitstreams. 
While method fragments already exist that can be used to effect encrypted partial 
bitstream relocation, these are far less time- and resource-efficient. On the one hand, an 
on-chip decryption engine can be used to decrypt the bitstream before passing it on to 
the configuration interface, in which case, the difference in resource utilization brought 
about by ATAL is the same as the utilization of the decryption engine which can almost 
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occupy an entire chip (for smaller devices). On the other end of the spectrum, an initial 
configuration followed by an intermediate readback and final configuration can be 
used, with the consequence that a very large system time overhead can be incurred in a 
bid to save resources. ATAL provides an efficient solution and it is not a middle-ground 
approach that incurs moderate resource and time overheads; it offers the best of both 
spectra, incurring a very negligible time and resource overhead. ATAL has been 
compared with these other methods and it happened to provide resource and time 




Chapter 6  
FPGA Clock Infrastructures for 
Dynamic On-Chip Inter-Task 
Communication 
The importance of on-chip communication in today’s System-on-Chip (SoC) platforms 
cannot be overemphasized. With the continued increase in the density of chips, the 
number of circuits that can coexist on a single chip has increased by astronomical 
proportions, sometimes numbering in the thousands [219]. Some of the processing 
elements or circuits that can coexist on a chip include CPUs, GPUs, DSPs, memory 
elements, and other IP modules. Establishing inter-circuit data transfer among these 
circuits in a scalable and resource-efficient manner is essential. In an FPGA, the area 
utilization of a circuit is influenced by the routability of the resources in the area 
occupied by the circuit [220]. Underutilization can occur if the resources in a region of 
the FPGA cannot be used by a circuit because there are no interconnect resources or 
possible routes to connect them, leading to an enlargement of the area occupied by the 
circuit in order to encompass more routing resources. The result is that the circuit 
occupies a larger area than necessary, with several unused, or rather, unusable 
resources. 
The NoC has come to be regarded as the future of on-chip communication, owing 
to advantages such as modularity and concurrency [173] (refer to Section 3.4). When 
implemented on an FPGA, in order to provide access to the communication network, 
the NoC typically uses the general routing resources as network links, thus increasing 
the demand on the already strained routing resources in the area occupied by the circuit. 
To alleviate this problem, a network link that does not use the general interconnect 
resources should be used where possible. Incidentally, it turns out that most FPGA-
based designs do not use the on-chip global and horizontal clock buffers [44] and 
invariably, a large part of the clock network. Repurposing these buffers and networks 
for use as network links would lessen the demand on general routing resources for inter-
6 
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circuit communication. Moreover, these otherwise redundant resources, which are not 
used for their intended clocking-related purposes have already been paid for in silicon. 
As such, using them for communication-related purposes represents an added value. 
Another advantage of using clock buffers and nets for communication is that they 
facilitate runtime PBR. One important challenge with PBR, which has limited its 
applicability, is the provision of dynamic communication for relocatable circuits in 
runtime as previously discussed in Section 3.2.5. This is because inter-circuit links are 
statically determined at compile time. Runtime routing is a possible solution to dynamic 
communication but it is both complicated and computationally expensive, often 
requiring several thousands of clock cycles [151]. In traditional NoCs, the general 
routing resources are used as network links and thus, constitute static routes and hamper 
circuit relocation. The use of clock buffers as network links avoids the restriction of 
static routes and allows the arbitrary relocation of circuits. Since the clock buffers, trees, 
and nets do not use the general logic routing resources [44] but have their dedicated 
routing in the clock layer as explained in Section 2.1.1, the path from a transmitting 
circuit to a receiving circuit is free of general routings. 
In addition, routing congestions are often the reason that static routes cross into 
RPs and requiring that these routes be preserved in all RMs using the RP, which is a 
further requirement of PBR (see Section 3.2.5). A way of reducing routing congestion, 
especially at the interface of circuits, and thus, reducing the number of static routes 
crossing RPs is to use bit-serial interconnections between circuits, as this has been 
shown to have reduced footprint and congestion factors [180]. Incidentally, our use of 
clock buffers for communication calls for the adoption of bit-serial connection at the 
clock buffer level. However, multiple bit-serial connections can be used depending on 
the availability of clock buffers in the target FPGA. In addition, a bit-serial 
communication implementation nevertheless is beneficial because it helps in easily 
meeting the requirement for the preservation of existing static routes, while at the same 
time garnering the other benefits of bit-serial over bit-parallel interconnects, which 
include high speed and power savings as demonstrated in [179] and [180]. 
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Because this technique incurs a low overhead of resources and involves the unique 
use of clock buffers for serial network interconnection, we have termed it Clock-
Enabled Low-Overhead Communication (CELOC). 
The techniques and implementations reported in this chapter are covered in 
publications [221], [222], [223], and [224]: 
 A. Adetomi, G. Enemali, and T. Arslan, ‘Clock Buffers, Nets, and Trees for 
On-Chip Communication: A Novel Network Access Technique in FPGAs’, in 
2017 IEEE International Parallel and Distributed Processing Symposium 
Workshops (IPDPSW), 2017, pp. 219–222. 
 A. Adetomi, G. Enemali, and T. Arslan, ‘Relocation-Aware Communication 
Network for Circuits on Xilinx FPGAs’, in 2017  International Conference on 
Field Programmable Logic and Applications (FPL), 2017, pp. 1–7. 
 A. Adetomi, G. Enemali, and T. Arslan, ‘Characterization of Clock Buffers 
for On-Chip Inter-Circuit Communication in Xilinx FPGAs’, in 2018 IEEE 
International Symposium on Circuits and Systems (ISCAS), 2018, pp. 1–5. 
 A. Adetomi, G. Enemali, G. Seetharaman, and T. Arslan, ‘Fault-Tolerant 
Mechanisms for Relocation-Aware Dynamic On-Chip Communication on 
FPGAs’, in 2018 NASA/ESA Conference on Adaptive Hardware and Systems 
(AHS), 2018, pp. 214–217. 
6.1 Clocking Resources in the Xilinx 7 Series FPGA 
There are several clock buffers in the Xilinx FPGAs for driving clock networks that 
span diverse clusters of regions. There are also Phase-Locked Loop (PLL) frequency 
synthesizers for on-chip jitter-free clock generation from an external clock source. 
6.1.1 Clock Buffers and Network Distribution 
The clock network of all modern FPGAs is based on the Spine-and-Ribs topology [225], 
where vertical spines drive clock signals into horizontal ribs. Eventually, local ribs in 
the clock regions directly clock logic resources. This provides support for multiple local 
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and global clock domains. Figure 6.1 shows the clock network distribution and 
interaction in a single clock region of the 7 series FPGA. There is a horizontal clock 
row (HROW) that spans the entire length of the clock region. It is in the middle of each 
region. Clock signals switch vertically upward and downward from the HROW to reach 
logic resources. 
A regional network serves synchronous resources contained in a single clock 
region and is driven by regional buffers (BUFRs) while a multi-region network 
distributes clock signals to multiple clock regions, vertically through multi-region 
buffers (BUFMRs), or horizontally through horizontal clock buffers (BUFHs). A global 
clock network spans the entire device and can drive multi-region and regional networks. 
This network is driven from the centre of the device by 32 BUFGs, with 16 in each 
top/bottom half. The most important thing to note, and that which is being exploited in 
our adaptation of clock buffers and networks for inter-task communication is that the 
clock networks use independent physical wires different from the general logic routing. 
Inside a clock region, switch matrices route clock signals to the logic resources with 
appropriate PIPs activated as required. 
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6.1.2 Clock Buffers and the Features Exploited by CELOC 
In order to realize CELOC, two factors are important for a clock buffer and its 
associated net – the span or reach of the net, and the availability of a Clock Enable (CE) 
pin on the buffer for logic functions. The reach or range of a buffer’s net determines 
how far on the chip the clock-layer-based communication signal can travel, and the 
number of buffers with switchable CEs affects the number of transmitting nodes a 
CELOC-based network can support. In addition, the clock buffer must be user-
accessible in the design tool, that is, it must be possible to instantiate and place it in 
order to control connections to and from it. We now consider the case take a look at 
these features in the clock buffers of the 7 series FPGAs [44]: 
A. Global Clock Buffers/Multiplexers - BUFGCTRL 
The global clock buffers drive the global vertical clocking backbone in the 7 series 
device and there are 32 of them per device, with 16 in each of the top and bottom halves. 
Their reach spans the entire FPGA and as such, they can feed any clocking point in the 
device. As such, they can be used for device-wide communication. These buffers do 
not reside in clock regions but up to 12 unique lines out of the 32 global clock lines can 
be driven into a clock region to feed clocking points inside the region. There are six 
possible configurations of the global buffer when placed in a site on the chip. However, 
the two of interest are BUFG and BUFGCE (see Figure 6.2) 
The global clock nets have the capacity to drive not only the clock inputs of logic 
resources, but also the Set/Reset (SR) and CE inputs of registers. This feature is 
particularly important in achieving CELOC-based dynamic communication, as it 
allows a communication clock signal to be received via the SR input of a register, and 
ensuring that no local (static) routing crosses the task boundary. 
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B. Horizontal Clock Buffers – BUFH and BUFHCE 
They are very similar to the global buffers as they drive the horizontal global clock 
tree spines. However, they span only two horizontally adjacent clock regions. Unlike 
global clock buffers that do not reside in clock regions, there are 12 BUFH(CE)s 
contained in the HROW at the edge of each clock region. However, both share the same 
12 routing tracks in the HROW. The horizontal buffers can be used as BUFHs, with 
simple input and output, or as BUFHCEs, with a CE pin (like the BUFG(CE)s of Figure 
6.2). Unlike the BUFGCTRL, the CE of the BUFHCE can be used to gate power 
consumption and as well achieve a true CE logic function on a clock cycle-to-cycle 
basis, allowing both synchronous and asynchronous transfer of the clock input to the 
output of the buffer. Like the global clocks, the BUFH(CE)s can drive the enable and 
reset inputs of logic resources. 
C. Multi-Region Clocks – BUFMR and BUFMRCE 
The multi-region clock buffers are used to enable multi-regional clocking by 
directly driving regional clock buffers (BUFRs) in the same clock region and the ones 
above and below it. Like the BUFHCE, the CE in the BUFMRCE can be synchronous 
or asynchronous to the input/output transfer. The BUFMRCE can be used to achieve a 
CELOC-based network that is local to three vertical clock regions. There are two 
BUFMR(CE)s in each clock region. 
D. Regional Clock Buffers - BUFR 
The regional clock buffers can drive any clocking point drivable by a global clock 
in a single clock region. In each region there are four dedicated clock nets driven by 
four BURs. These nets are independent of each other and the global nets in the clock 
region. Since each of these regional clock nets is distinct, this allows multiple unique 
clocks to feed a single design or provide communication. The regional clock buffers 
can be used in both BUFR and BUFRCE configuration. They have two control lines, 
the CE and the clear (CLR). These are associated with the frequency division mode of 
the buffer and can only be used in that mode. That is, the CE can only be toggled if the 
BUFR_DIVIDE option is set to any number other than “BYPASS” when the buffer is 
instantiated in RTL. With respect to CELOC, the BUFRs can be used for intra-region 
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communication and are also essential for transferring data out of a clock region for 
global inter-task communication as they are able to connect directly to BUFGs. 
6.2 Adaptation of Clock Buffers for Communication 
The availability of a diverse range of clock buffers with global and local spans in the 
Xilinx FPGAs offers a unique possibility that can be utilized to achieve on-chip 
communication functionality. Our communication solution involves a special 
adaptation of these clock buffers to serve as binary (‘0’ or ‘1’) signal transmitters and 
receivers on the FPGA. 
Would repurposing clock buffers for communication not be detrimental to their 
intended functionality? It is true that the clock buffers and nets are precious and are 
available in the chip predominantly for clocking-related functionalities. For instance, 
according to the 7 series FPGA clocking resources user guide [44], the functions of the 
buffers include glitchless multiplexing between clock sources, clock gating to reduce 
dynamic power consumption, elimination of clock distribution delays, clocking support 
for circuits spanning multiple clock regions on the FPGA, and clock frequency division. 
However, the same user guide reports that most FPGA designs contain several unused 
global and horizontal clock buffers. These buffers are essential to the working of 
CELOC. One of the aims of this research is to repurpose these redundant resources for 
dynamic on-chip communication support and thus save on valuable FPGA resources 
that would otherwise have been used for on-chip networking, while at the same time 
providing a static-route free inter-communication for relocatable circuits.  
Figure 6.3 presents the CELOC concept in a diagrammatic form. By gating a free-
running communication clock using a clock buffer, it is possible to send data from a 
transmitting (TX) task to a receiving (RX) task from any location on the device to 
another reachable by the buffer. At the TX end, a Serializer works in a Parallel-In 
Serial-Out (PISO) version to send data while a Deserializer at the RX reverses the 
operation in a Serial-In Parallel-Out (SIPO) version. The CELOC technique requires 
an RX task to be fed with three clocks: task_clock, com_clock, and data_clock. The 
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task_clock signal is used to clock the tasks while com_clock is used to generate 
data_clock, which carries a serialized data from the source to the destination. 



















































Figure 6.3: Transmitting serialized data with a clock buffer 
6.2.1 Data Transfer Mechanism 
To transfer data, the parallel data from a TX task is serialized and shifted out bit-by-bit 
to an RX task through the clock buffers. A register is used to latch the parallel data for 
onward shifting to the clock enable (CE) of the buffer on the ce_cntrl signal line. This 
latching is done by the Data Latch Controller. Since the same register block is used for 
shifting out the serial bits, multiplexers are used to select between updating the registers 
with new data and shifting already latched data. 
The ce_cntrl signal, which carries the serial data to be transmitted controls the 
output of the buffer by toggling its CE. A ‘1’ allows the input of the buffer to pass 
through to the output, while a ‘0’ ties the output to zero. Since the communication clock 
(which can be the same as the task clock) and the task clock are synchronous, a ‘1’ on 
ce_cntrl essentially allows a full clock cycle to pass through while a ‘0’ blocks it. As 
an example, Figure 6.4 shows the theoretical expected signal transitions for transmitting 
10011010 (binary) (see Table 6.1 for the corresponding truth table). The RX task’s 
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SIPO circuit can detect a falling edge on com_clock as a ‘1’. With respect to the 
distance between the TX and RX tasks, the clock buffers in the Xilinx FPGAs are 
designed for short propagation delays and very low skew [44]. This helps prevent the 
kind of long propagation delays associated with shared-bus interconnects. As a result, 
the two clock signals (com_clock and data_clock) can travel far with minimal loss of 
phase alignment, and thus ensure timing closure. 
com_clock
ce_cntrl
data_clock  1         0         0          1         1          0         1         0  
Figure 6.4: Transmission of an 8-bit binary data 10011010 
Table 6.1: Truth table for clock-enabled data transmission 
Inputs Outputs 
tx_serial_data (CE) com_clock data_clock 
1 X com_clock 
0 X 0 
 
6.2.2 Communication Clock and Task Clock Generation 
In order to achieve the maximum possible throughput for data transfer, it is important 
to drive com_clock as high as possible. An advantage of using a separate clock as the 
communication clock is that we are not limited to the frequency of the task clock; the 
communication engine can run at a much higher frequency. The FPGA provides a hard 
PLL clock generator, which can be used to generate a clock signal at a frequency much 
higher than that of the clock fed into the FPGA. 
In the demonstration of CELOC in this work, the PLLE2_BASE primitive in the 7 
series FPGA is used to generate the two clocks (com_clock and task_clock).  Two 
global clock buffers are then used to distribute them throughout the chip when 
necessary. Figure 6.20 shows the schematic of the PLL-based clock generation and 
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distribution for CELOC. The core of the clock generator is the PLLE2_BASE primitive, 
which can be used as a frequency synthesizer, jitter filter, or to deskew clocks. As a 
clock generator, the PLL requires an internal feedback as shown in Figure 6.20. 
  
Figure 6.5: Schematic of the PLL-based clock generator for CELOC 
6.2.3 Clock Domain Crossing 
Because com_clock and task_clock are functionally in different clock domains – one 
used to clock the registers that push out the serial bits, and the other to retrieve the 
serialized data through another set of registers, it is important to investigate the impact 
of Clock Domain Crossing (CDC). 
To avoid complications from CDC, the two clocks are sourced from a single PLL 
clock generator with the communication clock made as high as possible. Using this 
structure helps to prevent setup and hold timing violations by keeping both the 
transmission and the reception synchronous and in the same clock domain – no 
asynchronous clocks and no variable phase alignment. Therefore, no clock domain 
crossing issues are expected since the same clock (com_clock) is used to transmit and 
receive data [226]. Nevertheless, every implementation of CELOC is checked for CDC 
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6.2.4 Data Recovery Mechanism 
Since we are interested in avoiding the general routing resources, it is important that 
the recovery of the serial bits in the RX circuit should employ a mechanism that is 
independent of general interconnects. Hence, an ideal interface to data_clock should be 
a clocking point in a logic element. Two candidates for this are registers and latches 
with non-clocking inputs that can be fed by clock signals. The FDPE register and the 
LDPE latch [227] in the 7 series FPGA fall into this category and can thus be connected 
as shown in Figure 6.6 to receive data_clock into an RX circuit without using the 
general interconnect. This is because their Set/Reset (SR) and Preset inputs can be 
driven by global and horizontal clock buffers. Their Q outputs produce the same 
waveform as the original ce_cntrl signal used to toggle the clock buffers in Figure 6.3. 
The choice of either the FDPE or the LDPE influences the maximum bandwidth of 
communication as will be seen in Section 6.5. 
 
Figure 6.6: Setup of the FDPE (or LDPE latch) register to interface with com_clock and 
data_clock for serial data recovery 
Table 6.2: Truth table of the FDPE register 
Inputs Outputs 
PRE CE D C Q 
1 X X X 1 
0 0 X X No Change 
0 1 D 1 D 
 
The FDPE is a D flip-flop with clock enable (CE) and asynchronous preset [227]. 
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(com_clock) used to create the data clock at the transmitter, data_clock connected to 
the PRE input produces on Q, signal level transitions corresponding to the rising edges 
of data_clock as shown in Figure 6.7 for the same 8-bit data 10011010 (binary) 
transmitted in Figure 6.3. To understand how this works, we consider the truth table of 
the FPDE (see Table 6.2). We observe that by setting CE to ‘1’ and D to ‘0’, Q follows 
PRE (data_clock) instead of D at every rising edge of C. The LDPE data latch with 
asynchronous preset and gate enable [227]. A similar explanation applies to the LDPE 
with regards to the signal transmissions that allow the recovery of the transmitted data, 





 1         0         0          1         1          0         1         0
 
Figure 6.7: Waveform showing the signal transitions at the output of an FDPE register with 
com_clock as the clock input and data_clock as the PRE input 
6.3 Packet Synchronization and Encoding 
Since CELOC in general, serializes the data being sent before transmission, an idle line 
will be either a ‘1’ or a ‘0’. It then becomes important for the transceiver task to 
determine when to start or stop reception? It is also possible for a task node to join a 
CELOC-based network in the middle of an ongoing transmission. The new node has to 
correctly latch on to the beginning and end of packets. In general, a CELOC-based data 
transfer between any two circuits does not require any special handshaking or encoding 
technique, as a data bit that leaves the source circuit would arrive at the destination 
circuit without any ambiguity if the two circuits are directly interconnected. However, 
in CELOC-based NoCs, the source and destination nodes may not be directly physically 
connected and communication packets may be routed through intermediate nodes until 
they reach their destinations. 
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As such, data packet synchronization may be required to coordinate data transfer. 
It may be worth nothing however, that packet synchronization is not always required in 
bit-serial networks [180]. Depending on the adopted topology, a NoC design might be 
able to do away with packet synchronization and as such save on encoding resources 
and latency. This approach is favoured when applicable. However, in other 
applications, encoding is necessary if ambiguity in data transfer is to be avoided 
To uniquely mark off the boundaries of transmission packets in serial networks, 
frame synchronization mechanisms are used. One such mechanism is byte stuffing, 
where a special code byte is used to delimit packet boundaries. In order to prevent 
incorrect synchronization, as the code byte may be present in the data packet, special 
‘escape’ codes are often used [228], but the length of the packet ends up being 
inconsistent [229]. This is not desirable in real-time applications, where timeliness and 
predictability are important. To achieve consistency in packet size, we propose an 
adapted form of the Consistent Overhead Byte Stuffing (COBS) [229]. 
The COBS maps numbers in the range [0, 255] to numbers in the range [1, 255], 
thereby reserving one number which can be used as the frame synchronizer (delimiter). 
The details on how this is achieved can be found in [229]. Adopting a similar technique 
to map the hex number set [0, F] to [1, F], we reserve the number zero to be used as the 
delimiter. We call this Consistent Overhead Nibble Stuffing (CONS). Starting at the 
zeroth (most-significant) nibble (4 bits of 0’s and 1’s), the occurrence of a zero is 
replaced by the number of nibbles examined (including the zero) followed by the non-
zero nibbles before the zero. For example, an arbitrary 32-bit packet of hex numbers 
(400AD013) passed through the CONS encoder would produce 2413AD313 (hex) as 
shown in Table 6.3. 
A simple way to carry out the encoding is to logically pad the packet with zero 
nibbles at the beginning and end as shown in the second row of Table 6.3, with the first 
serving as a placeholder for the overhead and the other as a phantom helper to complete 
the encoding process. This phantom does not actually count as part of the data. Each 
nibble of the padded packet is then given an index starting at 0 from the most significant 
nibble (0 to 9 in this example). The encoded nibble of a zero nibble at index izn is 
obtained by subtracting izn from iznext, where iznext is the index of the next zero nibble. 
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There cannot be another nibble after the appended zero nibble. Therefore, the encoded 
packet is terminated on the penultimate index (index 8 in this example). Further 
illustrations in Table 6.3 show that an all-zero packet would be encoded as 111111111 
(hex) and a packet without a zero nibble as 9XXXXXXXX (hex), where X is a non-
zero nibble. 
The advantage of this form of encoding is that every packet is guaranteed to have 
a fixed overhead of one nibble. On the other hand, the disadvantage, as the examples 
show is that even when there is no zero nibble in the data, the overhead is still incurred. 
However, this is the price that is paid for the benefit of determinism in communication 
latency as far as the data packet is concerned. 
Table 6.3: Examples showing the CONS encoding process 
Index (in) 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
           
Nibbles (Di) 0 4 0 0 A D 0 1 3 0 
CONS Code (iznext – izn) 2  1 3   3    
Encoded Data 2 4 1 3 A D 3 1 3  
           
Nibbles (Di) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
CONS Code (iznext – izn) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
Encoded Data 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
           
Nibbles (Di) 0 5 1 D F 2 C 3 7 0 
CONS Code (iznext – izn) 9          
Encoded Data 9 5 1 D F 2 C 3 7  
 
In order for a new node to synchronize to the communication network, a bit-level 
framing delimiter is required. Since there is no zero nibble in the CONS encoding, there 
cannot be more than three consecutive 0’s except if a zero delimiter is used. To avoid 
ambiguity, a sequence of 1 and seven 0’s (10000000) will be used as the delimiter 
taking a cue from [229]. This delimiter or Frame Synchronization Sequence (FSS) is 
added at the beginning of each transmission packet. 
The FSS, the CONS overhead, and the data bits can all be concatenated into a 
single packet as shown in Table 6.4. The data bits can be no more than 7 bytes long for 
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a fixed-width data packet as this is the maximum number of bytes between any two 
successive zeros that can be encoded by the CONS scheme. This is because the 16 
nibbles in the set [0, F] are mapped to 15 nibbles in the set [1, F] for the purpose of 
encoding zero nibbles. In other words, only 15 consecutive zero nibbles (60 bits) can 
be encoded (including the phantom zero appended logically to carry out the encoding). 
Removing the 4 bits of this phantom zero leaves 56 bits (7 bytes) for the actual data to 
be transferred. 
Another way of looking at this is to note from Table 6.3 that a code nibble is derived 
from the subtractive operation between the indexes of two nearest zeros, with the code 
stored in the position of the first (placeholder) zero nibble. Since a nibble can only hold 
a maximum count of 15 (F in hexadecimal), and the phantom zero appended to the data 
is part of the count, the actual data (payload), which is the allowed maximum value of 
the distance between any two zero nibbles, is thus 14 nibbles (index 15+in minus index 
in minus one phantom overhead nibble). This 14-nibble maximum data bits is only true 
for packets with infrequent zeros; if zeros are guaranteed to show up at no more than 
14 nibbles apart, then a single packet can have data bits in excess of 56 bits. However, 
where such guarantees are not deterministic or where bounded transmission latencies 
are desired as is the case of real-time on-chip networking, a fixed data bit of not more 
than 56 bits has to be enforced. 
Nibbles have been used instead of bytes as a compromise between the percentage 
overhead and the maximum data bits. With a byte word length as in the original COBS, 
we would incur 8 bits of overhead per packet, though the maximum data bits would 
then be 254 bytes. A quick comparison shows that the COBS has a lower percentage 
overhead of 0.39% per 254 bytes compared to 7.14% per 14 bytes in CONS. However, 
at lower data sizes, COBS incurs more than CONS. For instance, for a data size of 6 
bytes, COBS would incur 20% overhead compared to 8.33% in CONS. Moreover, the 
size of the delimiter also increases with the word size, always two times the word size, 
and thus influencing the total overhead and latency of packet transactions. Ultimately, 
the choice of word size will be a compromise between the percentage overhead and 
the maximum data bits required per packet. 
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Table 6.4: Packet format for CONS-encoded data bits 
Fields FSS CONS Overhead Max. Data 
Number of Bits 8 bits 4 bits 56 bits 
Comment Value: 80 hex CONS-encoded 
 
6.4 Network Adapter for Communication Access 
To exploit the clock network for communication, each of the intercommunicating tasks 
in an RC system employing CELOC must be wrapped with a Network Adapter to 
arbitrate access to the CE of a clock buffer, When no packet synchronization is used, 
the CONS encoder and decoder are not needed and adapting to a network simply 
requires the Serializer/Deserializer (SERDES) of Figure 6.3 introduced in Section 6.2. 
The popular serial communication interfaces like the Serial Peripheral Interface 
(SPI) and I2C are avoided because they require more than one signal. A potential 
interface protocol for CELOC could be a 1-wire protocol like the one introduced in 
[230] or the Universal Asynchronous Receiver-Transmitter (UART). Essentially, since 
only the CE pin in a clock buffer is being driven by an RX task in CELOC, a single-
wire protocol would be more appropriate to prevent the usage of static routing resources 
as much as possible. The proposed SERDES provides a raw interface to the clock 
buffers and a higher-level bit framer can always be used to adapt to different serial 
protocols. As it is, the SERDES is a serial streaming interface that would bit-stream a 
packet of data presented at its data input and also recover a parallel data that is serially 
shifted in. 
On the other hand, when packet synchronization is needed, the CONS encoder and 
decoder are used and the task is wrapped as shown in Figure 6.8. This builds upon the 
proposed SERDES by implementing five major blocks: a CONS Decoder, a Task 
Interface Logic (TIL), and the CONS Encoder. The next subsections provide more 
details on these blocks and other components of the network adapter. 
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Figure 6.8: Network adapter for packet-synchronized communication access in CELOC 
6.4.1 Task Interfacing 
This work proposes a task interface model that is based on the Xilinx HLS Block-Level 
interface protocol [15] for any task that has to communicate using CELOC’s packet-
synchronized wrapper. This model requires that a minimum of five ports: ap_idle, 
ap_start, ap_rst, ap_ready, ap_done, and ap_return (indicated by the arrow that feeds 
the Mux in Figure 6.8) are defined for a task. This ensures uniformity of interfacing 
between different tasks and the CONS codec (decoder-encoder) and provides a 
standardized task interface. In addition, this is also in line with the current trend in using 
HLS-generated HDL modules for rapid system development. 
6.4.2 CONS Encoding 
In the encoder, which also serves the function of data serializer, the CONS encoding 
algorithm is implemented with a finite state machine. The flowchart in Figure 6.9 is a 
representation of the encoding process. The thick junctions depict the concurrency of 
the implementation. The theoretical encoding process presented in Section 6.3 is 
modified for hardware implementation. The encoder starts its operation when a START 
signal is asserted. First, it saves the data to encode in a shift register and then starts the 
encoding process. The process involves detecting zero nibbles and replacing them with 
CONS codes. Once the entire packet is encoded, the bits are shifted out serially for 
routing to the CE of a clock buffer. The encoder asserts a READY signal when all the 
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Figure 6.9: Flowchart describing the CONS encoder's implementation 
6.4.3 CONS Decoding 
The CONS decoder receives, decodes, and de-serializes a CONS-encoded packet. The 
decoding process can be roughly represented by the flowchart in Figure 6.10, where the 
thick junctions depict the concurrency of the implementation. In the decoder, the code 
nibbles in the received packet are replaced with zeros. The decoding is simplified by a 
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Table 6.3 in reveals that every code nibble points to the relative location of the next 
code nibble. This is as expected since the CONS codes are formed by counting the 
number of non-zero nibbles preceding a zero nibble as explained in Section 6.3. Also, 
the first nibble received is always a code nibble. These observations are crucial as they 
simplify the logic of the decoder, and hence reduce the FPGA resources used. By 
subtracting 1 from the value of a code we obtain the number of data nibbles preceding 
the next code.  Using a state machine, we loop through all the codes and extract the 
associated data. Once all the nibbles have been processed the data_rcvd port (see Figure 
6.8) of the decoder is asserted and the state machine resets in anticipation of a new 
packet.  
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6.4.4 Address-Inclusive Encoding and Decoding 
A generic approach is taken in the implementation of the encoder so that it is usable for 
varying numbers of data width. In the vanilla implementation, where there is no 
addressing or any special bits inserted in the packet, the codec is intended for P2P 
communication without provision for addressing. However, the applications that 
require CELOC for use in a NoC would benefit from an addressable codec that has the 
addressing functionality embedded in it.  
More often than not, the packet in Table 6.4 will need addressing if CELOC is used 
to implement an on-chip network. In appending the address bits to the packet, a plain 
un-encoded non-zero addressing is recommend, where a zero address is not used and 
the address bits therefore do not need to be encoded. This ensures the address bits do 
not eat into the maximum number of bits available for data. More important though, is 
the fact that in a CELOC-based NoC, the packet can therefore be routed through the 
network with much less latency since the intermediate nodes do not necessarily have to 
receive the entire packet as the address to deflect a packet to is visible in the packet. 
There is a use_addr port, with a corresponding address ports on the interface of the 
encoder and the decoder. This is used to enable the address-inclusive mode and is 
controlled by the TIL. Example waveforms showing the non-addressable and address-
inclusive modes of the CONS encoding and decoding can be found in Appendix D. 
6.4.5 Task Interface Logic 
The Task Interface Logic (TIL) interfaces the task to the CONS Encoder and Decoder. 
It glues together a Task Controller (TC), Mutex, multiplexer (Mux), and Synchronizer 
(Synch). The Mutex is a means of sending status information out of the task and 
wrapper, especially for the purpose of error detection. For instance, the decoder could 
fail due to an error in its internal state machine’s state transition. The Mux is used to 
choose between the output of the task and that of the Mutex.  
The function of the TC is to start the task if it is idle and data has been received 
by the decoder. It also deserializes the received packet, recovers the data and presents 
it to the task. In addition, it handles addressing when the address-inclusive CONS is 
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used. These are the functions of the TC in this prototypic implementation. However, 
in an RC system that deploys CELOC, the TC would receive command packets from 
a system-level Task Communication Manager (TCM) to start or stop its associated 
task. It would also receive the destination address and the system time instance the 
processed data should be sent. This time however, cannot be earlier than the time 
instance the task finishes execution. If the packet is a command packet, the TC would 
check whether to start the task or reset it based on the command and would do 
accordingly. Otherwise, the received packet would be handled as a data packet. If the 
task is already started, the TC would route the new data to the task. The situation 
should not arise where a task is not ready for a new data, thus avoiding the need for 
buffering and saving on memory resources. This is because the TCM would dictate 
the time to send data based on when a destination task can accept it. It would therefore 
be counterintuitive to provide a buffering capability. However, a buffer can easily be 
inserted if necessary but the TCM’s algorithm and the task computation model would 
have to be modified to account for this. In general, data should not be processed by the 
task at a rate faster than it can be routed through the CONS Encoder/Decoder (Codec) 
and the serial communication network except if buffering is used. 
Similarly, in data delivery to the CONS Encoder is not buffered. The TIL ensures 
that the encoder is ready for a new input before applying the task’s output data. The 
Synchronizer does this by checking that both ap_ready and CONS Encoder’s ready 
are driven HIGH before asserting the CONS Encoder’s start. It is guaranteed that once 
ap_ready goes HIGH, the data from the task is available as input to the CONS encoder. 
This is because the Output Data Mutex and Multiplexer are purely combinatorial and 
as such incur no clock delays. To ensure a non-buffered data at the input of the encoder, 
the encoding time should be accounted for in the timing model a system deploying 
CELOC. 
6.4.6 Resource Utilization and Performance Evaluation 
Table 6.5 shows the resource overhead of the network adapter for the bare SERDES 
and the packet-synchronized version. Tiny finite state machines are implemented for 
the PISO and SIPO blocks of the SERDES. These incur a total of 13 slices while the 
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CONS-based adapter’s utilization amounts to only 32 slices. As the reconfiguration 
frame, which defines the minimum selectable area for partitioning the FPGA area, is 
always two columns (200 slices for CLBs). This implies that the adapter will fit right 
in, even with the smallest of tasks, by occupying only between 6.5% and 16% area of 
the reconfiguration frame.  
While the use of the clock buffers for communication incurs a resource overhead 
of 32 slices owing to the encoding and decoding of serial data as expected in a serial 
transmission [229], this still offers a good area to performance ratio. Moreover, the big 
advantage of the buffers is that they avoid static interconnections between circuits. This 
facilitates a dynamic placement of circuits as will be shown in Section 6.6, and is fit for 
inter-task communication in reliability-aware applications as will be demonstrated in 
Chapter 7. 
Table 6.5: Resource utilization of CELOC’s network adapter 
Resource 
Network Adapter Modules 
SERDES Packet-Synchronized 
PISO SIPO CONS ENC CONS DEC CONS TIL 
FFs 30 72 65 100 84 
LUTs 14 10 35 28 24 
DSPs 0 0 0 0 0 
BRAMs 0 0 0 0 0 
Slice 13 32 
 
In terms of data transfer latency, the SERDES PISO block latches the parallel data 
in one clock cycle and streams it for the number of clock cycles equivalent to the 
number of bits in the parallel data. The SIPO recovers the data in the same period but 
uses one additional clock cycle for internal state transitions. As a result, the SERDES 
latency for a 32-bit data is 34 clock cycles.  
For the evaluation of communication latency of the packet-synchronized adapter, 
the CONS encoder is directly interfaced to the CONS decoder and the number of cycles 
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measured individually for the encoder and decoder; and also for the entire codec. Table 
6.6 presents the measured clock cycles. From the moment the encoder’s start signal is 
asserted to the end of encoding and serial data shifting out (ready signal asserted), 56 
clock cycles are incurred for the non-addressable codec and 60 for the address-inclusive 
version. Similarly, for the decoder, from the moment the FSS is received to the end of 
decoding, these numbers are 48 and 52 respectively. An entire 32-bit packet is sent and 
received in 60 and 64 clock cycles respectively. 
For the different word sizes, the test packet is made a multiple of 32 bits for ease 
of comparison and the generation of the latency equations. That is, for the word lengths 
of 4, 8, 16, and 32, data widths of 32, 64, 128, and 256 bits are used. The equations are 
therefore, applicable only when the packet size is 8𝑁𝑊, where 𝑁𝑊 is the word length in 
bits. 







Clock Cycle Latency for 8𝑁𝑊 Data Bits 
 Non-Addressable 4-bit Addressable 
ENC DEC CODEC ENC DEC CODEC 
4 56 bits 56 48 60 60 52 64 
8 254 bytes 100 88 108 104 92 112 
16 128 kB 188 168 204 192 172 208 
32 16,384 MB 364 328 396 368 332 400 
Latency Equation 60 + 12(𝑁𝑊 − 4) 64 + 12(𝑁𝑊 − 4) 
 
6.5 Clock Buffer Configurations for Network Access 
The diagram in Figure 6.11 is a representation of a section of the Xilinx 7 series FPGA. 
The left and right clock regions are symmetrical with respect to the placement of clock 
buffers. Also indicated, are Circuit Regions (CRs) that are potential areas within the 
clock regions for task placement targeting the exploitation of clock buffers for 
communication. Note that not all possible CRs and communication routes are shown. 
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The notion here is that inter-circuit communication should only be through the clock 
buffers for the purpose of avoiding the static routes completely in order to aid the 
flexible relocation of circuits. Figure 6.11 also shows the locations of the clock buffers 
on the FPGA. In general, a 7 series FPGA (apart from the smaller Artix-7 chips) has 4 
BUFRs, 2 BUFMRs, and 12 BUFHs in each clock region. In addition, there are 32 
BUFGs at the centre of the chip, common to all the regions. 
The clock buffers have different spans determining where communicating circuits 
can be placed. As stated in Section 6.1.2, BUFRs can drive clocking points in a single 
clock region, and thus can be used for intra-region communication. On the other hand, 
BUFMRs can drive resources in three vertical adjacent regions, providing a 
communication access that is 3-clock-region-wide. BUFHs are located in-between 
horizontal adjacent clock regions and thus can serve as communication links between 
them. Able to reach every clocking point, BUFGs are located at the centre of the FPGA 


















Horizontal Buffers (BUFHs)Clock Region Clock Management Tile (CMT) Column
 
Figure 6.11: Representation of the 7 series FPGA chip, showing the locations of clock 
buffers, circuit regions (CR1 to CR8) for placing circuits within clock regions, and sample 
vertical and horizontal interconnections between the CRs 
While the buffers can be used to communicate in different directions, certain 
configurations or combinations have to be used in order to provide communication. 
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This brings the question of data transfer speed since by connecting one buffer to 
another, a delay is introduced into the communication path. In the next subsections, we 
present some possible configurations of the clock buffers and their use cases. What 
informs these configurations are the reach of the buffers and the availability on them of 
clock enable (CE) pins that can be actively toggled. Furthermore, there is a restriction 
on buffer-to-buffer interconnections. For instance, it is only a BUFR that can feed a 
BUFG directly. As a result, if an intra-clock-region network has to access other clock 
regions not within its neighbourhood (immediate vertical and horizontal regions), a 
BUFR has to be used to drive a BUFG in order to feed such regions with data_clock. 
The following further points should be noted in the light of using different 
interconnections of the clock buffers for communication: All the buffers have physical 
CE pins; however, BUFMRs can only drive BUFRs, and both BUFHs and BUFGs can 
drive both BUFMRs and BUFRs. 
Since only the BUFGs and BUFHs can drive the SR/PRE and CE inputs of 
registers, and it is essential for data_clock to be interfaced with a receiving circuit 
through an input that can be driven by a clock buffer, not all of the possible buffer 
combinations can be used if relocation support is sought. Only the ones that have 
data_clock coming out of a BUFG or BUFH can be used. 
In the subsections that follow, it should be noted that arrows represent the direction 
of data transfer. For instance, with respect to Figure 6.11, CR1→CR8 means CR1 is 
transmitting to CR8 while CR2↔CR3 implies a bidirectional data transfer between 
CR2 and CR3. Moreover, since the clock regions have some symmetry, a 
communication like CR1↔CR3 is treated the same as CR2↔CR4; and CR1→CR6 as 
CR5→CR2. Also, except where indicated in the figures, all the connected clock buffers 
are in the same clock region, save for the BUFGs, which do not belong to any clock 
region. 
6.5.1 Clock Buffer Configurations for Global Communication 
Since the BUFGs have a device-wide reach, they can be used to transmit data to 
anywhere on the chip. This prevents any circuit region from being excommunicated 
from other regions. For instance, to communicate directly with CR-8 from CR-1 in 
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Figure 6.11, a BUFG has to be used (see Figure 6.12(a)). However, since the BUFGs 
are at the centre of the chip, an intermediate buffer has to be used to get access to them. 
There are four options – BUFR, BUFMR→ BUFR (used in Figure 6.12(a)), BUFH→ 
BUFR, or BUFH→ BUFMR→BUFR, depending on the available buffers and the 
relative location of the task. Depending on the specific application, either can be used. 
In contrast, for a global communication like CR2↔CR7, there is a direct access to 
BUFGs. Therefore, the BUFG-only configuration shown in Figure 6.12(b) can be used. 
Note that any communication that does not reside within the same clock region, or that 


















 (a)                           (b) 
Figure 6.12: Clock buffer configurations for global communication showing (a) 
[BUFMR→BUFR→BUFG→], and (b) [BUFG→] 
6.5.2 Clock Buffer Configurations for Horizontal Communication 
By placing circuits at the inner edges of two horizontal adjacent clock regions, 
advantage can be taken of the BUFHs for horizontal communication. However, circuits 
at the outer edges require other configurations. With respect to Figure 6.11, and picking 
the top clock regions for illustration, the communications that fall into the category of 
horizontal inter-clock region include CR1→CR2, CR1→CR3, CR1→CR4, 
CR2→CR3, and CR2→CR4. Communications like CR2↔CR3 and CR2→CR1 can 
be achieved by using the configuration in Figure 6.13(a). However, since there is no 
clock-buffer-based physical link between CR1 and CR2 in the middle of the clock 
region, while CR2→CR1 can use [BUFH→], CR1→CR2 can use 
[BUFMR→BUFR→] (see Figure 6.13(b)). All the other communications have to use 
the configuration [BUFMR→ BUFR→BUFG→] presented in Figure 6.12(a). It should 
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in the same region  
























(c)                           (d) 
Figure 6.13: Clock buffer configurations for horizontal inter-region communication showing 
(a) [BUFH→], (b) [BUFMR→BUFR→], (c) [BUFH→ BUFR→], and (d) 
[BUFH→BUFMR→BUFR→] 
6.5.3 Clock Buffer Configurations for Vertical Communication 
From Figure 6.11, and picking the left clock regions for illustration, the 
communications that fall into the category of vertical inter-clock region include 
CR1↔CR5, CR1→CR6, CR2→CR5, and CR2↔CR6. Note that symmetry can be 
used to pick other ones. CR2→CR5, CR6→CR1 and CR2↔CR6 communications can 
be through the configuration in Figure 6.14(a) and [BUFG→] presented in Figure 
6.12(b). All others can use the one in Figure 6.14(b). Note that the BUFRs in Figure 
6.14 are not in the same clock region as the other buffers. As a result, they are indicated 
as BUFR(adj) in the figure caption.  






























(a)                         (b) 
Figure 6.14: Clock buffer configurations for vertical inter-region communication showing (a) 
[BUFH→BUFMR→BUFR(adj)→], and (b) [BUFMR→ BUFR(adj)→] 
6.5.4 Maximum Speeds of the Clock Buffers and Nets 
The understanding of the maximum frequency of operation of the clock buffers is 
crucial in the attempt to adapt them for on-chip communication. This will help evaluate 
the limiting factor in the achievable communication speed of CELOC for different 
devices. Table 6.7 shows the maximum frequencies to which the clock buffers, nets, 
and trees can be driven. These numbers can be found in the respective datasheets for 
the Spartan-7 [231], Artix-7 [232], Kintex-7 [49], and Virtex-7 [233] FPGAs. At the 
time of writing, a Spartan-7 with speed grade -3 does not exist. 
6.5.5 Bandwidth Characterization 
To determine the maximum speed that each clock buffer configuration can achieve, the 
experimental setup in Figure 6.15 is used. The device used for the experiment is the 
Artix-7 (xc7a35tcpg236-1) FPGA with speed grade -1. The TX circuit is used to 
generate predetermined data packets to be received by the RX circuit. To confirm the 
correctness of data transfer, the validation of the received data is done by using an ILA 
to observe the signal transitions. A PLL clock generator is used to sweep the 
communication clock’s frequency to the maximum value that still meets timing and 
does not corrupt the communication. 
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628 628 680 420 
Kintex-7 741 741 800 600 
Virtex-7 741 741 800 600 
Spartan-7 
-2 
628 628 - 375 
Artix-7 628 (394a) 628 (394a) 680 (600a) 375 (315a) 
Kintex-7 710 (560a) 710 (560a) 800 (667a) 540 (450a) 
Virtex-7 710 710 800 540 
Spartan-7 
-1 
464 464 - 315 
Artix-7 464 464 600 315 
Kintex-7 625 625 710 450 
Virtex-7 625 625 710 450 
a At speed grade -2LE, 0.9 V 
 
Figure 6.15: Experimental setup for characterizing the clock buffer configurations 
The test communication packet is a 44-bit packet comprising of 32-bit data, a frame 
synchronization sequence of 8 bits and a serial encoder overhead of 4 bits. Table 6.8 
shows the maximum bandwidths (data transfer rates) at which the buffer configurations 
work without a corrupted data transfer. The corresponding data recovery register or 
latch is also indicated. Moreover, based on the number of clock buffers in the FPGA, 
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configurations and those used for other purposes) that can coexist on a single chip is 
also indicated in Table 6.8. 
Table 6.8: Bandwidth of the clock buffer configurations 







BUFG→ FDPE 266.67 32 per chip 
BUFR→BUFG→ LDPE 171.43 4 
BUFMR→BUFR→BUFG→ LDPE 171.43 2 
BUFH→BUFR→BUFG→ LDCE 187.50 4 
BUFH→BUFMR→BUFR→BUFG→ LDCE 171.43 2 
BUFH→BUFMR→BUFR(adj)→BUFG→ LDCE 171.43 2 
BUFH→ FDPE 266.67 12 
BUFMR→BUFR→ LDPE 240.00 2 
BUFH→BUFR→ LDPE 275.00 4 
BUFH→BUFMR→BUFR→ LDPE 240.00 2 
BUFH→BUFMR→BUFR(adj)→ LDPE 240.00 2 
BUFMR→BUFR(adj)→ LDPE 240.00 2 
BUFR→ LDPE 233.33 4 
Average - 221.15 - 
 
The highest speed of 275 Mbps is observed with the [BUFH→BUFR→] 
configuration and the lowest (171.43 Mbps) with the [BUFR → BUFG →] and 
[BUFMR → BUFR → BUFG→] configurations. Indeed, BUFR appears to be the 
limiting buffer. This is because it is the buffer with the slowest speed. In fact, for the 
Artix-7 board used for the experimentation, the speed grade is -1 and the BUFR’s 
maximum frequency is graded at 315 MHz, which is the minimum for any of the buffers 
in the chip (see Table 6.7). Therefore, the average speed of 221.15 Mbps is relatively 
high considering that it is only 29.79% short of the BUFR’s maximum. By extension 
to other speed grades, the average CELOC speed can be expected to scale as 70.21% 
of fBUFR_MAX, where fBUFR_MAX is the maximum frequency of the BUFR net in the target 
device. 
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In addition, the use of the clock buffers does not impact negatively on the number 
of circuits that can be on the FPGA simultaneously. The CRs can accommodate more 
than one circuit. Therefore, from the number of instances in Table 6.8, it is estimated 
that up to 16 circuits with communication access can be in a single clock region at the 
same time assuming they can be partitioned such that the CE access does not constitute 
a static route problem. This number is arrived at by excluding configuration instances 
that use similar buffers. In addition, there are 32 global configuration instances that can 
be shared by all the clock regions. 
6.6 Dynamic Communication via Clock Nets 
Partial Bitstream Relocation (PBR) is a key mechanism for enabling fault tolerance to 
permanent chip damages by relocating affected circuits to damage-free areas in 
runtime. In addition, PBR is fundamental to the management of tear and wear to delay 
the eventual occurrence of chip damages due to ageing (see Section 3.2.3). Meanwhile, 
PBR is not supported by vendor tools and PR flow, thereby necessitating that all routes 
between inter-communicating circuits are statically determined at compile time. For 
full relocatability, a dynamic communication infrastructure is needed. 
This section advances a dynamic communication access mechanism that is termed 
Clock-Enabled Relocation-Aware Network-on-Chip (CERANoC). This builds on 
CELOC with the main advantage for CERANoC being that the clock buffers and nets 
use dedicated routing wires that are independent of the general logic interconnect. This 
removes the restriction of the static interconnect links and enhances the online 
relocation of circuits. This mechanism relies on the replacement of the interconnect 
links in NoCs with clock buffers. Since the clock buffers do not use the general logic 
routing resources, the path from a transmitting circuit to a receiving circuit is free of 
general logic interconnections.  
As discussed in 3.2.5, for circuit relocation to be feasible, communication must be 
provided for the circuit being moved at the resource-matching destination. With regards 
to Figure 6.16, the easiest way to provide this communication is to ensure that a route 
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from Task 1 to LOC 2 is established at design time. This way, during runtime, Task 2 
can be moved to LOC 2 while maintaining its communication link with Task 1. 
The solution to dynamic communication in CERANoC eliminates the static inter-
circuit communication routes all together. Using Figure 6.16 as an example, this is 
achieved by removing the static inter-task connections and replacing them with clock 
buffers as shown in Figure 6.17. The hypothetical layout of tasks here is the same as 
that in Figure 6.16, except that the interfaces between Tasks 1 & 2, and between Tasks 
1 & 3 have been removed. To provide communication, a clock buffer is used to transmit 
serial bits from Tasks 1 to 2 and 3. This signal also feeds LOC 2, so that if Task 2 is 
relocated to LOC 2, the communication between it and Task 1 remains intact. At the 
same time, LOC 1 is now free of a crossing routing. Basically, the surface of the chip 
is generally freed of inter-circuit routings. 
In the implementation of CERANoC in this work, the clock regions of the FPGA 
are used as NoC nodes. The clock buffers are pre-routed between clock regions at 
design time so that during runtime, regardless of the clock region a task is placed, it is 
able to communicate with any task in any other clock region. The main concept behind 
the technique is to allow serial data to ride on a clock signal from a source node to a 
destination node. 
 
Figure 6.16: Diagram demonstrating how static routes hinder relocation. Task 2 cannot be 
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Figure 6.17: By removing the inter-circuit interfaces and replacing them with clock buffers, 
it is possible to achieve dynamic communication 
Shown in Figure 6.18 is the classic mesh topology for CERANoC. With respect 
to the clock buffer configurations, vertical node-to-node interconnections are achieved 
with [BUFMR→ BUFR(adj)→] and horizontal communication with [BUFH→]. 
Node-to-node bandwidth in this topology would be expected to be an average of 237 
Mbps. 
Other topologies can be formed easily by using a relevant combination of the 
clock buffer configurations presented in Section 6.5. The diagram only shows four 
nodes, but this can be easily extended as the dotted lines depict. Clock buffers are 
connected in-between nodes as shown in Figure 6.18 and Figure 6.19. The clock buffer 
connections are based on the relevant configurations in Section 6.5. In the following 
subsections, the special considerations for the implementation of CERANoC are 
presented in relation to the design parameters of a traditional NoC. It should be noted 
that the aim is to implement a full-fledge NoC as that is beyond the scope of this work; 
rather, the intention is to demonstrate how the use of clock buffers for inter-circuit 
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Figure 6.18: 4-node CERANoC mesh network showing inter-clock region connections 
achieved with clock buffers 
6.6.1 Packet Format and Addressing Scheme 
The FSS, the destination address, the CONS overhead, and a data of 56 bits maximum 
are all concatenated into a single packet as shown in Table 6.9. A unique Node ID is 
given to each node on the network. This ID also serves as the address of the node and 
is added to the communication packet as the destination address. With N nodes, the 
address range is from 1 to N, with zero deliberately avoided because the address field 
in the packet is un-encoded as noted for the address-inclusive packet encoding and 
decoding in Section 6.4.4. 
As such, one reason for transmitting the address in plain format is that the routers 
need to know the destination address before routing the packet. Encoding and decoding 
the address would incur further clock cycles at the encoder and the decoder. In addition, 
this would require more logic resources for the decoding and re-encoding functions in 
the router. Furthermore, an encoded address would eat into the number of bits available 
for the actual data, eventually preventing data transfer as N increases and becomes 56. 
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Therefore, with this careful choice of an address range, CERANoC saves on time and 
resources, and ensures a maximum data transfer throughput. 




CONS Overhead Data 
Number of Bits 8 bits N bitsa 4 bits 56 bits max 
Description Value: 80 hex Unencoded CONS-encoded 
a N = number of nodes 
6.6.2 Network Routing 
A routing algorithm determines the routing of data from the source to the destination in 
a network. The problem of designing routing algorithms that meet different 
performance and architectural requirements has been extensively studied. Some of 
these requirements are low latency, low power consumption, scalability, and 
programmability [176]. CERANoC supports any existing routing algorithm so far the 
clock buffers can be arranged to serve as links in the topology chosen. There is no other 
special consideration for routing in CERANoC. For instance, a Torus CERANoC can 
use BUFGs to connect the topmost clock regions to the tail regions and the leftmost 
regions to the rightmost regions. 
6.6.3 Prototype Network Demonstration 
To demonstrate the feasibility of CERANoC, a 4-node prototype star network with a 
Central Router is implemented on the Artix-7 (XC7A35TCPG236) FPGA chip (see 
Figure 6.19). Figure 6.20 shows the global clock generation and distribution 
architecture. A special switch_clock is needed by the Central Router. This is from the 
same output that feeds the BUFG which distributes com_clock. The clock buffer 
configuration used by the nodes is [BUFMR→BUFR→BUFG→] but could have also 
been [BUFR→BUFG→]. Note how the BUFGs are located logically inside the Central 
Router. Because switch_clock feeds these BUFGs, passing it through another BUFG 
would adversely affect network bandwidth. Moreover, by directly feeding the BUFGs, 
switch_clock ensures that on the part of a receiving node, a received packet arrives 
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directly from another node with the data clock having been refreshed. This is because 
as the data_clock from the BUFR, having gone through a BUFG, enters the Switch 
Arbiter, it is received by an LDPE latch and passed through a crossbar logic before 
being fed to the CE of a BUFG, essentially starting a new transmission (see Figure 
6.21). 
  
Figure 6.19: 4-node CERANoC star network using clock buffers as network links 
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Figure 6.21: Data clock renewal as it traverses the centre of a star-shaped CERANoC 
Since the objective of this prototype demonstration is to show that using the clock 
buffers in the manner stipulated by CELOC/CERANoC facilitates dynamic 
communication and circuit relocation by circumventing the general interconnect, most 
of the intricacies of NoC designs are avoided as these are already extensively studied. 
A point-to-point routing is used for the star-network (see Figure 6.22), and a 32-bit 
payload data is used, giving a 48-bit packet. 48-bit buffer memories (48 x 1-bit LUT-
RAMs) are provided inside the Central Router in order to temporarily store packets that 
cannot be immediately routed. In order to control access to multiple nodes attempting 
to transfer packets simultaneously to the same receiving node and thus keep in line with 
real-time requirements, priorities are assigned to the nodes based on the node address. 
A node with a lower address has a higher priority. 
Figure 6.22 shows the switch architecture implemented for the 4-node star 
network. Ni implies node i while Sjk denotes a switch position from node j to node k. 
The indicated positions of the switches are for the following routing: N0 → N3, N1 → 
N0, and N3 → N1. There is one Node Router (NR) for each input to the Switch Arbiter. 
In each NR there are three (N – 1) independent switch endpoints (Sjk) which determine 
the routing of the incoming packet to the other three nodes. In the Switch Arbiter, there 
is a 4-bit occupied_switches register that shows the state of the nodes with respect to 
data reception. A node that is presently receiving a packet has its corresponding bit 
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state of the occupied switches. If the destination node is not already occupied by an 
ongoing transmission, the packet is routed through and the occupied_switches state is 
updated. 
 
Figure 6.22: Switch architecture for a 4-node CERANoC star network 
To test dynamic communication and relocation at the fundamental level, four tasks 
(θ0 to θ3) are set up, with one task in each of the nodes. It is very important in this 
demonstration to have a visual indication that new tasks are able to establish 
communication and that existing tasks still execute correctly when new tasks are placed 
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Tasks θ0 to θ2 are pattern generators, each generating three different patterns (P) of 
four vertical stripes of colours white (W), red (R), green (G), or blue (B). Each of these 
coloured stripes is represented by 8 bits (3 bits for R, 3 bits for G, and 2 bits for B). 
Every 32 bits of data sent by a pattern generator, therefore, determines four stripes of 
8-bit colour. θ0 to θ2 generate P0 to P2 respectively, with P0 = [W, R, G, B], P1 = [G, B, 
W, R], and P2 = [B, W, R, G]. θ3 is a fixed VGA controller that interfaces to a VGA 
monitor in order to display the patterns generated by θ0 to θ2. At design time θ0 to θ3 
are floor-planned in nodes N0 to N3 respectively and partial bitstreams are generated for 
only θ0 to θ2. Task θ3 has to be static because it needs access to the VGA’s interface 
pins which are in fixed locations on the FPGA. Tasks θ0 to θ2 are set to transmit to θ3 
at the same time. Because of the router priority, this means P0 is continuously displayed. 
By blanking N0 and N1 successively using blanking bitstreams, we are able to see P1 
and P2; reconfiguring N1 then N0 also results in patterns P1 then P0, demonstrating that 
communication in the network is unimpaired when tasks are swapped in and out in 
runtime. 
The demonstration of relocation involves configuring θ0 in N1 while blanking N0 
and θ1 in N0 while blanking N1, though, after necessary bitstream manipulations to 
change the target frame address. In the former case, we are able to see pattern P0 even 
though it is configured in N1, and vice-versa for the latter case. The Vivado Hardware 
Manager is used to configure the partial bitstreams. Figure 6.24 shows the floorplan of 
the FPGA after implementation. It can be seen that the chip areas belonging to nodes 0 
to 2 are free of general routing. This is as expected. The Network Interface does not 
contribute to static routing as it is made part of the reconfigurable task itself. Only the 
clock lines can be seen routed in the HROW from a global network feeding the clock 
regions (refer to Figure 6.1 in Section 6.1.1). These routings are dedicated clock nets 
and do not interfere with relocation. This means the clock regions remain free of general 
routing even though they are interconnected. The connections to CEs are at the edges 
of the clock regions, leaving the majority of the region free of general routing. 
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Figure 6.24: Floorplan of the implemented 4-node network 
A. Resource Utilization 
The only component peculiar to CERANoC is the network adapter and it uses only 
32 slices (see Section 6.4.6). The entire 4-node network itself (without the tasks) takes 
144 slices. Clock buffer utilization stands at 4 BUFMRs, 4 BUFRs, and 6 BUFGs, with 
per clock region utilization of 50%, 25%, and 3.125% respectively. 
B. Network Latency 
Since the central router simply routes the packet from the source to the destination 
nodes, essentially effecting the connection between [BUFMR→ BUFR→] and 
[BUFG→] in a [BUFMR→BUFR→BUFG→] clock buffer configuration, the packet 
transfer latency remains 64 clock cycles as presented in Table 6.6 in Section 6.4.6 for 
packet-synchronized address-inclusive encoding. 
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C. Network Throughput 
The CONS encoder and decoder do not share circuitry. Therefore, nothing stops 
concurrent data transfers like these four simultaneous data transfers: N0 → N1, N1 → 
N2, N2 → N3, and N3 → N0. That is, for the 4-node star CERANoC, the throughput of 
the individual link can be multiplied by 4 to obtain the network throughput. As such, 
for an N-node star CERANoC in full-duplex mode, the throughput (in Mbps) can be 
defined by Equation (6.1) in terms of the payload size (in bits), the number of nodes 
(N), the frequency of operation (f in MHz), and the latency cycles as follows: 
 𝑇ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ𝑝𝑢𝑡 (𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝑏𝑝𝑠) =
𝑃𝑎𝑦𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑑 (𝑖𝑛 𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠)×𝑁×𝑓(𝑖𝑛 𝑀𝐻𝑧)
𝐿𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑦 𝐶𝑦𝑐𝑙𝑒𝑠
 (6.1) 
At 100 MHz this gives a throughput (data rate) of 200 Mbps for the network 
demonstrated. The CELOC links used has a maximum speed of 171.43 Mbps (same as 
171.43 MHz since one bit is transmitted in one clock cycle). The maximum throughput 
for the Artix-7 device used is therefore, 428.58 Mbps for a 32-bit payload and N = 5 
(assuming the Central Router’s RP is also used to host a node). It should be noted that 
the latencies for payloads other than 32 bits can easily be determined from Table 6.6. 
Compared with methods that involve runtime routing, CERANoC does not incur 
any clock cycle overhead in order to place a new circuit or relocate one in runtime. 
Moreover, compared with the method in [90], the ICAP is not required for 
communication purposes, thus allowing SEM to have as much ICAP time as possible. 
The use of the ICAP for communication could be counterintuitive where reliability is 
important. Moreover, while DyNoC [182] also achieves dynamic communication for 
newly placed tasks, it is not certain that it is able to support relocation since the problem 
of general routing seemed not to have been addressed. CERANoC on the other hand 
leaves the chip area clear of general routing. 
6.7 Fault-Tolerant Data Transfer 
The occurrence of soft errors in a communication network could manifest itself in the 
form of erroneous data transfers. For CERANoC, bit flips can occur in the flip-flops of 
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the network adapter leading to erroneous encoding or decoding of the received data. It 
is also possible for permanent damages to occur, for instance due to chip ageing or 
electro-migration, and in this case, the HEM methods discussed in Section 3.2.3 can be 
applied. For instance, the core and its associated network adapter can be relocated to a 
damage-free region by using a fault-tolerant configuration engine like the one in 
Chapter 4. In the following subsections, the modifications that have to be made to 
CERANoC in order to make it resilient to errors are highlighted. 
6.7.1 Network Adapter 
The diagram in Figure 6.25 shows a TMR design of the network adapter. Only the key 
blocks and signals are shown. The adapter in Figure 6.8  has been modified by inserting 
an error control (EC) decoder and an EC encoder in the path of the CONS decoder and 
encoder respectively. The resulting circuit is triplicated and a voting circuit used to 
monitor and compare the outputs of the TMR modules. If at least two of the outputs are 
the same, communication can continue and the offending adapter can be reconfigured. 
The EC block can be for CRC or SEC-DED, depending on the requirement of the 
application. CRC is only able to detect errors but not correct them. On the other hand, 
as a forward error correction mechanism, SEC-DED is able to detect and correct single-
bit errors but only detect double-bit errors. 
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6.7.2 Communication Packet Format 
The structure of the packet for both the CRC and the SEC-DED error control 
implementations are shown in Table 6.10 and Table 6.11 respectively. For the CRC 
implementation, the FSS, the destination address, the CONS overhead, a data of 32-bit, 
and a 4-bit CRC Frame Check Sequence (FCS) are all concatenated into a single packet 
as shown in Table 6.10. A similar thing is done for the SEC-DED implementation 
except for the fact that the SEC-DED Error Control Code (ECC) bits are interleaved 
with the 32-bit data. 









Num. of Bits 8 bits N bits a 4 bits 32 bits 4 bits 
Description 80 hex Un-encoded Encoded 
a N = number of nodes 






32-Bit Data Interleaved 
with 7-Bit ECC 
Num. of Bits 8 bits N bits a 4 bits 39 bits 
Description 80 hex Un-encoded Encoded 
a N = number of nodes 
6.7.3 Packet Error Control Implementation 
For the CRC detection of erroneous transfer of data, a 4-bit checksum FCS with a 
Hamming Distance of 2 and a reverse-of-reciprocal polynomial 0x9 [60] is used. This 
means all 1-bit and some 2-bit errors can be detected. To minimize the impact on data 
transfer latency, a parallel CRC implementation is used. The 4-bit FCS is calculated on 
the data to be sent and appended to it. At the receiver, CRC is again calculated on the 
data and the result checked against the FCS contained in the received packet to verify 
the correctness of the received data. When a CRC error is detected, the packet is 
dropped and a resend request is sent to the source node. Additional data bit fields in the 
packet are used for this.  
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For the forward error correction scheme based on SEC-DED, the SEC-DED 
Hamming code (39, 32) is used. This code uses 7 parity bits for correcting single-bit 
errors, and detecting double errors in 32 data bits. Although, Figure 6.25 shows the EC 
Decoder and Encoder as being distinct blocks in the network adapter, in the actual 
implementation, they are absorbed into the CONS decoder and encoder respectively. 
6.7.4 Pipeline Mechanism for Packet Transfer 
The CRC-4 module adds only a 4 clock-cycle latency to the serial stream and does not 
impact the CONS encoding process. It is not impossible for a CRC calculation to give 
an FCS of zero. Since a zero cannot be part of the packet, to avoid ambiguity, the FCS 
itself has to be encoded by the CONS encoder. In addition, the CONS encoding uses a 
look-ahead algorithm, where a nibble early-on in the packet cannot be encoded until a 
zero nibble is found later on in the packet. If the CRC encoding were to be applied to 
the CONS-encoded nibbles, a latency of as much as the number of nibbles in the packet 
could be incurred. As a result, the CRC has to be applied to the data before CONS 
encoding is done. However, this does not delay the CONS encoding. Since the CRC is 
a non-intrusive error detection mechanism, that is, it does not modify the data, the 
CONS encoder can be pipelined to start at the same time as the CRC encoder. By the 
time the CONS encoder is on the last nibble, the FCS is ready. At the receiver, the CRC 
can only be applied after at least the first nibble in the packet is decoded. The 4 bits of 
a nibble are shifted in and decoded in 4 clock cycles. This means an unavoidable 
minimum of 4 clock cycle wait for the CRC decoder. 
For the SEC-DED implementation, it is impossible to avoid waiting for the entire 
packet to be CONS-encoded before applying the SEC-DED algorithm. The SEC-DED 
is intrusive since the parity bits are interleaved with the data. Therefore, the pipelining 
of the CONS encoding and the SEC-DED encoding is not possible. However, to limit 
impact on latency, a completely combinatorial implementation is used for the SEC-
DED algorithm, with no input registering or internal pipelining. Moreover, the 
implementation is such that the SEC-DED decoder corrects a single-bit error 
automatically and flags double-bit errors. 
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6.7.5 Evaluation of the Fault-Tolerant Network Adapter 
Table 6.12 shows the resource and time overheads of introducing the CRC and SEC-
DED error control into the CONS encoder and decoder. The data presented here is for 
a single instance of the TMR modules and is based on the implementation on an 
xc7a35tcpg236 FPGA chip. Only the relevant blocks (CONS encoder and decoder) are 
presented in the table. Without any error control mechanism applied, the CONS encoder 
and decoder require totals of 147 flip-flops and 88 LUTs, with the latency from the 
point of CONS encoding to the point of complete data reception being 60 clock cycles. 
For the CRC-based error control, the utilization goes up to 157 (6.80% increase) 
for flip-flops and 109 (23.86% increase) for LUTs, with the total latency 68 clock cycles 
for an address-inclusive CONS codec. Compared to when no error control is applied, 
only 4 clock cycles have been added, arising from the transmission and the reception 
of the 4-bit FCS. Note that the latency measurements were made using a continuous 
data transfer and reception. This is implies that though, 8 clock cycles are expected for 
the transmission and reception of the FCS, only 4 are observed because of the overlap 
between transmission and reception. 
On the other hand, the SEC-DED implementation uses the same number of flip-
flops for the CONS encoder and decoder. This is because of the LUT-only 
implementation used. However, LUT utilization has surged to 199 (126.14% increase). 
The latency also increase by 9 clock cycles accounting for the time taken to transmit 
the added 7 bits and one clock cycle transitioning period each for the encoded and 
decoding of data respectively. 
The implication of this result is that depending on the nature of the environment 
into which the network is deployed, either the CRC or the SEC-DED-based error 
control mechanism can find application. For instance, if the network is anticipated to 
experience several bit flips, then a forward error control mechanism would be better. 
Though the SEC-DED is more expensive in terms of hardware resources and latency, 
the cost of retransmissions that would be incurred in a CRC-based error control could 
easily offset this overhead in latency costs. On the other hand, if the system would be 
operating under a mild error-prone environment, then a CRC-based error control 
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implementation would suffice, as there would only be intermittent requests for 
retransmissions, which at the system level would be negligible. 
 
Table 6.12: Logic resource overhead of the fault-tolerant network adapter 
Error Control Module 
Resource Utilization Latency 
(cycles) Flip-Flops LUTs 
None 
CONS Encoder 59 52 
64 CONS Decoder 88 36 
Total 147 88 
CRC 
CONS Encoder 64 71 
68 CONS Decoder 93 38 
Total 157 109 
SEC-DED 
CONS Encoder 59 80 
73 CONS Decoder 88 119 
Total 147 199 
 
6.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has presented a unique and novel adaptation of clock buffers as serial 
network links for on-chip inter-circuit communication. This has proven to not only 
reduce the utilization of general routing resources as network links, it has also been 
demonstrated to help avoid the traditional static routes that are bottlenecks to runtime 
partial bitstream relocation. To access a clock buffer for communication, a special 
adapter is wrapped around a task. This adapter utilizes only 32 slices and different 
configurations of clock buffers have shown an average bandwidth of 221.15 Mbps for 
an Artix-7 speed grade -1 device. A unique clock-buffer-based network access 
mechanism was also advanced and shown to facilitate dynamic on-chip communication 
for the purpose of circuit relocation. Finally, this chapter presented a fault-tolerant 
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In order to demonstrate the practicality of the proposed frameworks, a case study 
application is drawn from the NASA/JPL Compositional InfraRed Imaging 
Spectrometer (CIRIS). This spectrometer has data processing stages that can be used as 
hardware tasks. A system setup that involves the use of the configuration memory 
access manager (CAM) proposed in Chapter 4 and the inter-task communication 
framework advanced in Chapter 6 are used for evaluations. The latency and the extent 
of relocation supported are evaluated for three approaches to on-chip communication, 
with the target device chosen as the Zynq-7000 (xc7z100ffg900-2), which contains a 
Kintex-7 programmable fabric and a dual-core Arm processor. The CIRIS data 
processing RTL codes used for evaluation were provided by one of the investigators 
who designed an SoC-based controller for the CIRIS instrument [210].  
Part of the investigations reported in this chapter has been covered in the author’s 
publication in [234]: 
 A. Adetomi, G. Enemali, Xabier Iturbe, Didier Keymeulen, and T. Arslan, 
‘R3TOS-Based Integrated Modular Space Avionics for On-Board Real-Time 
Data Processing’, in 2018 NASA/ESA Conference on Adaptive Hardware and 
Systems (AHS), 2018, pp. 1–8. 
7.1 An Overview of the CIRIS Spectrometer 
The CIRIS is one of the new-generation NASA instruments proposed to search for life 
indicators in Jupiter’s moon, Europa [208]. This moon orbits inside Jupiter’s high-
7 
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radiation belts, and hence any mission sent there must withstand extremely harsh 
radiation. Therefore, the CIRIS avionics must be designed to have a high system-level 
reliability with emphasis on tolerance to high radiation doses.  
CIRIS is a small, rugged and lightweight Fourier Transform Spectrometer (FTS) 
with a high Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) in the near-IR to thermal-IR region (2-12 µm), 
where the strongest and most diagnostic vibrational bands of the compounds of interest 
in Europa are found (e.g., ‘CHNOPS’ functional groups). The major structural novelty 
introduced by CIRIS is its constant speed rotating refractor to vary the optical path 
difference of the two rays in which incoming light is divided at the entrance of the 
instrument using a beam splitter (red and green rays in Figure 7.1). The reflected rays 
in the rotating refractor recombine after travelling through the instrument, resulting in 
a fringe interference light pattern (interferogram) that is measured with a photo-detector 
(purple ray in Figure 7.1). Based on Snell's law, the light rays travel the same distance 
through CIRIS optics when they are incident on the rotating refractor at 45º. The Zero 
Path Difference (ZPD) positions occur when the refractor is parallel or perpendicular 
to the beam splitter, that is, four times over the course of a revolution. The regions 
where the optical interference between the input light rays can be measured are located 
at approximately 16º arcs around each of the four ZPD positions. As the CIRIS refractor 
performs 6.5 revolutions per second, the interferograms span over a period of 13.6 ms 
every 24.8 ms. 
 
 
Figure 7.1: CIRIS interferometer [207] 
 Light Input Mirrors 
Rotating Refractor 
Beamsplitter 
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7.2 CIRIS Data Processing 
The CIRIS interferogram signal is conditioned, filtered and amplified to ±5V range 
prior to being digitized at 1 MSPS using an 18-bit resolution ADC. The interferogram 
samples are then processed to produce a spectrum that illustrates the intensity of the 
wavelengths present in the light beam. This in turn permits to find out the chemical 
composition of the sample under study by looking at the absorption lines in the 
spectrum. However, spectral leakage (i.e., “picket-fence” effect) and noise are also 
present in the spectrum due to the limited discretization of the interferograms through 
time limited digital sampling, and need to be properly processed by the instrument 
avionics to produce meaningful results [235]. The CIRIS data processing is 
accomplished in four stages.  
The first stage prepares the interferogram for subsequent processing by selecting 
8,192 samples centred on the ZPD position. This is done to deal with any temporal shift 
that might have occurred while sampling the interferogram. This stage also removes 
the DC offset in the ZPD-aligned interferogram by subtracting its average value, which 
is computed using a Cumulative Moving Average (CMA).  
The second stage (STAT Inter.) computes the variance and performs a CMA on 
successive interferograms detected around the same ZPD positions with the objective 
of estimating and increasing the SNR by removing the effect of high frequency and 
random noise. The mean and variance results for every interferogram position after 
each algorithm iteration are stored in dedicated DDR memory segments.  
The third stage apodizes the averaged interferograms at the edges of the sampled 
regions to minimize the effects of spectral leakage and computes the FFT on the 
interferogram. In the light of increasing spectral resolution, this stage adds 4,096 zeros 
to each of the tails of the interferogram to obtain 8,192 additional interpolated spectrum 
points in-between the original nonzero-filled spectrum data, that is, 16,384 total 
spectrum points. In order to obtain the best performance, the FFT stage pipelines several 
Radix-2 butterfly processing engines, where each engine has its own memory banks to 
store input and intermediate data. This pipelined implementation allows computing one 
spectrum data per clock cycle, with a latency of 33,013 clock cycles. A CORDIC logic 
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is then used to translate the real and imaginary representation of the spectrum data used 
in the internal butterfly processing engines into polar representation, which is more 
suitable for scientific analysis. This translation is completed within 36 clock cycles.  
The fourth and last stage computes the variance and CMA on the spectrums 
resulting from the successive interferograms detected around the same ZPD positions. 
Both amplitude and phase data are processed in parallel using dedicated logic: STAT 
Amp. and STAT Phase. As for the second stage, the statistics are independently 
computed for each spectrum position and temporarily stored in dedicated DDR memory 
segments between algorithm iterations. 
The work in [210] describes an implementation of the CIRIS data processing stages 
on a Xilinx Zynq SoC. This SoC relies on using a DDR memory to exchange data 
between the different data processing stages. Namely, each processing stage is assigned 
a dedicated memory segment in the DDR and a data flow controller in the SoC 
coordinates all data transfers. However, this SoC does not use DPR, and hence cannot 
cope with any potential permanent damage provoked by cumulative radiation. 
7.3 CIRIS Data Processing Tasks for Evaluation 
The CIRIS data processing stages described in Section 7.2 are assigned to three 
different hardware tasks: ZPD, STAT and FFT. STAT is used three times, to process 
interferogram (STAT-I), amplitude (STAT-A), and phase data (STAT-P), respectively. 
The main functioning parameters for these hardware tasks are detailed in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1: Specification of the CIRIS tasks 
Task Execution time Input Data Output Data 
STAT 100 µs 8,192 of 32bits (for 3 ports) 8,192 of 32bits (for 3 ports) 
FFT 200 µs 8,192 of 18bits 8,192 of 32bits (for 2 ports) 
ZPD 750 µs 13,000 of 18bits 8,192 of 18bits 
 
 
The CELOC-based model requires each task to be interfaced with the network 
adapter of Figure 6.8 in Section 6.4, slightly increasing the resource utilization of each 
________________________________________ Chapter 7 – Applications and Case Studies 
 194 
task by 32 slices. Similarly, for the ICAP-based strategy, the task wrapper of Figure 3.5 
presented in Section 3.4.4 is attached to each task to enable the tasks to use the 
configuration layer for data exchange as demonstrated in [79]. The increase in resource 
utilization here is only 21 slices and at least 2 BRAMs for the I/O data buffer. The 
static-communication implementation requires no wrapping and a bus-based network 
or a NoC is assumed. Though there is no wrapping, the network itself would consume 
a significant amount of resources with figures reaching 1669 FFs and 2035 LUTs for 
the switch block (with a 32-bit payload and 16-bit address) [184]. Table 7.2 shows the 
FPGA resource requirement of the hardware tasks, excluding the wrappers. 
Table 7.2: Resources required by the CIRIS tasks 
Task Flip-flops LUTs BRAM36s DSP48s 
STAT 551 833 1 15 
FFT 20,496 18,290 64 132 
ZPD 1,055 9,694 12 32 
Total 22,102 28,817 77 179 
 
 
Figure 7.2 shows the CIRIS tasks implemented on the FPGA fabric. The biggest 
box in the bottom-left part of the FPGA is FFT and the smallest one in the bottom-right 
part is STAT. Note that for both CELOC and ICAP-based schemes tasks are self-
contained within their boundaries, that is, they are free of external interconnections. 
The CAM occupies two different regions on the FPGA. The configuration manager and 
AXI peripherals are located next to the Arm cores in the top-left quadrant, and the DDR 
memory controller is located on the top-right part, close to the FPGA pin blocks to 
access the DDR memory chip. The top-right part also includes some static logic to 
interface with the CIRIS spectrometer and receive the interferogram samples, which 
are stored in the DDR memory. 
The partitioning of the static logic in two locations is done very carefully to 
minimize the number of static routes. However, a significant number of routes is still 
needed to connect both static components in the two sides of the FPGA, as shown in 
Figure 7.2. As a result, the top 6 clock regions cannot be used to configure tasks. This 
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issue could be solved in a custom-made board by connecting the DDR memory chip to 
FPGA pins that are close to the Arm cores, in the top-left quadrant of the chip. This 
would free the entire right part for placing the CIRIS tasks. 
 
Figure 7.2: R3TOS-based CIRIS avionics system 
7.4 CIRIS Avionics Models for Evaluation 
In this study, the data flow controller in the SoC implementation described in [210] is 
assumed to be replaced by a ROS which manages task loading (provided by CAM) and 
inter-task communication. In order to demonstrate the capabilities of the contributions 
of this work, the configuration controller is used to configure the CIRIS tasks while 
inter-task communication is provided by a star-shaped CERANoC network. Reliability 
study is carried out to demonstrate that CELOC provides a better overall system 
reliability when compared to existing inter-task communication methods. Most of the 
existing RC systems use the static routing resources of FPGAs to implement P2P, bus, 
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and NoC structures (see Section 3.4), thereby hampering task relocation. On the other 
hand, the use of the configuration layer for communication highly favours relocation 
but at the expense of task configuration and SEM (see Section 3.4.4). It would be 
interesting to see how CELOC fairs with respect to these two approaches. Therefore, 
CELOC will be compared with a traditional fixed communication approach and an 
ICAP-based communication scheme using three CIRIS avionics models. A few 
simplifying, but nonetheless, practical and carefully-considered assumptions will be 
made along the line. 
For all the models, the assumption is that none can keep multiple PBs of the same 
task. Moreover, a precise representation of the FPGA fabric is ensured by marking off 
regions occupied by static logic as well as hardware primitives such as the ICAP. All 
irregularities in the chip are also considered, including clock region boundaries and 
heterogeneous resource columns. The techniques described in [236][237] are used to 
choose the most optimal synthesis location for the tasks to improve their relocatability. 
That is, the synthesis positions for the tasks are selected not only to maximize the 
number of allowed relocation positions at runtime, but also to minimize overlapping 
among them, as described in [237]. 
7.4.1 Static CIRIS Avionics Model 
In the static CIRIS avionics model, the available area in the chip is distributed into 16 
different slots as shown in Figure 7.3. Tasks are mapped to slots in one-to-one fashion. 
The smallest A-type slots can host only STAT tasks, medium size B-type slots can 
allocate both STAT and ZPD tasks, and the largest C type slots can allocate any of the 
tasks. The most optimistic case in which no static routes go beyond the static region is 
considered. It should be noted that this is not the case in most slotted systems that use 
static communication infrastructures. Besides, the CIRIS controller in [210] does not 
use slots at all. 
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Figure 7.3: Static CIRIS avionics model 
7.4.2 ICAP-Based CIRIS Avionics Model 
Figure 7.4 shows the initial task allocation in the ICAP-based CIRIS avionics model. 
This is also the synthesis location for the tasks. Note that this initial task allocation is 
exactly the same as in the static model to allow a fair comparison between them. At 
runtime, tasks can be relocated to any position on the FPGA where the arrangement of 
the resources matches that in the original synthesis location. 
7.4.3 CELOC CIRIS Avionics Model 
For CELOC, the reconfigurable region is partitioned into circuit regions (CRs) and used 
as nodes. Unlike in the 4-node star network of Section 6.6 that uses a whole clock region 
as node, the CERANoC network here hosts two nodes in a single clock region resulting 
in 15 nodes and one Central Router as shown in Figure 7.5. The versatility of CELOC 
brought about by the variety of clock buffer combinations can be exploited in this 
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BUFG→] for accessing the CERANoC network while those to the inner edges use 
[BUFG→]. It should be noted that the meeting point between the two CRs in a clock 
region is not a fixed one. The tasks are flushed to left and right to access the buffers. As 
such, it is possible for both A- and B-type location pairs to coexist in the clock regions 
on the right of the chip. 
 
Figure 7.4: ICAP-based CIRIS avionics model (initial configuration) 
Meanwhile, it should be noted that the entire right side of the reconfigurable region 
in the target board has no BUFRs and BUFMRs. To allow for a fair comparison, the 
buffers are assumed to be present as they would be in other chips and meanwhile any 
application deploying CELOC would specifically choose a chip that has all or most of 
its clock buffers in place. Nevertheless, if this particular chip were to be used in reality, 
the left and right nodes in the right clock regions can use a horizontal partition rather 
than a vertical one, with each directly accessing a BUFG. However, tasks occupying 
those nodes would have to take flat rectangular shapes and care must be taken to 
properly preserve the other node when one node is been reconfigured. It should recalled 
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partition could have been used in Figure 7.5 that has not been done because the tasks 
are laid out to ensure the lowest fragmentation (the presence of unused resources) 
possible and an optimum relocatability for each task. Note the same starting positions 
are used for the tasks as with the Static and ICAP-based avionics. 
 
Figure 7.5: CELOC-based CIRIS avionics model 
7.5 Inter-Task Communication Evaluation  
Figure 7.6 depicts the data flow between the tasks, which execute concurrently in 
pipeline on the FPGA. Table 7.3 shows the data communication latencies for the three 
avionics models. For the static communication, the latencies are estimated from the 
AXI bus-based latencies in [210]. The results are indicated in the “Static Links” column 
in Table 7.3. 
In the ICAP avionics model, a single BRAM36 is used for each of the IDM and 
ODM (see Figure 3.5 in Section 3.4.4). As a result, the ICAP-based data transfer 
throughput is 7.805 MB/s based on the use of the RMW operation (see Section 4.2.4) 
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BRAM36s but this would have a serious impact on the area utilization. In fact, each 
CIRIS task would need an additional 18 BRAM36s, 9 on the input and 9 on the output. 
This translates to 2 additional BRAM columns for each of the tasks. These columns 
cannot be absorbed into the current RP area coverages. In addition, more non-BRAM 
resources would be wasted as it is in general, impossible to select BRAM-only columns 
and certainly, there are no BRAM-BRAM column pairs. 
 
Figure 7.6: Simplified data flow of the CIRIS avionics 
From Section 6.5.5, the average network speed of CERANoC for the CELOC-
based model is 379.134 MHz, calculated from 70.21% of fBUFR_MAX, where fBUFR_MAX is 
540 MHz for the Kintex-7 at speed grade -2 (see Table 6.7).. Therefore, for the 15-node 
CERANoC clocked at 379.134 MHz, the total network throughput is determined from 
Equation (6.1) as 2,843.505 Mbps (355.44 MB/s) for a 32-bit payload per packet. Each 
node contributes an average of 23.70 MB/s (24,264.58 kB/s) to this total. Note that the 
address field in the packet is still 4 bits. A 4-bit field can address 16 nodes. Since a zero 
address is avoided (refer to Section 6.6.1) and a node in the 16 circuit regions is used 
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CELOC ICAP-Based Static Links 
DDR Memory → ZPD 29,250 1.180 3.574 0.100 
ZPD → STAT-I 18,432 0.744 2.252 0.041 
DDR Memory ↔ STAT-I 65,536 2.644 8.008 0.188 
STAT-I → FFT 18,432 0.744 2.252 0.100 
FFT → STAT-A 32,768 1.322 4.004 0.041 
FFT → STAT-P 32,768 1.322 4.004 0.041 
DDR Memory ↔ STAT-A 65,536 2.644 8.008 0.188 
DDR Memory ↔ STAT-P 65,536 2.644 8.008 0.188 
Total 328,258 13.244 40.11 0.887 
 
Since this is a data processing application where a new interferogram is received 
every 24.8 ms, it is extremely important to meet real-time performance. Note that 
CERANoC requires 13.244 ms to move data for a complete processing of an 
interferogram. This is 3.03x better than an ICAP-based inter-task communication which 
takes up to 40.11 ms, which is already higher than the interval of interferogram arrival. 
Because of the bit-parallel nature of data transfer in the static approach, it requires only 
0.887 ms for communication. 
7.6 Reliability Study  
This study will evaluate the implication of the different communication approaches on 
the reliability of the CIRIS avionics system. Two studies will be carried out, one for 
soft error mitigation evaluation and the other for permanent damage (hard error) 
mitigation evaluation. The performance of each avionics model will be evaluated. 
7.6.1 Soft Error Mitigation Evaluation 
First, the SEM scanning time for each of the task has to be determined using Table 4.15 
from Section 4.5.2. The entire area occupied by each task has to be scanned in each 
SEM cycle. However, since it is impossible to partition the CIRIS tasks to occupy areas 
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spanning only the resources in Table 7.2, it becomes necessary to align the RPs to 
reconfiguration frames spanning columns of CLB-CLB, CLB-BRAM, and CLB-DSP 
pairs (see Section 2.2.2). The resulting area occupation in terms of columns of CLBs, 
BRAMs, and DSPs is presented in Table 7.4 along with the number of frames needed 
for SEM. Note that the BRAMs are not scanned; therefore, the number of SEM frames 
is less than the number of frames occupied by the task. The configuration (CFG) and 
SEM scan times are also included, with a complete SEM scan cycle for all the tasks 
requiring a little over 4 ms. 
Table 7.4: Area overhead of the CIRIS tasks 
Task 







Time (µs) CLB BRAM DSP 
STAT-I 4 1 1 300 172 306.72 175.2 
STAT-A 4 1 1 300 172 306.72 175.2 
STAT-P 4 1 1 300 172 306.72 175.2 
FFT 62 7 9 3,380 2,484 3,417.52 2,510.32 
ZPD 25 2 3 1,240 984 1,256.12 995.32 
Total 99 12 15 5,520 3,984 5,593.8 4,031.24 
 
Table 7.5 summarizes the total required configuration memory access times for all 
the strategies. The configuration times and SEM scan times are the same for all the 
three strategies. The CELOC and ICAP-based strategies incur resource overheads for 
their network adapters. However, these are easily absorbed into the slice usage of the 
tasks themselves and as such, do not increase configuration and SEM overhead. If the 
ICAP’s available time is normalized to the total time (26.81 ms) required by the CIRIS 
application, then it implies that the CELOC-based avionics model has an occupation of 
the ICAP at 64.12% (2.79x) less for the CIRIS application when compared to the ICAP-
based model. 
The simplifying assumption is made that there is frequent need for reconfiguring 
(relocating) the tasks to improve reliability by wear levelling (see Section 3.2.3 for a 
discussion on wear levelling). For the ICAP-based model, all the operations can only 
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be done in sequence using the single available ICAP. Therefore, if we assume that the 
system operations always follow the cycle of task (re)configuration, SEM, and inter-
task communication, then it becomes clear that one of these critical functions would 
suffer. The full SEM cycle scan (based on the selective-area scanning introduced in 
Section 4.3.2) is 4.03 ms. If this is taken as 99% as recommended by Xilinx to ensure 
reliability [187], then only 40.71 µs is available for the other functions, that is, 
configuration in the case of CELOC and Static Bus/NoC CIRIS avionics; and both 
configuration and communication for the ICAP-based model. Communication alone in 
the ICAP-based CIRIS avionics requires 40.11 ms, which is 985x of 40.71 µs. 
Assuming inter-task communication cannot be delayed for the reason of another 
reliability-related factor, that is, real-time deadlines, then either SEM or reconfiguration 
would suffer. 
Table 7.5: ICAP bandwidth utilization of the CIRIS tasks 
System Model 
ICAP Time Required (ms) 
Total % of Total 
CFG SEM Comm. 
CELOC 
5.59 4.03 
0 9.62 19.33% 
ICAP-Based 40.11 49.78 (x5.17) 80.65% 
Static Bus/NoC 0 9.62 19.33% 
Total 49.78 ms 
 
7.6.2 Hard Error Mitigation Evaluation 
For the purpose of comparison, the resilience to permanent damages of the three 
avionics models can be evaluated by estimating how many such damages each model 
can tolerate before failing. A good estimate can be obtained for each avionics model by 
counting how many locations each of the CIRIS tasks can be relocated to while 
maintaining full communication access as permanent damages emerge. For a fair 
comparison, it is assumed that none of the avionics models can keep multiple PBs of 
the same task. If a region occupied by a task fails, online relocation is used to configure 
it somewhere else. Table 7.6 indicates the performance metrics of the avionics models. 
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The number of overlapping locations (#LOC) for each task is reported. The bigger a 
task is, the more prone it is to being hit by an error requiring it to be relocated. This is 
because the task occupies a larger area. This is taken into account by normalizing the 
largest task’s size to 1, and obtaining size factors that are multiplied with #LOC to get 
a fairer result for the relocation (RELOC) quality which reflects the reliability of the 
model. 
Referring to the Static avionics model in Figure 7.3, the provision for relocation 
involves activating another instance of a failed task only in the location determined at 
compile time. There is no possibility for space-multiplexing the tasks to share chip area. 
Therefore, once a task fails, another instance can be used in its place until all the 
instances for any one task has failed, at which point the system fails. The FFT only has 
3 locations to use while the ZPD has 4. All the a-type slots are shared 3 each by the 
STAT tasks. 
On the other hand, both the CELOC and ICAP-based avionics model can withstand 
more damages since tasks can be relocated to any position on the FPGA where there is 
a matching arrangement of the resources. The sheer size of the FFT task means that it 
can only use one extra location in addition to the initial 3. It can use the location 
occupied by A-1 to A-8, whereas the ZPD can use its own 4 locations and an additional 
8 from the left clock regions in the reconfigurable region. 




Static Avionics ICAP Avionics CELOC Avionics 
#LOCs RELOC #LOCs RELOC #LOCs RELOC 
STAT-I 0.089 3 0.267 30 2.67 30 2.67 
STAT-A 0.089 3 0.267 30 2.67 30 2.67 
STAT-P 0.089 3 0.267 30 2.67 30 2.67 
FFT 1.000 3 3.000 4 4.00 4 4.00 
ZPD 0.367 4 1.468 12 4.40 12 4.40 
Total 16 5.269 106 16.41 106 16.41 
Comparison x1 x1 x6.63 x3.11 x6.63 x3.11 
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For the CELOC and the ICAP-based CIRIS avionics, the ZPD task can use up to 
12 locations. However, this number could have been 8 for CELOC considering that by 
being closer to the left inner edge of the clock regions, the ZPD tasks would have been 
routed to access BUFGs for communication. However, note that the CELOC network 
adapter can be used such that the CE connection to the clock buffers is effected in 
runtime by simply activating the required PIPs. This does not require an expensive 
online clock routing as the buffer configuration needed for each CR can be laid offline 
by using dummy loads (see Section 3.2.5) [154]. 
Although there is an unavoidable mutually-exclusive relationship between the A-, 
B-, and C-type slots in every row for CELOC. For instance, if the C-2 slot is occupied 
by the FFT task, then an A-type slot would have to be sacrificed in order to access 
BUFMRs and BUFRs on the right of the clock region. That is, all the three cannot be 
placed in a single row at the same time. Such a scenario does not occur with the ICAP-
based avionics. However, this is negligible compared to the immense overall system 
reliability enabled by CELOC, especially in terms of soft error mitigation, which is the 
prevalent failure mode in reconfigurable hardware systems. 
Overall, for the CIRIS data processing, CELOC proves to be better for a holistic 
approach to reliability. Indeed, in space-grade systems like the CIRIS, system reliability 
is crucial. While process-based radiation hardening can be used to improve reliability 
in a static CIRIS avionics implementation, and a configuration-layer-based 
communication used to enable a 3.11x tolerance to permanent damages, CELOC is a 
cheaper and a more reliable option as it enables tolerance to both soft and hard errors 
in COTS reconfigurable device. In fact, compared to the non-slotted static 
implementation of the CIRIS controller in [210], CELOC offers a reliability 
improvement of 16.41x. While a much rigorous testing like fault injection analysis 
would give a clearer picture, CELOC can still be expected to outperform both static and 
ICAP-based communication schemes in terms of reliability. 
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7.7 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter a case study application has been presented to demonstrate the 
advantage of adapting clock buffers and nets for on-chip communication. The 
evaluation drew a case study from a NASA/JPL spectrometer data processing 
controller. The stages of this data processing controller were used as tasks and 
configuration, communication, and soft error mitigation times were determined. The 
application highlighted that CELOC is 3.03x faster when compared to a configuration–
layer-based communication. However, as expected, it is slower when compared to a 
static implementation. What sets CELOC apart from the static communication 
architecture is that it supports relocation inherently. While the ICAP-based model is 
able to relocate the tasks more freely compared to CELOC, from a holistic system 








Chapter 8  
Conclusions and Future Work 
The core of this thesis proposed and implemented novel methods and strategies that 
could serve as the frameworks for reliable, high-performance, available, efficient, and 
secure real-time reconfigurable computing. The observed trend in computing is the 
change in paradigm from processor-only computation to hardware-assisted accelerated 
computing, where software processes running on a CPU are accelerated by offloading 
compute-intensive and time-critical tasks to hardware. The prominent deployed 
hardware solution is the FPGA, where hardware tasks (circuits) are dynamically 
managed by a Reconfigurable Operating System (ROS) on behalf of a host software 
operating system. The key system services or frameworks in a ROS are task 
configuration and inter-task communication. However, in order to ensure system 
reliability, especially for the high-end applications like aerospace, military, defence, 
and nuclear that now use the FPGA, these services are required to be real-time, efficient, 
and secure. These two key services have been the subject of this thesis and the core 
contributions of this work have been presented in Chapters 4 through 6 while Chapter 
7 evaluated the proposed frameworks with a single application by drawing a case study 
from the NASA/JPL’s CIRIS instrument. 
8.1 Summary, Limitations, and Concluding Remarks 
Chapter 4 presented a high-performance and reliability-centric configuration memory 
access controller with key features for task management in reconfigurable systems. In 
the light of the aims and objectives specified in Section 1.2, the proposed configuration 
controller has proven to be both resource- and time-efficient. It saves up to 71% area 
and has 30% less configuration latency in comparison to state-of-the-art 
implementations. In addition, with an average raw throughput of 380 MB/s, which is 
very close to the theoretical maximum of 400 MB/s, the controller has demonstrated a 
very high performance. Moreover, the fact that configuration errors are monitored and 
8 
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provisions made for runtime correction, where possible, implies that the controller is 
able to improve the availability of the device for high-end applications like datacentres 
and aerospace. Related to this, the provision of soft error detection and correction 
functionalities will be invaluable in devices that operate in the harsh environment of 
space and nuclear decommissioning. Indeed, based on the observation with the 
NASA/JPL CIRIS data processing case study, the controller can mitigate errors at up 
to 74% less time compared to the state-of-the-art vendor SEM IP. 
The runtime relocation of circuits is a key mechanism for improving the reliability 
of reconfigurable devices. However, the vendor bitstream format for encrypted 
bitstreams hampers the relocation of circuits by including the frame address as 
cyphertext in the bitstream. The frame address specifies the location where a circuit 
should be configured and for relocation, this needs to be manipulated in plain format. 
In Chapter 5, a completely new format for encrypted bitstreams was proposed. This 
relied on the fact that a plain frame address can be loaded on-chip in advance of the 
frame data that defines the functionality of the circuit being configured. The concept 
was thus termed Advance Task Address Loading (ATAL). An algorithm was developed 
(with a Windows-based GUI designed) for parsing a partial bitstream generated by 
Vivado and formatting it to remove the frame addresses and splitting the bitstream into 
multiple parts which can be loaded separately after the on-chip loading of runtime-
generated plain frames addresses. ATAL has shown promising results by 
outperforming other strategies for encrypted partial bitstream relocation, providing a 
far more time-efficient relocation with very small area overhead. In fact, the only area 
overhead was that of the configuration controller, which was needed whether or not 
ATAL was used. As such, ATAL can be considered to have no resource overhead.  In 
order to load the specially-formatted ATAL bitstream, a unique configuration controller 
was developed. 
The most important limitation of the controllers developed in Chapter 4 and 
Chapter 5 is the configuration speed, which is due to the limited speed of the 
configuration interface of the device used in the prototype. While the logic resources 
and the FPGA in general can operate at clock frequencies that are a few hundreds of 
MHz, the configuration interface is limited to 100 MHz. Similarly, the ICAP also posed 
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a limitation in the ATAL configuration controller. Apart from the limited speed of 100 
MHz, the ICAP only supports bitstream loading though its 8-bit bus when encryption 
is used. This means that the configuration latency for encrypted bitstreams is in general, 
quadrupled. Moreover, when an encrypted bitstream is being loaded it is not 
straightforward to know when configuration has been concluded, making the design of 
the controller more complicated by having to keep track of how many words has been 
loaded. 
Certainly, the configuration interface in FPGAs and the provision of security 
should not undermine the high performance that has come to be expected of hardware. 
As a result, some of these issues have been addressed to some extent in the latest device 
families. The ICAP in the UltraScale architecture can be clocked at up to 200 MHz and 
in fact, it only supports the 32-bit interface, even with encryption used, and has extra 
signal ports for configuration monitoring. It would be interesting therefore, to port these 
controllers to the new architecture for an improvement on an already impressive 
performance. 
While the controllers have been targeted at the Xilinx 7 series architecture, only 
minor modifications are needed in order to adapt them for use in the UltraScale 
architecture. For devices from Altera and other FPGA manufacturers, the same 
methodologies can be followed – build a custom control structure around the 
configuration interface to deliver reliability-enabling functionalities. For ATAL’s 
configuration controller, an insight would have to be gained into the encryption and 
authentication scheme adopted by the manufacturer. However, the most important 
aspect is to be able to leave the frame address out of the encrypted portion of the 
configuration bitstream. 
In Chapter 6, a new mechanism for on-chip communication was advanced. 
Motivated by the need to provide a dynamic communication support for relocatable 
circuits, the concept involved the adaptation of clock buffers and nets in a typical FPGA 
for linking nodes in a NoC. This approach to communication was characterized and 
used to demonstrate relocation. However, because of the serial nature of the data 
transmission, the overall throughput of a network so formed is limited by the maximum 
usable operating frequency that does not violate setup and hold times. In addition, the 
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fact that a transmitter needs access to the CE pin has restricted relocation of tasks to 
clock-region-sized partitions in the prototype implementation. If a task is not big 
enough, there could be many unused resources in the region. One way to resolve this is 
to use a multiplexing approach to the connection to the CE pins of the buffers in order 
to allow multiple tasks to share the same CE. This will ensure that a small task placed 
in a clock region does not prevent other tasks from using the same region. This would 
reduce the link bandwidth available to each task. On the other hand, a better approach 
would be to have multiple horizontal tasks in the same region accessing BUFHs to form 
a mesh network. 
Moreover, one limitation in the present implementation of CELOC/CERANoC 
arises from the limited number of clock buffers, limiting the network throughput. This 
could possibly be alleviated in newer chips like the UltraScale, which have more clock 
buffers. This is worth investigating in the future. 
8.2 Recommendations for Future Work 
Having designed and implemented the supporting infrastructures for reliable real-time 
reconfigurable computing, the next stage, which could serve as future work would be 
the development of a truly reliable RC system. This would aim at bringing all the 
mechanisms advanced in this thesis together into a complete system architecture for 
RC, with a more holistic approach given to reliability, real-time processing, high 
performance, availability, efficiency, and security. Shown in Figure 8.1 are key system 
components that will be needed for effecting the suggested system for future work. 
The system is proposed to be made up of two major sub-systems: a Software 
Microkernel (SWµK) and a Hardware Microkernel (HWµK). The SWµK would 
contain the Main CPU for executing software tasks and a Scheduler and an Allocator, 
which can also be implemented in hardware. The HWµK would use the reconfigurable 
fabric to implement system managers and provide a chip area for placing hardware 
tasks. 
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Figure 8.1: System architecture for reliable reconfigurable computing 
The key components of the recommended system and other relevant features are 
discussed below: 
 The core of this system would be a Configuration Manager based on the 
controller described and implemented in Chapter 4, providing salient system 
functionalities that include task loading, task deallocation, task replication for 
TMR implementation, device error diagnosis, and SEM.  
 Inter-task communication and synchronization would be provided in the 
clock routing layer through the instrumentality of the clock buffers and nets 
in an FPGA. The methods advanced in Chapter 6 would be highly relevant 
for this, especially for providing dynamic communication support for PBR.  
 A Communication Manager would provide communication support at the 
system level, bridging synchronizations between the hardware tasks and 
parent software processes executing on a Main CPU. 
 A Scheduler, which determines the order of task execution would also be 
needed. Depending on the targeted application, the scheduling may be based 
on Earliest Deadline First (EDF) [188], which is a popular scheduling 
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 To find a suitable region for a hardware task on the chip, an Allocator would 
be necessary. With considerations given to the reduction of chip area 
fragmentation, methods like those proposed in [237], [238] and [239] can be 
used. A Security Manager would cater for both task- and system-level 
security using the approaches developed in Chapter 5. 
8.2.1 Traditional Slotted Reconfigurable Systems 
In a traditional partially reconfigurable system, each reconfigurable circuit is 
synthesized using resources exclusively contained within a predefined rectangular 
region in the FPGA. That FPGA region is named as “reconfigurable slot”. Several 
reconfigurable circuits can be mapped to the same slot at design time. At runtime, it is 
possible to switch between the different partial bitstreams associated to the 
reconfigurable circuits to change the functionality implemented in the FPGA slots [37]. 
Therefore, slotted reconfigurable systems exhibit coarse granularity defined by the slots 
in which the FPGA is divided. 
Two aspects need to be considered here. First, in addition to the configuration 
information for the FPGA resources contained in the slots, partial bitstreams also 
include configuration information associated with static routes that cross the slots 
connecting resources located in non-reconfigurable FPGA regions. FPGA vendor tools 
ensure that these static routes are always preserved in all generated partial bitstreams. 
Second, Partition Pins (PartPins) are used to preserve the interfaces of the slots in all 
possible configurations [37]. PartPins are LUTs inserted by the build tool to connect 
resources located in both reconfigurable and static FPGA regions. Therefore, PartPins 
shape the physical boundaries of slots, which are decided at design time and remain 
fixed at runtime. 
8.2.2 Towards Slotless Reconfigurable Systems 
Partial bitstreams can be relocated to different FPGA regions where resources are 
arranged in the same exact way as in the reconfigurable slots for which the partial 
bitstreams were originally generated (refer to Section 3.2.4). Note that this can be done 
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by changing the configuration frame FAR addresses in the partial bitstreams to refer to 
the target relocation regions. 
However, this process is not currently supported by any FPGA vendor tool and 
therefore, there are some limitations as pointed out in Section 3.2.4. The root problem 
of this is the use of static routing resources for inter-task communication (see Section 
3.1). While a recent ROS, in the name of R3TOS manages to avoid the use of static 
interconnections, by using the configuration infrastructure of the FPGA for inter-task 
data transfer, it risks upsetting the same reliability for which it is developed. Other 
critical services (e.g., SEM and task loading) relying on configuration are impaired, as 
the configuration interface is a single resource that needs to be shared by these critical 
system services. 
8.2.3 Partition Architecture for Reliable Computing 
To avoid static routes, a partition architecture shown in Figure 8.2 can be used for 
placing tasks in the proposed system. In this architecture, intra-clock region 
communication is enabled by BUFHs while inter-clock region communication is 
achieved through a combination of BUFMRs and BUFRs. For generalization, it should 
be noted that the indicated clock buffers can be easily replaced with equivalent 
primitives in other FPGAs and PLDs, whether from Xilinx or from other manufacturers. 
To avoid static routes, RePARC does not rely on the general routing for inter-
communication and synchronization, save for a single wire used for accessing the CE 
of a clock buffer. Hence, it keeps the FPGA’s reconfigurable area generally empty, that 
is, free of any partition boundaries (i.e., PartPins) and static routes. Inter-task 
communication and synchronization are carried out through the FPGA's clock routing 
layer, as described in Chapter 6. In this context, task allocation and deallocation are 
considerably accelerated, as there is no need to preserve any static routes in the target 
and source positions when relocation is being performed. In fact, task deallocation 
simply consists in blanking the whole content of the corresponding frames, which can 
be done very quickly using bitstream compression DPR commands. 
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Figure 8.2: Partition architecture showing slots interconnected by clock buffers (represented 
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Appendix A ICAP Access Command Templates 
For the various operations of the ICAP controller, configuration command packets are 
kept inside the IBUF as templates and are written to the ICAP along with the 
configuration frame data. The commands are based on the registers in Table 2.3. Details 
on how to compose read and write commands packets have been presented in Section 
2.1.2. The benefit of using templates is that the commands are generic and thus 
reusable, minimizing external storage requirement as incoming bitstreams do not have 
to include the commands already in these templates.  
A.1 Operation Starting Sequence (OSS) 
Configuration commands and data are sent to the internal configuration logic only after 
it has been synchronized by sending a special Synchronization Word (0xAA995566) 
through the ICAP interface. The purpose of this is to enable the alignment of the 
configuration data with the internal configuration logic. The OSS sequence of Figure 
A.1 is used to achieve this. After the synchronization, the CRC register is reset by 
writing 0x00000007 to the CMD register 0x30008001 to restart CRC check coverage. 
Figure A.2 is a waveform showing the OSS in action. The waveform shows the 
transition of the ICAP’s output from 0xFFFFFFD9 to 0xFFFFFFDB indicating that the 
configuration interface has been synchronized. 
 











Write 1 word to the CMD register
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Figure A.2: Waveform showing the synchronization of the configuration interface 
A.2 Configuration Frame Readback Template (CFRT) 
To perform a readback operation, the IFSM fetches and uses the CFRT template (see 
Figure A.3) at the address RBK_TEMPLT_ADDR (0x007). In order to read from the 
CMEM, the RCFG command must be used and a frame address specified. The user is 
expected to set the FAR value at template address 0x00E. The user content in the LUT-
based RAMs could have changed. If a readback operation is performed without 
masking LUTs, the read back frame data would reflect the user content rather than the 
original CMEM values. If this is not a desired behavior, the LUTs can be masked by 
using the GLUTMASK_B bit in the CTL0 register. In fact, this is the default setting. 
However, the user can control the masking by writing to the template address 0x00A. 
 











Write 1 word to the MASK register
Permit writing to the GLUTMASK_B bit
Write 1 word to the CTL0 register
GLUTMASK_B = x
Write 1 word to the CMD register
RCFG command
Write 1 word to the FAR register
FAR value = xxxxxxxx
Type 1 read frame data from FDRO (no word)
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A.3 Configuration Frame Write Template (CFWT) 
CMEM writing is done by writing a number of contiguous frames to the FDRI register 
preceded by issuing the WCFG command (0x30008001 followed by 0x00000001). 
Every write to the CMEM requires a valid device ID, which must be loaded into the 
IDCODE register. This ID is inserted in the bitstream generated by the design tool. The 
user should specify this ID at address 0x019 in the IBUF (see the CFWT template in 
Figure A.4). The user can also set the GLUTMASK_B bit at address 0x015. In the basic 
form of configuration, every FDRI register loading must be finished with the loading 
of a pad frame (101 dummy words) to flush the internal pipeline of the configuration 
logic. 
 
Figure A.4: Configuration frame write template 
The CFWT template does not include commands for loading the FAR and FDRI 
registers because these commands are expected to be included in the bitstream that is 
being configured, especially since the user may be interested in performing PBR, in 
which case the original frame address is not of great significance. As such, the task 
bitstream supplied for (re)configuration has to be in the format presented in Figure A.5 
and buffered in the IBUF starting at address 0x073. The preamble and postamble of the 
bitstream are generally catered for by the OSS and the OES respectively. Nevertheless, 
additional setup commands not included in the OSS can be added before the 











Write 1 word to the MASK register
Permit writing to the GLUTMASK_B bit




Write 1 word to the IDCODE register
IDCODE value = xxxxxxxx













_________________________________________________________________ Appendix A 
 234 
after uploading the frame data. It should be noted that a typical bitstream has a 
multiplicity of frame addresses and the IFSM has been implemented to handle this. 
 
Figure A.5: Configuration command and frame data format for task bitstreams 
A.4 Multiple Frame Write Template (MFWT) 
The MFWT template provides the commands and parameter placeholders for using the 
multiple frame write feature of the FPGA. In the basic form of configuration based on 
the CFWT template, a pad frame is incurred for every write to the CMEM. However, 
with the MFW functionality, the pad frame is not needed, though the configuration 
commands and steps are more involving. However, there is an overall benefit of lower 
configuration time overhead. Meanwhile, the MFW is expected to be done frame-by-
frame. This means that for a large bitstream, the traditional configuration method would 
be better. It should also be noted that though the MFW is intended for writing the same 
frame data to multiple frame locations especially for bitstream compression, it as well 
allows a single frame location to be written. Figure A.6 shows the MFW template. The 






Write 1 word to the FAR register
FAR value = xxxxxxxx
No operation word
Type 1 write to the FDRI (no word)
Type 2 write xxxxxxx words to the FDRI
IBUF_DATA_ADDR 0x073
Upload xxxxxxx frame data words to the FDRI
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Figure A.6: Multiple frame write template 
 
CFG_TEMPLT_ADDR 0x012
Upload 101 frame data words to the FDRI








Write 1 word to the CMD register
MFW command
No operation word
Write 8 words to the MFW register
Dummy word 0
Dummy words 1 to 6
Dummy word 7
Loop on the next 7 words for (NUM_OF_FRAMES - 1) times





No operation word 0
No operation words 1 to 6
No operation word 7




No operation word 0
No operation words 1 to 6







Write 1 word to the FAR register
FAR value = xxxxxxxx (CONFIG_FAR_2)
Write 4 words to the MFW register
Dummy word 0








Write 1 word to the FAR register
FAR value = xxxxxxxx (CONFIG_FAR_1)
No operation word
Type 1 write to the FDRI (no word)
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A.5 Configuration Frame Blanking Template (CFBT) 
The frame blanking uses the MFW feature. As such, it relies heavily on the MFW 
template as shown in Figure A.7.In the use of the CFBT, 101 blank words are not stored 
in the IBUF. Only a single blank word (0x00000000) is kept at address 
BLK_DATA_ADDR address of 0x059 and written 101 times when needed. The 
template requires two parameters, the starting frame address (START_FAR) and the 
number of frames to write at addresses 0x04A and 0x04D. In addition, since the CFBT 
is basically a frame write template, the correct IDCODE value should be specified at 
address 0x046. 
  
Figure A.7: Configuration frame blanking template 
A.6 Operation Ending Sequence (OES) 
In this sequence (see Figure A.8), the GLUTMASK_B bit is restored to the default 
value, which allows the masking of changeable memory cell readback values. This is 
done regardless of GLUTMASK_B’s user setting in the OSS sequence. The next 
command issued is for resetting the CRC register. At this point in the bitstream loading, 
the configuration logic expects a precomputed CRC value that it can compare with the 
one calculated while loading the bitstream data. However, because some of the 


















Write 1 word to the IDCODE register
IDCODE value = xxxxxxxx
Write 1 word to the CMD register
WCFG command
Write 1 word to the FAR register
FAR value = xxxxxxxx (START_FAR)
No operation word
Write 101 words to the FDRI
MFWT
xxxxxxxx
Use the multiple frame write template
xxxxxxxx = number of frames to blank0x04D
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rendering the precomputed CRC void, resetting the CRC register is necessary. 
Meanwhile, to restore the bitstream CRC protection, a CRC-32 circuit can easily be 
used to recompute the CRC on-chip but this has not been implemented in this work. 
The last command in the OES sequence is the desynchronization of the 
configuration interface by writing 0x0000000D to the CMD register. Each time the 
configuration interface is desynchronized two NOOP words must be written to flush 
the internal packet buffer. 
 











Write 1 word to the MASK register
Permit writing to the GLUTMASK_B bit
Write 1 word to the CTL0 register
GLUTMASK_B = 0
Write 1 word to the CMD register
RCRC command (Reset the CRC register)













Appendix B ICAP Access Operation Waveforms 
B.1 Readback (RBK) Operation 
Figure B.1 is a waveform showing a successful readback operation. The first two 
icap_en pulses indicate temporary disabling of data loading while the IFSM determines 
the sequences and templates to load, the first pulse being for OSS and the second for 
CFRT. The last two pulses are for switching the ICAP from write to read and then from 
read to write, the last writing being for the loading the OES. Note should also be taken 
of how the pad frame (101 instances of 0x00000000) is discarded by fixing 
ibuf_addr_pntr at 0x073 for 101 clock cycles. In addition, it should be noticed that the 
configuration interface is successfully desynchronized (icap_output becomes 
0xFFFFFFD9) after the operation. 
 
Figure B.1: Waveform showing a readback operation 
B.2 Configuration (CFG) Operation 
Figure B.2 shows the handover from the CFWT to the user-specified uploaded data 
during a CFG operation. It should be noted that the ICAP is disabled to carry out this 
process. Figure B.3 shows the detection of a FAR loading command (0x30002001) and 
the subsequent modification of the frame address during CFG operation. It should be 
noted that the loading is paused by only two clock cycles during which a new FAR 
value is computed. An internal signal (en_data_ifsm_to_icap) is used to force the 
writing of the newly calculated FAR value.  
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Figure B.2: Waveform showing the handover from the CFWT template to the user data 
 
Figure B.3: Waveform showing frame address detection and modification 
B.3 Read-Modify-Write (RMW) Operation 
Figure B.4 is a waveform showing the read-modify-write of a BRAM content frame. 
Notice the automatic switching from reading to writing (icap_rw_en goes from 1 to 0). 
B.4 Blanking (BLK) Operation 
Figure B.5 gives an example of the BLK operation on 3 contiguous frames with frame 
addresses 0x00800101 to 0x00800103. Note the two pulses on the 
en_data_ifsm_to_icap internal signal, which are used to write internally-generated FAR 
values to the ICAP. Note that the incremented FAR values are determined ahead of 
when they are needed. As a result, data loading does not stall waiting for the FAR 
calculation. Note also that the ibuf_addr_pntr does not change during the writing of the 
blank word (0x00000000). This is because the blank word is kept in the IBUF at address 
0x059 and written iteratively for 101 times, thereby saving 100 memory spaces in the 
IBUF. 
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Figure B.4: Waveform showing the RMW operation. Notice the switch from readback to 
writing at the cursor 
 
Figure B.5: Waveform showing a blanking operation 
B.5 Register Read (RGR) Operation 
An example of the RGR operation being used to read the device IDCODE is shown in 
Figure B.6. In this example, the register address is 0b01100 (see Table 2.3) and the 
RGR command is therefore 0x28018001. The IDCODE of the used device is correctly 
read back as 0x0362D093. 
 
Figure B.6: RGR operation being used to read the device IDCODE 
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B.6 Abort (ABT) Operation 
Figure B.7 is a captured waveform that shows the successful abort of a readback 
operation and the return of the FSM and the ICAP interface to a stable state, ready for 
another operation. A corresponding CFG configuration abort is shown in Figure B.8. 
When an abort is in progress, the bit 4 of the unswapped ICAP’s output should read ‘0’ 
[47]. After icap_rw_en is toggled (changed to 0 during a readback operation) in Figure 
B.7, icap_output[7:0] becomes 0xD1. If this is swapped, it gives 0x8B. The 4th bit in 
0x8B is a ‘0’, confirming the ABT operation is correctly performed. Notice that the 
device is eventually desynchronized by the abort process. To resume configuration or 
readback after an ABT operation, the configuration interface is resynchronized by a 
new operation which loads the OSS sequence. 
 
Figure B.7: Waveform showing the successful abort of an RBK operation 
 
Figure B.8: Waveform showing the successful abort of a CFG operation 
B.7 SEM Operation Validation 
To validate the SEM operation, a frame (at address 0x00000400) is read back and the 
10th bit of the 35th word is flipped and the frame written back by using the CWR (See 
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Section 4.3.3 where a system-level approach to fault injection analysis is presented). 
Access to the IBUF to perform this is gained via a VIO connected to the IFSM’s control 
interface and this is the same for all the waveform snapshots in this work. Figure B.9 
presents a waveform of the SEM operation in action. A single-bit error is correctly 
detected at the 10th bit of word 35 as indicated by the internal signals syn_bit_addr and 
syn_word. The ecc_error_far port also correctly points to the offending FAR address. 
 
Figure B.9: Waveform showing the detection of a single-bit error by the SEM operation 
Figure B.10 shows the correction of the flipped bit while the frame is being written 
back to the CMEM. As shown, the data from the IBUF (data_ibuf_to_ifsm) is 
0x00000400 (35th word with a flipped bit in the 10th position). The icap_input, 
however, has been corrected to 0x00000000. Notice the en_sem_flip_bit internal signal 
pulse that controls the flipping combinatorially without stalling the frame data loading. 
A reissue of the SEM operation does not detect any error. 
The same process carried out for the single-bit error is done for a double-bit error. 
In this case, the error cannot be corrected and is simply reported on the ecc_mbu_error 
port as shown in Figure B.11. 
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Figure B.10: Waveform showing the correction of an SEU by the SEM operation 
 
Figure B.11: Waveform showing a multi-bit error detection by the SEM operation 
B.8 Configuration Error Monitoring and Recovery 
Figure B.12 shows the detection of a configuration error triggered by deliberately 
loading the CRC register with an incorrect precomputed value using the CWR 
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operation. Notice the transition of the ICAP output’s least significant byte from 0xDB 
to 0xDA, and finally to 0xD8, signifying that the configuration interface has been 
desynchronized after an error detection (see Table 4.7). An internal error_detected 
signal is used to trigger the IFSM into action.  In Figure B.13, the configuration 
interface is resynchronized by the IFSM (0xD8 changes to 0xDA) but the error still 
persists. To prevent the resync process from clearing a CRC error, the RCRC command 
in the OSS (see Figure A.1 in Appendix A) is avoided by using only the first three 
words of the OSS. Notice also that the STAT register read command (0x2800E001) to 
determine the source of error. 
 
Figure B.12: Waveform showing configuration error detection 
 
Figure B.13: Waveform showing the resynchronization of the configuration interface after 
configuration error detection 
In Figure B.14, the STAT register value is read back and the icntrlr_err signal is 
asserted to alert the user. Notice that the ibuf_addr_pntr reflects the fact that the value 
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read has been written to the IBUF_DATA_ADDR at 0x073. The user can read this 
location to determine the source of error and act accordingly. The readback STAT 
register value of 0x46107DFD has bit 0 as a ‘1’ correctly indicating that a CRC error 
has occurred. 
 
Figure B.14: Waveform showing the STAT register value and the eventual assertion of the 





Appendix C Splixbit ICAP Controller Waveforms 
Figure C.1 shows that Splixbit hardware’s IFSM parsing the global preamble of an 
ATAL-formatted bitstream. Once the number of body parts has been decoded as 2, the 
IFSM requires the setting of the first FAR value by asserting the set_new_far port. Once 
the new FAR value is available (new_far_avlbl pulsed), the frame address 
(0x00420000) is registered and written in plain format ahead of the encrypted frame 
data (see Figure C.2). The number of encrypted bytes to load after the plain FAR writing 
is retrieved from the DWC as 26,976 (see Figure C.3). 
 
Figure C.1: Waveform showing how the Splixbit’s IFSM parses the global preamble and 
retrieves the plain frame address 
 
Figure C.2: Waveform showing the online loading of a plain frame address in advance of 
encrypted frame data 
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Appendix D CONS Waveforms 
Figure D.1 and Figure D.2 are respective waveforms showing the non-addressable and 
address-inclusive modes of the CONS encoding and decoding. Because the use_addr 
signal is driven low in Figure D.1, the addr_rcvd port on the decoder remains zero all 
through the decoding as against in Figure D.2, where it changes to reflect the received 
plain unencoded address before the decoding begins. The 4-bit address 0b1010 
accompanies the packet 0x10900016 and is received before the serial encoded packet 
is received. 
 
Figure D.1: Waveform showing the non-addressable encoding and decoding of packets 
 
Figure D.2: Waveform showing the addressable encoding and decoding of packets 
